scholarly journals EUROINTEGRATION CRISIS AND ITS EFFECT ON UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY AND SECURITY

Author(s):  
N. Yakovenko ◽  
G. Piskorska

The article deals with the strategic approaches and interests of Ukraine in the context of the crisis of the European security system in connection with the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Russian aggression against Ukraine from 2014, including the annexation of Crimea and deployment of a major war in Donbas, further aggressive and unpredictable actions of a large nuclear power have sharply increased instability of global security environment, greatly exacerbated the effect of negative factors aimed at destruction of the existing world order. Recent threats arise from the very nature of contemporary international relations and have become an objective phenomenon. The authors focuse on the causes of the current crisis of the European security system. The factors of formation and essence of the political position of the EU and NATO concerning the military-political aggression of Russia against Ukraine in 2014, are revealed. The peculiarities of the European security policy, strategic interests of the EU in conditions of the restoration of elements of block-civilization confrontation are analyzed.

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (54) ◽  
pp. 223-246
Author(s):  
Hana N. Hlaváčková ◽  

The European security environment has changed and the EU has become more independent in its security policy. New threats faced by the EU in 2014 (the migration crises) and other remaining threats (such as terrorism, organised crime, piracy) need solving by its greater involvement in the region. One problem that the EU tries to solve is the inconsistency of member states in security issues. In this article, we focus on the V4 group and their opinions towards EU security. This article examines strategies adopted by small/new EU member states to protect European borders and European territories and regions outside the EU that affect their security. For a long time, the V4 countries only participated sporadically in EU missions. The article shows what changes took place and what were the reasons for the decision to participate or not in the EU activities. The article raises the question of whether the show-the-flag strategy adopted by the V4 countries and their participation in EU missions is relevant for ensuring European security nowadays.


2021 ◽  
Vol 65 (5) ◽  
pp. 14-27
Author(s):  
N. Arbatova

Received 12.02.2021. The article is devoted to the analysis of the fundamental reasons that led to the crisis in relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union as well as relations between Russia and the West at large. The main attention is paid to both objective changes in international relations and subjective factors in the policies of Russia and the EU, that which predetermined the vector of evolution of their interaction. The article proposes a layer-by-layer analysis of these reasons, leading from a superficial perception of problems in depth to the origins of the current crisis. This method of analysis can be called the “matryoshka method”, when the main problem lies in the very depths of the phenomenon under study. In other words, the article proposes a “countdown” from the current crisis to the postbipolar start of cooperation between Russia and the European Union. Why did it all go wrong when it all started so well? And, finally, who is to blame for the failed partnership, and is it possible to get out of this deadlock? These and other questions are at the center of this article. The Ukraine conflict is widely perceived by the European Union and the West as whole as a turning point in their relations with the Russian Federation and the main reason of the deepest divide between them. However, this conflict is not so much the reason but rather the consequence of more profound contradictions between Russia and the West. These contradictions are revolving around the mutual misperceptions about the acceptable foundation of the post-bipolar European security and rivalry in the CIS space. The EU and NATO enlargement strategies presented by both institutions as two complementary processes raised Russia’s concerns about their intentions in the CIS region. But these contradictions did not appear from “the middle of nowhere”. They resulted from the uneven end of the bipolarity and mistakes made by the West and its institutions as well as miscalculations of the new Russian leadership. In the very centre of this “matryoshka doll” one can find the arguments explaining Russia’s historic convolutions on its way to Europe. Acknowledgements. The article was prepared within the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” supported by the grant from Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation program for research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement № 075-15-2020-783).


Author(s):  
Stefan Tibuleac

This article analyzes the most current security issues for the Republic of Moldova that are part of the regional security context of Eastern Europe –the region that can be considered the epicenter of international tensions through which the„geopolitical line of fracture”passes. The geographical position of the Republic of Moldova makes this state particularly sensitive to any negative trends in theregion. Growing of international tensions creates security threats and complicates economic development. From a historical point of view, Moldova has repeatedly fallen victim by the confrontation of the great powers. Therefore, the Republic of Moldova has a vital interest in preventing a new conflict in Eastern Europe. This article is based on a number of assumptions made by changes in the European security environment, such as the „shift of weight” to the East, strategic uncertainty, increasing the role of non-state actors, the situation in eastern Ukraine, etc. Based on these assumptions, this article makes an attempt to outline the potential role of the Republic of Moldova in the Eastern European security system, taking into account the desideratum for integration of the republic into the European Union. Other relevant factors will be taken into account for shaping the role of the Republic of Moldova in the European security system, namely: the security deficit; the impact of NATO and EU security policy; the rebirth of the project to create a regional defense alliance, etc. This article will largely take into account the military aspects of security. Keywords: Republic of Moldova, national security, Eastern Europe, NATO, Intermarium, defence, threats, risks, challenges


1978 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 321-350 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Falk

