Appendix G

1916 ◽  
Vol 20 (79) ◽  
pp. 115-124
Author(s):  
Wilbur Wright

My brother and I became seriously interested in the problem of flight in 1899, a little more than 12 years ago. Some three years before this the death of Lilienthal, which was mentioned in the newspapers of that day, had brought the subject to our attention and led us to make some inquiry for books relating to flight. But the only serious books we found were by Professor Marey, and these related to the mechanism of bird flight rather than human flight. As our interest at that time was mere curiosity as to what had been done, we did not pursue the subject further when we failed to find books relating to human flight.Several years later, while reading a book on ornithology, we became interested in studying the appearance and habits of birds, but it soon occurred to us that the really interesting thing about birds was their power of flight. This was a power which seemed to us almost in contradiction of the laws of nature.

Dialogue ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Hanly

Modern philosophy, if it has not settled any other of the chronic disputes that have troubled the history of the subject, appears to have decided once and for all the question of synthetic a priori principles. Logical analysis has demonstrated that synthetic propositions are empirical while a priori propositions are analytical and notational. Nevertheless, a broader survey of the contemporary philosophical scene reveals that the strict meaning of the expression “modern philosophy” above should be rendered “philosophers of one of the current schools of philosophy”. For contemporary European philosophers have not abandoned the notion of synthetic a priori principles altogether. They have modified without abandoning Kant's Copernican discovery of the laws of nature in the human mind. There are, to be sure, two ways of viewing the situation. Either logical analysis has overlooked certain unique phenomena and thus has failed to comprehend the arguments which take their description as premises, or existentialism has persisted in the use of an inadequate logic. The purpose of this paper is to test this issue and in doing so to explore the psychological roots of the idea of synthetic a priori principles. The means adopted is a critical study of the existentialist theory of emotion which claims to have discovered a previously unrecognized basis for synthetic a priori principles in the phenomenelogy of human existence.


2012 ◽  
Vol 21 (26) ◽  
pp. 151-160
Author(s):  
Wiesna Mond-Kozłowska

This article aims to grasp the ontological constitutional principle known as correspondances des artes. The affinity of arts is usually interpreted as a functional quality, while the author holds that it is of ontic character as well. This results from the shared ontological reference of all natural phenomena of human life and, consequently, human creative work. Experimental knowledge of this metaphysical truth, according to the composer-synaesthetic Olivier Messiaen, is within the reach of very few people, even less so amongst the artists themselves. Mikalojus Konstantinas Čiurlionis, the Lithuanian composer and painter, was one of those very few. The main argument of the article, which is developed in the realm of the ontology of a piece of art, is the premise that the rhythm factor can serve as grounds for discussion to investigate the nature of the correspondances des artes. This was also the subject matter of the French phenomenologist Mikel Dufrenne’s writings (Dufrenne 1992, pp. 323–324).In addition, the author argues that all so-called organic aesthetics (Tatarkiewicz 1985, p. 84), those who claim that the laws of the creative process depend on the laws of nature, prove the existence of the common and shared ontic base of the world, logos. This base belongs to both natural and created ontological phenomena. The synaesthetic pictorial and musical oeuvre of Čiurlionis is the research field for inferring the initial argument of the paper.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Binhi

The subject of this research is D. Chalmers’ argument in explanation of the phenomenal consciousness –sentience or qualia – explanation on the basis of dualism of the low-level physical and high-level mental propertoes of the brain. The dualism of properties in the philosophy of consciousness means that consciousness is a high-level property, supervenient on the physical properties of the brain. Chalmers introduces the concept of logical supervenience and explains the phenomenal consciousness by the fact that psychical properties are supervenient on physical properties naturally, rather than logically. This comprises the essence of Chalmers' concept of naturalistic dualism. The article reviews the concept of supervenience in most commonly used form, and the definition of logical and natural supervenience. Supervenience becomes logical and/or natural due to the fact that its definition includes the modal term “possibility”, which concedes different interpretations: possibility by virtue of the laws of nature – nomic possibility, and logical possibility. The author demonstrates that the definition of logical supervenience, which leans on the concept of identity, makes sense only in the context of transtemporal, rather than transworld identity. Such circumstance substantially changes the meaning of the definition of logical supervenience. The novelty of this work consists in showing that unlike the logical and natural possibilities, logical and natural supervenience are different names for the same type of relationship. The conclusion is formulated that naturalistic dualism, which claims their fundamental difference, cannot explain the phenomenal consciousness using this distinction.


