The Challenging Data of Neuroscience and the Challenges Mounted from That Data

2020 ◽  
pp. 207-261
Author(s):  
Michael S. Moore
Keyword(s):  
Moral Agency ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
The Brain

The suppositions about the psychology of moral agency are challenged by neuroscience in four ways: first, by denying that the choices of persons can be uncaused (and thus “free” in this contra-causal sense); second, by denying that the choices of persons actually cause the actions that are chosen, such actions rather being epiphenomenal with such actions, co-effects of some common cause in the brain; third, by denying that the minds of persons are anything but the brute, dumb firing of two valued switches in the brains of such persons, a mere mechanism or machine; fourth, by denying that persons have the kind of privileged access to their own mental states that gives persons the knowledge needed for control and for responsibility. Two responses to these four challenges are previewed, a response denying the truth of these claims and a response denying the relevance of these claims to responsibility. The attempt to sidestep these challenges known as “cheap compatibilism” is also reviewed and rejected.

People represent their own mental states more distinctly than others’

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Judith Mildner ◽  
Diana Tamir
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Social Distance ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Direct Access ◽  
Social Brain ◽  
Privileged Access ◽  
Behavioral Studies ◽  
The Social ◽  
External Cues

One can never know the internal workings of another person – one can only infer others’ mental states based on external cues. In contrast, each person has direct access to the contents of their own mind. Here we test the hypothesis that this privileged access shapes the way people represent internal mental experiences, such that they represent their own mental states more distinctly than the states of others. Across four studies, participants considered their own and others’ mental states; analyses measured the distinctiveness of mental state representations. Two neuroimaging studies used representational similarity analyses to demonstrate that the social brain manifests more distinct activity patterns when thinking about one’s own states versus others’. Two behavioral studies support these findings. Further, they demonstrate that people differentiate between states less as social distance increases. Together these results suggest that we represent our own mind with greater granularity than the minds of others.

scholarly journals Harmonic Brain Modes: A Unifying Framework for Linking Space and Time in Brain Dynamics

2017 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 277-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Selen Atasoy ◽  
Gustavo Deco ◽  
Morten L. Kringelbach ◽  
Joel Pearson
Keyword(s):  
Neural Activity ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Structural Connectivity ◽  
Building Blocks ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Dynamics ◽  
Space And Time ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Brain

A fundamental characteristic of spontaneous brain activity is coherent oscillations covering a wide range of frequencies. Interestingly, these temporal oscillations are highly correlated among spatially distributed cortical areas forming structured correlation patterns known as the resting state networks, although the brain is never truly at “rest.” Here, we introduce the concept of harmonic brain modes—fundamental building blocks of complex spatiotemporal patterns of neural activity. We define these elementary harmonic brain modes as harmonic modes of structural connectivity; that is, connectome harmonics, yielding fully synchronous neural activity patterns with different frequency oscillations emerging on and constrained by the particular structure of the brain. Hence, this particular definition implicitly links the hitherto poorly understood dimensions of space and time in brain dynamics and its underlying anatomy. Further we show how harmonic brain modes can explain the relationship between neurophysiological, temporal, and network-level changes in the brain across different mental states ( wakefulness, sleep, anesthesia, psychedelic). Notably, when decoded as activation of connectome harmonics, spatial and temporal characteristics of neural activity naturally emerge from the interplay between excitation and inhibition and this critical relation fits the spatial, temporal, and neurophysiological changes associated with different mental states. Thus, the introduced framework of harmonic brain modes not only establishes a relation between the spatial structure of correlation patterns and temporal oscillations (linking space and time in brain dynamics), but also enables a new dimension of tools for understanding fundamental principles underlying brain dynamics in different states of consciousness.

scholarly journals II. Experimental researches on the temperature of the head

1878 ◽  
Vol 27 (185-189) ◽  
pp. 166-177 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Present Communication ◽  
Experimental Researches ◽  
The Brain