While taking note of the growing anxiety, particularly on the part of the superpowers, over the spread of nuclear technology and of the frantic campaign (most of all on the part of the USA), through a combination of pressures and blandishments, to halt proliferation, the paper does not see much chance of the campaign succeeding so long as as it remains suspect because, among other reasons, of its being spearheaded by a power which is itself the greatest proliferator and one, too, which has not only got an enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons, but is constantly engaged in evolving ever more sophisticated (which means deadly) weapons. Nonproliferation, unless wedded to denuclearization, will continue to be viewed by non-nuclear states as unacceptably discriminatory and as a geopolitical confidence trick calculated to freeze the present hegemonistic global structure. Obviously, the first moves toward denuclearization have to be made by nuclear nations, but, above all, by the two superpowers. However, denuclearization will be illusory if a distinction is made between the military and the civilian uses of the atom. Denuclearization must, therefore, at some stage-now rather than later, when it might be too late-involve the total renunciation of nuclear power for whatever purpose and its substitution with other less centralized, less costly, and pollution-free sources of energy, such as sun, wind, water and biomass. In between, however, the ruling elites all the world over, but principally in its industrialized part, have to accept a concept of world order securely anchored to the values of peace, economic well-being of all, social and political justice, both within and between nations, and environmental quality. Recognising that such a world order cannot be erected at one go, the author suggests transition steps, none frighteningly radical in itself and each demonstrably feasible, although establishment circles, unable to move out of the narrow groove of conventional wisdom, may scoff at them as ‘romantic’ or ‘utopian’.


In this issue of the Contemporary Military Challenges, we focus on the relations between the European Union and NATO in the field of security. On 1 June 2021, NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels to discuss the details of the NATO Summit to be held on 14 June 2021 in Brussels, Belgium; the period, which coincides with the publication of this thematic issue. Twenty foreign ministers represented NATO member states, which are also EU members, making an event such as the NATO summit all the more important for the future of European security. Many topics were mentioned at the ministerial, such as Afghanistan, Belarus, Russia and China. In general, however, the emphasis was put on the fact that NATO should adapt to new challenges, security settings in a highly competitive environment. As mentioned by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, we are presented with a number of challenges to our security that we need to tackle together, because no country and no continent can deal with them alone. This includes strengthening the existing partnerships and building new ones, including in the Asia-Pacific, Africa, and Latin America. The participants also discussed the stepping up of training and capability building for partners, as well as work to address the security impact of climate change. In the conclusion, the ministers broadly agreed that it was important to start work on NATO's next Strategic Concept, because our strategic environment has significantly changed since 2010. Secretary General underlined that NATO’s future adaptation would require Allies to continue investing in defence, and to invest more together, as a force multiplier and a strong message of unity and resolve. During Donald Trump’s mandate as President of the United States, the fact that the European Union or its Member States pay too little attention and thus resources for their own defence has often been a hot topic of political debate. In 2016, a year before the US President Trump took office, the European Union adopted a Global Strategy which envisaged several options to strengthen the Common Security and Defence Policy, which we will discuss in further detail in the next issue of the Contemporary Security Challenges. The Global Strategy provided that the European Defence Fund, the Permanent Structured Cooperation, the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence, and other existing and new mechanisms would operate in such a way that activities, resources and capabilities would not duplicate with NATO’s, but would complement each other. True enough that, within the Common Security and Defence Policy, the European Union has already foreseen many activities at its meetings and in the adopted documents in terms of strengthening this policy, but later implemented little. Has anything changed in this area in the past four years, or will perhaps something change at the time of the conference on the European future? Just as the Alliance is planning a new strategic concept, the European Union is announcing a Strategic Compass, which will set new directions for future cooperation, also in the field of security. In this issue, the authors present how the cooperation between the European Union and NATO is taking place in 2021 in some areas of security. The article titled EU-NATO cooperation and the Slovenian presidency of the Council of the European Union by Marko Mahnič presents an interesting thesis on whether obstacles to the coherent functioning of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the field of common security and defence are of a purely technical nature, or are there maybe differences in the policies, bilateral relations and national ambitions of certain countries. Damjan Štrucl writes about the EU-NATO partnership and ensuring information security and cybersecurity: theory and practice. According to him, the development of information and communication technology and new challenges of the modern security environment have led to the signing of the Joint Declaration on deepening the strategic partnership between both organizations in 2016. The author provides an analysis of the EU-NATO strategic partnership in ensuring security and defence in the modern security environment. Defence initiatives to strengthen the security of the European Union motivated Gregor Garb to write an article presenting what the 2016 European Union Global Strategy contributed to the EU’s strategic defence autonomy. Initially, in a theoretical sense, and after five years in a practical sense. All of course, given the fact that the European Union will continue to maintain strong relations and cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance. David Humar and Nina Raduha present the process of creating the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia in the Slovenian Armed Forces. Changes in the international environment have initiated security-related strategic considerations of NATO and the European Union. Slovenia as a member of both organizations also needs a strategic consideration in both military and security fields. Their article provides more details about the The process of devising the Military Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia. Tackling irregular migration in Europe is a topic addressed by Miklós Böröcz. Ever since 2015, the then mass illegal migration has posed a major problem for Europe and the European Union. The mass refugee crisis has gradually transformed into illegal migrations of individuals and small groups, who have maintained and strengthened contact with everybody along the way, who take part in this and ensure that the migration flow with of illegal character does not subside. The author provides some solutions to this problem.


