Evolution of Three Norms of Distributive Justice in an Extended Nash Demand Game

2014 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 409-417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kazuaki Kojima ◽  
◽  
Takaya Arita
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Equal Distribution ◽  
Nash Demand Game ◽  
Conflict Cost ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The One ◽  
Evolutionary Simulations

The Nash demand game (NDG) has been at the center of attention when explaining moral norms of distributive justice on the basis of the game theory. This paper describes the demand-intensity game (D-I game), which adds an “intensity” dimension to NDG in order to discuss various scenarios for the evolution of norms concerning distributive justice, while keeping such simplicity that it can be analyzed by the concepts and tools of the game theory. We perform an ESS analysis and evolutionary simulations, followed by the analysis of replicator dynamics. It is shown that the three norms emerge: the one claiming an equal distribution (Egalitarianism), the one claiming the full amount (Libertarianism), and, as the special case of Libertarianism, the one claiming the full amount but conceding the resource in conflict (Wimpy libertarianism). The evolution of these norms strongly depends on the conflict cost parameter. Egalitarianism emerges with a larger conflict cost while Libertarianism with a smaller cost. Wimpy libertarianism emerges with a relatively larger conflict cost in libertarianism. The simulation results show that there are three types of evolutionary scenarios in general. We see in most of the trials the population straightforwardly converges to Libertarianism or Egalitarianism. It is also shown that, in some range of the conflict cost, the population nearly converges to Egalitarianism, which is followed by the convergence to Libertarianism. It is shown that this evolutionary transition depends on the quasi stability of Egalitarianism.

scholarly journals Application of the Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural company

2013 ◽  
Vol 59 (No. 1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Cabrera García ◽  
J.E. Imbert Tamayo ◽  
J. Carbonell-Olivares ◽  
Y. Pacheco Cabrera
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Linear Programming ◽  
Equilibrium Point ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Agricultural Economics ◽  
Nash Equilibrium Point ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Linear Programming Problems ◽  
The One

This paper deals with the application of Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural economics problem. The goal of this analysis is demonstrating the possibility of obtaining an equilibrium point, as proposed by Nash, in the case of an agricultural company that is considered together with its three sub-units in developing a game with perfect information. Production results in terms of several crops will be considered in this game, together with the necessary parameters to implement different linear programming problems. In the game with perfect information with the hierarchical structure established between the four considered players (a management center and three production units), a Nash equilibrium point is reached, since once the strategies of the rest of the players are known, if any of them would use a strategy different to the one proposed, their earnings would be less than the ones obtained by using the proposed strategies. When the four linear programming problems are solved, a particular case of equilibrium point is reached.

Modeling justice as a natural phenomenon

2013 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-83
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Natural Phenomenon ◽  
Interpersonal Comparison ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
The Third ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Fairness Norms ◽  
Psychology Literature

AbstractAmong other things, Baumard et al.'s “A Mutualistic Approach to Morality” considers the enforcement and establishment of moral norms, the interpersonal comparison of welfare, and the structure of fairness norms. This commentary draws attention to the relevance of the game theory literature to the first and second topic, and the social psychology literature to the third topic.

Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

scholarly journals The Superiority of Quantum Strategy in 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Final State ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Initial States ◽  
Quantum Strategy ◽  
Selection Of

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.

A New Collaborative Filtering Approach Based on Game Theory for Recommendation Systems

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Selma Benkessirat ◽  
Narhimene Boustia ◽  
Rezoug Nachida
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Collaborative Filtering ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Shapley Value ◽  
Cooperative Game Theory ◽  
Recommendation Systems ◽  
Internet Users ◽  
User Communities ◽  
The One

Recommendation systems can help internet users to find interesting things that match more with their profile. With the development of the digital age, recommendation systems have become indispensable in our lives. On the one hand, most of recommendation systems of the actual generation are based on Collaborative Filtering (CF) and their effectiveness is proved in several real applications. The main objective of this paper is to improve the recommendations provided by collaborative filtering using clustering. Nevertheless, taking into account the intrinsic relationship between users can enhance the recommendations performances. On the other hand, cooperative game theory techniques such as Shapley Value, take into consideration the intrinsic relationship among users when creating communities. With that in mind, we have used SV for the creation of user communities. Indeed, our proposed algorithm preforms into two steps, the first one consists to generate communities user based on Shapley Value, all taking into account the intrinsic properties between users. It applies in the second step a classical collaborative filtering process on each community to provide the Top-N recommendation. Experimental results show that the proposed approach significantly enhances the recommendation compared to the classical collaborative filtering and k-means based collaborative filtering. The cooperative game theory contributes to the improvement of the clustering based CF process because the quality of the users communities obtained is better.

scholarly journals Multi-Robot Searching using Game-Theory Based Approach

10.5772/6232 ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Meng
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Dynamic Programming ◽  
Utility Function ◽  
Real Time ◽  
Dynamic Environment ◽  
Equilibrium Solutions ◽  
Strategy Equilibrium ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Target Searching ◽  
Multi Robot

