Optimal Incentives for Teams
2001 ◽
Vol 91
(3)
◽
pp. 525-541
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Keyword(s):
Much of the existing theory of incentives describes a static relationship that lasts for just one transaction. This static assumption is not only unrealistic, but the resulting predictions appear to be at odds with many work organizations. The current paper introduces possible long-term interaction among agents, and studies how the design of explicit incentives and work organizations can exploit, and interact with, the implicit incentives generated by the repeated interaction of the agents. The optimal incentive scheme is shown to display observed features of the increasingly popular “teams,” such as the use of low-powered, group incentives. (JEL D23, J33, J41, L23)
2017 ◽
Vol 2017
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pp. 1-15
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Keyword(s):
Keyword(s):
2017 ◽
Vol 11
(1)
◽
pp. 264-275
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Keyword(s):
2018 ◽
Vol 2018
(1)
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pp. 12216
2020 ◽
Vol ahead-of-print
(ahead-of-print)
◽
Keyword(s):
2007 ◽
Vol 102
◽
pp. 153-217
Keyword(s):
2020 ◽
Vol 5
(2)
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