Political orientation and dominance: Are people on the political right more dominant?

2016 ◽  
Vol 94 ◽  
pp. 113-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jana Grina ◽  
Robin Bergh ◽  
Nazar Akrami ◽  
Jim Sidanius
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Stefaniak ◽  
Michael Jeremy Adam Wohl ◽  
Constantine Sedikides ◽  
Anouk Smeekes ◽  
Tim Wildschut

Collective nostalgia is a bittersweet emotion that reflects sentimental longing for valued aspects of the past of one’s group. Given that conservatism is typically associated with a general desire to preserve the societal status quo or return society to its traditional way of being, nostalgia has been theorized to be characteristic of those on the political right (i.e., conservatives). In the current work, we proposed and tested the hypothesis that collective nostalgia is experienced by both conservatives and liberals, but the content of their nostalgizing differs. Across three studies in three socio-political contexts—United States (Study 1, MTurk, N = 352), Canada (Study 2, student sample, N = 154), and England (Study 3, online panel, N = 2,345)—we found that both conservatives and liberals experienced collective nostalgia for a more homogenous and open society. However, conservatives experienced more homogeneity-focused collective nostalgia, whereas liberals experienced more openness-focused collective nostalgia. Replicating previous findings, homogeneity-focused nostalgia emerged as a positive, whereas openness-focused nostalgia emerged as a negative, predictor of intergroup attitudes. The results have both theoretical and practical significance for understanding political attitudes and behaviors. To the point, variance in the conservative and liberal political agendas is, in part, a function of a difference in their respective predisposition to nostalgize about and thus desire the return of a particular aspect of the in-group’s past.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel ◽  
Julia Emmer

The 2016 European Union (EU) refugee crisis exposed a fundamental distinction in political attitudes between the political left and right. Previous findings suggest, however, that besides political orientation, ideological strength (i.e., political extremism) is also relevant to understand such distinctive attitudes. Our study reveals that the political right is more anxious, and the political left experiences more self-efficacy, about the refugee crisis. At the same time, the political extremes—at both sides of the spectrum—are more likely than moderates to believe that the solution to this societal problem is simple. Furthermore, both extremes experience more judgmental certainty about their domain-specific knowledge of the refugee crisis, independent of their actual knowledge. Finally, belief in simple solutions mediated the relationship between ideology and judgmental certainty, but only among political extremists. We conclude that both ideological orientation and strength matter to understand citizens’ reactions to the refugee crisis.


2006 ◽  
pp. 54-75
Author(s):  
Klaus Peter Friedrich

Facing the decisive struggle between Nazism and Soviet communism for dominance in Europe, in 1942/43 Polish communists sojourning in the USSR espoused anti-German concepts of the political right. Their aim was an ethnic Polish ‘national communism’. Meanwhile, the Polish Workers’ Party in the occupied country advocated a maximum intensification of civilian resistance and partisan struggle. In this context, commentaries on the Nazi judeocide were an important element in their endeavors to influence the prevailing mood in the country: The underground communist press often pointed to the fate of the murdered Jews as a warning in order to make it clear to the Polish population where a deficient lack of resistance could lead. However, an agreed, unconditional Polish and Jewish armed resistance did not come about. At the same time, the communist press constantly expanded its demagogic confrontation with Polish “reactionaries” and accused them of shared responsibility for the Nazi murder of the Jews, while the Polish government (in London) was attacked for its failure. This antagonism was intensified in the fierce dispute between the Polish and Soviet governments after the rift which followed revelations about the Katyn massacre. Now the communist propaganda image of the enemy came to the fore in respect to the government and its representatives in occupied Poland. It viewed the government-in-exile as being allied with the “reactionaries,” indifferent to the murder of the Jews, and thus acting ultimately on behalf of Nazi German policy. The communists denounced the real and supposed antisemitism of their adversaries more and more bluntly. In view of their political isolation, they coupled them together, in an undifferentiated manner, extending from the right-wing radical ONR to the social democrats and the other parties represented in the underground parliament loyal to the London based Polish government. Thereby communist propaganda tried to discredit their opponents and to justify the need for a new start in a post-war Poland whose fate should be shaped by the revolutionary left. They were thus paving the way for the ultimate communist takeover


Author(s):  
Daniel A. Dombrowski

In this work two key theses are defended: political liberalism is a processual (rather than a static) view and process thinkers should be political liberals. Three major figures are considered (Rawls, Whitehead, Hartshorne) in the effort to show the superiority of political liberalism to its illiberal alternatives on the political right and left. Further, a politically liberal stance regarding nonhuman animals and the environment is articulated. It is typical for debates in political philosophy to be adrift regarding the concept of method, but from start to finish this book relies on the processual method of reflective equilibrium or dialectic at its best. This is the first extended effort to argue for both political liberalism as a process-oriented view and process philosophy/theology as a politically liberal view. It is also a timely defense of political liberalism against illiberal tendencies on both the right and the left.