The present communication forms an abstract of the first portion of a series of investigations having the following primary objects in view:— 1st. To find out, as far as possible, the normal relative temperatures of different portions of the surface of the head, when the brain is comparatively inactive. 2nd. To study the effect of different mental states upon the different portions of the surface of the head previously examined in the condition of comparative cerebral inactivity.

scholarly journals Ecstasy from a physiological point of view

1982 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 74-86 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kaj Björkqvist
Keyword(s):  
Religious Tradition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Body ◽  
Biological Study ◽  
Physiological Basis ◽  
Slowing Down ◽  
Psychosomatic Diseases ◽  
The Brain

The biological study of man is one of today's most rapidly advancing sciences. There is no reason for not utilizing these methodologies of research and the knowledge already gained when studying ecstasy and other similar religious phenomena. Drugs have been used in all parts of the world as an ecstasy technique. Since mental states and physiological correlates always accompany each other, it is obvious that the human mind can be affected by external means, for instance by drugs. But the opposite is also true; mental changes affect the body, as they do in the case of psychosomatic diseases. Ecstasy is often described as an extremely joyful experience; this pleasure must necessarily also have a physiological basis. It is of course too early to say anything for certain, but the discovery of pleasure centres in the brain might offer an explanation. It is not far-fetched to suggest that when a person experiences euphoric ecstasy, it might, in some way or other, be connected with a cerebral pleasure center. Can it be, for example, that religious ecstasy is attained only by some mechanism triggering off changes in the balance of the transmitter substances? Or is it reached only via a change in the hormonal balance, or only by a slowing down of the brain waves, or is a pleasure centre activated? When a person is using an ecstasy technique, he usually does so within a religious tradition. When he reaches an experience, a traditional interpretation of it already exists.

Recognition of true and false states of the brain by means of the electroencephalogram wavelet analysis

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
S.S. Pertsov ◽  
E.A. Yumatov ◽  
N.A. Karatygin ◽  
E.N. Dudnik ◽  
A.E. Khramov ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Wavelet Transform ◽  
Experimental Model ◽  
Continuous Wavelet Transform ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Mental Activity ◽  
Continuous Wavelet ◽  
Wavelet Energy ◽  
True State ◽  
The Brain

It is a well-known fact that mental activity of the brain can be presented by two different states, i.e., the true state and the false state. A promising method of the electroencephalogram (EEG) wavelet transform has been developed over recent years. Using this method, we evaluated the principle possibility for direct objective registration of mental activity in the human brain. Previously we developed and described (published) a new experimental model and software for recognizing the true and false mental responses of a person with the EEG wavelet transform. The developed experimental model and software-and-data support allowed us to compare (by EEG parameters) two mental states of brain activity, one of which is the false state, while another is the true state. The goal of this study is to develop an absolutely new information technology for recognizing the true and false states in mental activity of the brain by means of the EEG wavelet transform. Our study showed that the true and false states of the brain can be distinguished using the method of continuous wavelet transform and calculation of the EEG wavelet energy. It was revealed that the main differences between truthful and false mental responses are observed in the delta and alpha ranges of the EEG. In the EEG delta rhythm, the wavelet energy is much higher under conditions of the false response as compared to that in the true response. In the EEG alpha rhythm, the wavelet energy is significantly higher with the true answer than in the false one. These data open a new principal possibility of revealing the true and false mental state of the brain by means of continuous wavelet transform and calculation of the EEG wavelet energy.

Neuroethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 405-420
Author(s):  
Georg Northoff
Keyword(s):  
Deep Brain Stimulation ◽  
Psychiatric Disorders ◽  
Brain Stimulation ◽  
Empirical Data ◽  
Moral Agency ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Spatio Temporal ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Deep Brain