KÜLÖNBSÉG ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gábor Tóth

The paper discusses Kant’s concept of the subject through Heideger’s critique. Heidegger deconstructs the structure of Kant’s idea of personal identity as the moral subject. In the 13th paragraph of The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), Heidegger distinguishes three basic aspects of Kant’s idea of the self: the personalitas transcendentalis, the personalitas psychologica, and the personalitas moralis. The personalitas moralis is defined as the sphere of pure morality, the intelligible realm of freedom. This is an aspect of the individual beyond physical features and also beyond the determinism of laws of nature. The causality by freedom forms the basis of practical actions ordered by moral law. Therefore, it acts as the highest level determinism of Being in human existence. Heidegger’s conclusion shows Kant’s failure in delineating a functional model of the moral subject but accepts Kant’s contribution to laying the foundations of such a theory.


Author(s):  
Viktor S. Levytskyy ◽  

The subject of the article is the process of forming ideas about the world as reality, which is most accurately described by the word “invention”. The author, relying on classical texts in this respect (E. Husserl, M. Heidegger) and modern studies (A. Makushinsky, J.-F. Kurtin) substantiates the position according to which the idea of reality is not a cultural invariant. The notion that reality has always existed, and thanks to scientific reason has been most adequately reflected, understood and described, is a significant modernization. This has been evidenced by both the etymology of the concepts of “reality” and “reality”, which first appeared only in scholasticism (D. Scotus, M. Eckhart), and the process of their content filling, which is inextricably linked with the formation of scientific rationality. The article shows that both the scientific mind and the integral image of the world created by it, which we call reality, genetically date back to the Christian value-semantic universe. Initially, it was within the framework of the discourse of natural theology that the image of the autonomous world has been conceptualized, developing according to the universal principles established by God. In the first scientific programs (R. Descartes, G. Galilei, I. Newton), these ideas were continued, as a result of which the world began to be understood as an immanent reality that is subject to the laws of nature. The new ontological beliefs received the ultimate philosophical foundation in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, to whom the phenomenal world exhausts the reality available to man. Accordingly, the world turns into a one-dimensional detranscendentalized reality. This methodological approach allows the author to make the following conclusions: 1) the image of world “reality” is a rather modern “invention”, which was unknown in previous eras; 2) at the same time, it is genetically connected with the Christian semantic universe, outside of which it could not appear; 3) the world in it is understood as a one-dimensional immanent reality.


1904 ◽  
Vol 8 (29) ◽  
pp. 23-25
Author(s):  
Williams Cochrane

In commencing the paper which I am about to read I would like, first of all, to make a few remarks as to what has been done towards solving the difficult, yet extremely fascinating problem of aerial flight.In recent years much has been attempted, but, when all is weighed in the balance, I venture to think that comparatively nothing of any value has yet been accomplished, and the successful flying machine has yet to come. A debt of gratitude is due to M. Santos Dumont. M. Lebaudy, and other pioneers, for breaking down, as they have, prejudice against the subject; but, after all, do his or their machines embody any new principle ? Only by careful attention to certain mechanical details and a combination of mechanism already in existence have they accomplished what they have.It is unnecessary for me to go into details of the defects of navigable air-ships. Most students of aeronautics are, I think, agreed that the flying machine of the future will be one which is heavier than the atmosphere and presents the least surface of resistance when travelling horizontally.