Author(s):  
DENIS ČALETA ◽  
SARA PERKOVIĆ

Povzetek V analizi smo želeli prikazati, ali so tuji borci resnično nevarni za evropsko varnost, saj vemo, da je morebitna grožnja vedno mogoča. Do zdaj je bilo zelo težko oceniti grožnjo vrnitve tujih borcev. V raziskavo smo vključili dve državi, v katerih so napade izvedli tuji borci, ki so se vrnili v državo. Vključeni državi sta bili Belgija in Francija. V raziskavi smo primerjali politiko posameznih držav s skupno zunanjo in varnostno politiko EU. Ugotavljali smo, kako se te države spoprijemajo z vrnitvijo tujih borcev in kateri ukrepi so bili glede tega sprejeti. Poleg tega smo poskušali oceniti, ali so bolj osredotočeni na pregon tujih borcev, ki se vračajo, ali je njihov poudarek na programih deradikalizacije in reintegracije. Ključne besede Tuji borci, terorizem, Islamska država, EU, zakonodaja. Abstract This analysis will consider whether foreign fighters pose a real danger to European security, knowing that the potential threat is always possible. Up to now, assessing the threat of returning foreign fighters has been very difficult. In this article we have attempted to analyze the attacks that have been carried out by returning foreign fighters in Belgium and France. Our research compared the politics of individual countries with the common foreign and security policy of the EU. We have investigated how these countries are dealing with the return of foreign fighters and what measures have been taken in this regard. In addition, we have tried to evaluate whether they are more focused on the prosecution of returning foreign fighters or whether their focus is connected with deradicalization and reintegration programmes. Key words Foreign fighters, terrorism, Islamic state, EU, legislation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 107 (7) ◽  
pp. 115-124
Author(s):  
Julia Melnikova ◽  

2016–2020 witnessed significant structural changes in the foreign and security policy of the European Union. External factors encouraged the need to strengthen the EU strategic autonomy not only in the form of particular practical moves related to the establishment and development of new institutions, but also as part of an attempt to formulate a new common discourse. The article examines these processes through the security communities theory, traditionally applied to analyze transatlantic dynamics. This helps to both systemically address the recent changes and identify miscalculations and missing elements in framing the European security community. Since the 2020 PESCO Strategic Review to a certain extent summed up the initial phase of development of the central initiative of the whole process, the article analyzes the so far achieved results in setting up the new agenda for the EU and the prospects of translating it into joint practices. The main assumption posits that the key obstacle for enhancing strategic autonomy is the need to use a collective identity - both a tool for developing institutions and a goal of this process. As a result, neither a new collective identity, nor a functional network of institutions have been built, leaving the EU unprepared to bring the idea of strategic autonomy further.


Author(s):  
Maxime H. A. Larivé

This empirical and historical analysis of the Western European Union (WEU), an intergovernmental defense organization, contributes to the broader understanding of the construction and integration of European security and defense policy. The WEU was established in 1954 by the Modified Brussels Treaty after the failure of the European Defense Community and at the time of the construction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Over its lifetime, the WEU was confronted by two major trends: the centrality of collective defense agreement providing security on the European continent enforced by NATO and the construction of a European security and defense policy within the broad integration process of the European Union (EU). The WEU provided a platform for Western European powers, particularly France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, to engage in the construction of a European defense. Historically, these countries had diverging visions ranging from an autonomous force to one that should remain under the NATO auspice. The end of the Cold War accelerated the transfer of the WEU mission to the EU, but the crises in the Gulf region and in the Balkans in 1990s led to a period of activity for the WEU. The institutionalization of the EU, beginning with the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, accelerated the construction of a European defense and security policy within EU structures. The transfer from the WEU to the EU began in the late 1990s and the WEU was dissolved in 2011.


Author(s):  
Ulrich Kühn

This chapter discusses the military- and defence-related capabilities and policies of Western Europe’s major powers (Germany, France, United Kingdom), of the NATO alliance, the Russian Federation, and Austria in the realm of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (weapons of mass destruction (WMD)). It focuses on the differing roles, positions, and security policy outlooks of these actors, with a special emphasis on their respective policies towards nuclear weapons. Particularly in the realm of nuclear weapons, the situation on the European continent is extremely diverse and complex, with officially recognized nuclear-weapons states, non-nuclear-weapons states under NATO’s ‘nuclear umbrella’, and staunch supporters of a world free from nuclear weapons. Highlighting converging and diverging international policy trends, the chapter concludes that European security policies on WMD continue to have a significant impact on related global security and defence matters.


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