2019 ◽  
Vol 118 (11) ◽  
pp. 365-371
Author(s):  
J Dorasamy ◽  
Mr Jirushlan Dorasamy

Studies, especially in the North America, have shown a relationship between political orientation and moralfoundation. This study investigated whether moral judgements differ from the political orientation of participantsin South Africa moral judgment and the extent to which moral foundations are influenced by politicalorientation.Further, the study investigated the possibility of similar patterns with the North AmericanConservative-Liberal spectrum and the moral foundation. There were 300participants, 78 males and 222 females,who completed an online questionnaire relating to moral foundation and political orientation. The results partiallysupported the hypothesis relating to Liberal and Conservative orientation in South Africa. Further, this studypartially predicted the Liberal-Conservative orientation with patterns in the moral foundation, whilst showingsimilar findings to the North American studies. A growing rate of a neutral/moderate society is evidenced in SouthAfrica and abroad, thereby showing the emergence of a more open approach to both a political and generalstance.”””


Author(s):  
Tamar Hermann

In Israel, as in many other countries, the impact of public opinion on national policymaking has increased dramatically over the last few decades. In fact, public opinion has practically developed into one of the prime political inputs in Israel. This chapter argues that this increased impact, which could have contributed to improving the Israeli democracy, is in fact often undermined by the increasing overlapping of the main cleavages within Israel: between the political Right and Left, between Jews and Arabs, and between religious and secular Israelis. This extreme overlapping has severely eroded the national consensus and accelerated the emergence of deep disagreements in public opinion over strategic issues, such as the nature of the state (Jewish? Democratic?), the main challenges facing the nation (including the best way of dealing with the protracted Israeli–Palestinian conflict), and the desired collective future.


Laws ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 63
Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Sharrow

Between 2020 and 2021, one hundred and ten bills in state legislatures across the United States suggested banning the participation of transgender athletes on sports teams for girls and women. As of July 2021, ten such bills have become state law. This paper tracks the political shift towards targeting transgender athletes. Conservative political interests now seek laws that suture biological determinist arguments to civil rights of bodies. Although narrow binary definitions of sex have long operated in the background as a means for policy implementation under Title IX, Republican lawmakers now aim to reframe sex non-discrimination policies as means of gendered exclusion. The content of proposals reveal the centrality of ideas about bodily immutability, and body politics more generally, in shaping the future of American gender politics. My analysis of bills from 2021 argues that legislative proposals advance a logic of “cisgender supremacy” inhering in political claims about normatively gendered bodies. Political institutions are another site for advancing, enshrining, and normalizing cis-supremacist gender orders, explicitly joining cause with medical authorities as arbiters of gender normativity. Characteristics of bodies and their alleged role in evidencing sex itself have fueled the tactics of anti-transgender activists on the political Right. However, the target of their aims is not mere policy change but a state-sanctioned return to a narrowly cis- and heteropatriarchal gender order.


2021 ◽  
pp. 136843022110203
Author(s):  
Samantha K. Stanley

Those on the political right engage in greater meat consumption and animal exploitation than their left-wing counterparts. Previous research suggests this is because they view vegetarianism as threatening the nation’s dietary customs and economy. Across two studies, I extend this concept of “vegetarianism threat” by showing that it separates into two distinct dimensions of concern: cultural (symbolic) threats and economic (realistic) threats. The resultant multidimensional scale allows a finer grained understanding of the roots of ideology-based threat responses to meat-free movements. Together, results implicate symbolic concerns as the key element of vegetarianism threat contributing to negative attitudes towards meat abstention and its proponents.


2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 292-300 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jan-Willem van Prooijen ◽  
André P. M. Krouwel

Dogmatic intolerance—defined as a tendency to reject, and consider as inferior, any ideological belief that differs from one’s own—is often assumed to be more prominent at the political right than at the political left. In the present study, we make two novel contributions to this perspective. First, we show that dogmatic intolerance is stronger among left- and right-wing extremists than moderates in both the European Union (Study 1) as well as the United States (Study 2). Second, in Study 3, participants were randomly assigned to describe a strong or a weak political belief that they hold. Results revealed that compared to weak beliefs, strong beliefs elicited stronger dogmatic intolerance, which in turn was associated with willingness to protest, denial of free speech, and support for antisocial behavior. We conclude that independent of content, extreme political beliefs predict dogmatic intolerance.


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