This paper proposes a game-theory based approach in a multi–target searching using a multi-robot system in a dynamic environment. It is assumed that a rough priori probability map of the targets' distribution within the environment is given. To consider the interaction between the robots, a dynamic-programming equation is proposed to estimate the utility function for each robot. Based on this utility function, a cooperative nonzero-sum game is generated, where both pure Nash Equilibrium and mixed-strategy Equilibrium solutions are presented to achieve an optimal overall robot behaviors. A special consideration has been taken to improve the real-time performance of the game-theory based approach. Several mechanisms, such as event-driven discretization, one-step dynamic programming, and decision buffer, have been proposed to reduce the computational complexity. The main advantage of the algorithm lies in its real-time capabilities whilst being efficient and robust to dynamic environments.

scholarly journals Homophily, heterophily and the diversity of messages among decision-making individuals

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 180027 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pouria Ramazi ◽  
James Riehl ◽  
Ming Cao
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Cheap Talk ◽  
Convergence Result ◽  
Term Survival ◽  
Dominated Strategies ◽  
The Face ◽  
Cheap Talk Games ◽  
The One

To better understand the intriguing mechanisms behind cooperation among decision-making individuals, we study the simple yet appealing use of preplay communication or cheap talk in evolutionary games, when players are able to choose strategies based on whether an opponent sends the same message as they do. So when playing games, in addition to pure cooperation and defection, players have two new strategies in this setting: homophilic (respectively, heterophilic) cooperation which is to cooperate (respectively, defect) only with those who send the same message as they do. We reveal the intrinsic qualities of individuals playing the two strategies and show that under the replicator dynamics, homophilic cooperators engage in a battle of messages and will become dominated by whichever message is the most prevalent at the start, while populations of heterophilic cooperators exhibit a more harmonious behaviour, converging to a state of maximal diversity. Then we take Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) as the base of the cheap-talk game and show that the hostility of heterophilics to individuals with similar messages leaves no possibility for pure cooperators to survive in a population of the two, whereas the one-message dominance of homophilics allows for pure cooperators with the same tag as the dominant homophilics to coexist in the population, demonstrating that homophilics are more cooperative than heterophilics. Finally, we generalize an existing convergence result on population shares associated with weakly dominated strategies to a broadly applicable theorem and complete previous research on PD games with preplay communication by proving that the frequencies of all types of cooperators, i.e. pure, homophilic and heterophilic, converge to zero in the face of defectors. This implies homophily and heterophily cannot facilitate the long-term survival of cooperation in this setting, which urges studying cheap-talk games under other reproduction dynamics.

scholarly journals Pornografi Dan Kekerasan Terhadap Perempuan (Kajian Kritis Pandangan Feminisme Radikal)

ULUMUNA ◽  
2006 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 215-236
Author(s):  
Atun Wardatun
Keyword(s):  
Violence Against Women ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Radical Feminism ◽  
Critical Reading ◽  
Equal Distribution ◽  
Men And Women ◽  
Women’S Sexuality ◽  
Patriarchal Society ◽  
Distribution Of Power ◽  
The One

Some people presume that feminisms are permissive for pornography due to the fact that many women support pornography as an expression of women’s freedom. By critical reading and analysis of radical feminism point of view on women’s sexuality, this work proves that feminisms are ant pornography. Pornography, since it always puts women as the object, is violence against women, dehumanization, and colonialization of women by the domination of patriarchal society. There is no way for women to minimize—if not to bring to an end—  pornography but to start realizing that women are the blamed victims and keep on struggling for gaining equal distribution of power between men and women. Besides, women have to ensure that women are not the only party who have responsibilities for moral degradation of society but at the same time women must be the one as the primary controller for their own body and life.

scholarly journals Distributive Justice: From Steinhaus, Knaster, and Banach to Elster and Rawls — The Perspective of Sociological Game Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tom Burns ◽  
Ewa Roszkowska ◽  
Nora Machado des Johansson
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Distributive Justice ◽  
Social Organization ◽  
Fair Division ◽  
Theoretical Framework ◽  
Human Judgment ◽  
Key Concepts ◽  
Point Of Departure ◽  
Organization Section

Abstract This article presents a relatively straightforward theoretical framework about distributive justice with applications. It draws on a few key concepts of Sociological Game Theory (SGT). SGT is presented briefly in section 2. Section 3 provides a spectrum of distributive cases concerning principles of equality, differentiation among recipients according to performance or contribution, status or authority, or need. Two general types of social organization of distributive judgment are distinguished and judgment procedures or algorithms are modeled in each type of social organization. Section 4 discusses briefly the larger moral landscapes of human judgment – how distribution may typically be combined with other value into consideration. The article suggests that Rawls, Elster, and Machado point in this direction. Finally, it is suggested that the SGT framework presented provides a useful point of departure to systematically link it and compare the Warsaw School of Fair Division, Rawls, and Elster, among others.

scholarly journals Cooperative n-person Prisoner's Dilemma on a Network

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 122-126
Author(s):  
Aleksandra L. Grinikh ◽  
◽  
Leon A. Petrosyan ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Pairwise Interaction ◽  
Network Interaction ◽  
The Game Theory

In the paper n-person prisoner's dilemma on the network is investigated. A cooperative game with the pairwise interaction of players is constructed. The model is a modification of the classic 2-person prisoner's dilemma problem in the game theory. Network interaction provide an ability to take into account the in uence only to the adjacent players from the whole set of players. The feature of the game is found that allows to make a decision about necessity of playing dominated strategy by a few players. This solution is based on the number of the adjacent players. The work is a continuation of the paper published earlier by Grinikh A.L. and Petrosyan L.A. in 2021.

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