Author(s):  
Evgenii M. Dmitrievskii ◽  

The article analyzes the ideal from the position of antipsycholo- gism (objectivism), which is opposed to psychologism. The proponents of psy- chologism attributed the ideal only to the mind of an individual. Objectivists considered the existence of the ideal not only in the mind of a separate indivi- dual, but also outside of it, as a rule, allocating their own area for it in reality. But the objectivists also understood the objective existence of the ideal differ- ently. E. Husserl connected the ideal with the pure laws of logic and mathema- tics, comprehended intuitively. G. Frege extended the ideal, including the laws of nature, linking it with the meaning of the sentence. He also formulated the concept of three regions of reality, including the ideal. K. Popper extended the ideal to cultural objects and also introduced the principles of evolutionism into the world of the ideal. M. A. Lifshits connected the ideal with all objects, both the natural and cultural. He pointed to the activity of the ideal in relation to the subject. E.V. Ilyenkov understood the ideal not as an abstract image, but as a form (scheme) of human activity in the rational transformation of the reality objects revealed in social practice. He believed that the ideal exists objectively in the forms of social consciousness.


2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 49-69
Author(s):  
Martin Harvey

AbstractTwo interpretations of Hobbes's theory of morals dominate the subject: the Egoistic Reading (ER) and the Naturalist Reading (NR). According to ER, all of Hobbes's moral concepts are self-interested at their core. According to NR, Hobbes's Laws of Nature set down genuine moral obligations/virtues both inside of the state of nature and out. This article rejects both of these interpretations in favor of a Voluntarist Reading (VR). On this reading, morality is an artifact of human endeavor, specifically covenanting. Unlike both ER and NR, VR takes seriously Hobbes's claim that there is “no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own”.


1853 ◽  
Vol 20 (4) ◽  
pp. 513-540
Author(s):  
W. P. Alison

In offering to this Society a few remarks which have occurred to me on this fundamental department of Mental Physiology, I beg in the first place to explain, that my reason for doing so is merely this, that in consequence of certain unguarded expressions, and, as I think, hasty reflections, the opinions of Dr Brown, and likewise of Sir James Mackintosh, and of Lord Jeffrey, and other more recent writers on this subject, have been supposed to be irreconcileably at variance with those of Dr Reid and Mr Stewart; i. e., with those which are usually called the leading doctrines, or essential characteristics, of the Scotch School of Metaphysics, in this fundamental department of the science. And when such difference of opinion is believed to exist among men of generally acknowledged talent, who have studied this subject, and nothing like an experimentum crucis can be pointed out, to compel us to adopt one opinion and reject another,—the natural inference is, that there is something in the study itself, which renders it unfit for scientific inquiry,—that what is called the study of the Mental Faculties granted to our species is, in fact, only a record of the vacillations of human fancy and ingenuity, in the invention and demolition of hypotheses,—and that the subject is one on which it is in vain for our minds to dwell, with any hope of applying the principles of Inductive Science, and acquiring any insight into the laws of Nature, regulating the phenomena presented by the last and greatest of her works, similar to that which is the object and the reward of all other scientific inquiries.


2020 ◽  
pp. 302-319
Author(s):  
M. T. Satanar

The relevance of the study is due, on the one hand, to the insufficient knowledge of the semiotics of the Yakut epos olonkho, and on the other, the need to implement a new paradigm of modern science, which involves the convergence of scientific knowledge. It is noted that the fundamental categories in the worldview are the modes of space and time, which in total lead to another mode of being - a chronotope. The subject of this article is the codes of cosmological mythology in the texts of the epic olonkho from the perspective of a peculiar spatio-temporal organization of the epic world of olonkho. The purpose of the study is to decode the elements of mythology, as a result of which “compressed” messages about scientific knowledge that indicate the existence of a single source of typology of culture are found. Particular attention is paid to the variety of codes, the rules for their emergence, taking into account the national characteristics of language and thinking. A systematic approach to the subject of study, structural-semiotic analysis, methods of review and description are used in the study. The novelty of the study is in an attempt to partially solve the problem of the disunity of two types of cultures (folklore and fundamental laws of nature) in the context of a general typology of culture. This study indicates the prospects for further consideration and definition of the elements of a peculiar symbolic-semiotic system of space-time organization in the texts of the Yakut epos olonkho.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document