Neuroethics, located at the interface of conceptual and empirical dimensions, carries major implications for psychiatry, such as the neuroscientific basis of ethical concepts as moral agency. Drawing on data in neuroscience, this chapter highlights issues central to psychiatric ethics. First, it addresses a reductionistic model of the brain, often conceived as purely neuronal, and then it discusses empirical data suggesting that the brain’s activity is strongly aligned to its respective social (e.g., relation to others) and ecological (e.g., relation to the environment and nature) contexts; this implies a relational rather than reductionist model. Second, it suggests that self (e.g., the experience or sense of a self) and personhood (e.g., the person as existent independent of experience) must also be understood in such a social and ecological and, therefore, relational and spatio-temporal sense. Ethical concepts like agency, therefore, cannot be limited solely to the person and brain, but must rather be understood in a relational and neuro-ecological/social way. Third, it discusses deep brain stimulation as a treatment that promotes enhancement. In sum, this chapter presents findings in neuroscience that carry major implications for our view of brain, mental features, psychiatric disorders, and ethical issues like agency, responsibility, and enhancement.

Mind, identity theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Ontological Categories ◽  
Great Merit ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?

Disorders of consciousness, memory, and will

2018 ◽  
pp. 51-86
Author(s):  
Walter Glannon
Keyword(s):  
Psychiatric Disorder ◽  
Mental Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
External World ◽  
The Body ◽  
Disorders Of Consciousness ◽  
Action Plans ◽  
Flexible Behavior ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Insight Into

This chapter examines major psychiatric disorders as disorders of consciousness, memory, and will. All of these disorders involve disturbances in how the brain processes and integrates information about the body and external world. Distorted mental content in these psychopathologies impairs the capacity to consider different action plans, and to form and execute particular plans in particular actions. Dysfunctional mental states correlating with dysfunctional neural states impair the capacity for flexible behavior and adaptability to the environment. This dysfunction also impairs the capacity for insight into a psychiatric disorder and understanding the need for and motivation to seek treatment.

Brain disorders? Not really: Why network structures block reductionism in psychopathology research

2018 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Denny Borsboom ◽  
Angélique O. J. Cramer ◽  
Annemarie Kalis
Keyword(s):  
Mental Disorders ◽  
Clinical Psychology ◽  
Network Models ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Modern Medicine ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Network Structures ◽  
Common Cause ◽  
Biological Basis ◽  
Holistic Research

AbstractIn the past decades, reductionism has dominated both research directions and funding policies in clinical psychology and psychiatry. The intense search for the biological basis of mental disorders, however, has not resulted in conclusive reductionist explanations of psychopathology. Recently, network models have been proposed as an alternative framework for the analysis of mental disorders, in which mental disorders arise from the causal interplay between symptoms. In this target article, we show that this conceptualization can help explain why reductionist approaches in psychiatry and clinical psychology are on the wrong track. First, symptom networks preclude the identification of a common cause of symptomatology with a neurobiological condition; in symptom networks, there is no such common cause. Second, symptom network relations depend on the content of mental states and, as such, feature intentionality. Third, the strength of network relations is highly likely to depend partially on cultural and historical contexts as well as external mechanisms in the environment. Taken together, these properties suggest that, if mental disorders are indeed networks of causally related symptoms, reductionist accounts cannot achieve the level of success associated with reductionist disease models in modern medicine. As an alternative strategy, we propose to interpret network structures in terms of D. C. Dennett's (1987) notion ofreal patterns, and suggest that, instead of being reducible to a biological basis, mental disorders feature biological and psychological factors that are deeply intertwined in feedback loops. This suggests that neither psychological nor biological levels can claim causal or explanatory priority, and that a holistic research strategy is necessary for progress in the study of mental disorders.

Psychosurgery

2002 ◽  
Vol 12 (12) ◽  
pp. 443-448
Author(s):  
Marilyn Williams
Keyword(s):  
Surgical Procedures ◽  
Ethical Issues ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
History Of ◽  
Ethical And Legal Issues ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Brain

The use of surgical procedures to alter mental states raises many issues. Surgery on the brain has been known for thousands of years, but procedures developed in the 1930s, ‘40s and ‘50s, and the reasons for them, raised many ethical issues that remain with us today. The following article touches on the history of psychosurgery, the conditions treated, the literature on the subject, and the ethical and legal issues.

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