Imagistic Imagining Part I
The relationship of attitude imagining to imagistic imagining is explored in depth. Formal characterizations are given of each. A nuanced definition of ‘mental imagery’ is developed as a means to better-defining I-imagining. Competing attempts to define A-imagining in terms of a certain “direction of fit” are criticized, as are attempts to distinguish “mere supposition” from A-imagining. It is then argued that A-imagining and I-imagining pick out overlapping but distinct sets of mental phenomena. Some A-imginings are I-imaginings, and some I-imaginings are A-imaginings. But neither is a sub-set of the other. Several strains of resistance to that conclusion are considered and rejected. Currie & Ravenscroft’s (2002) notion of “recreative imagining” is closely analyzed with the conclusion that it does not pick out a third theoretically important class of imaginings.