Political Parties, World Demand, and Unemployment: Domestic and International Sources of Economic Activity

1985 ◽  
Vol 79 (4) ◽  
pp. 1016-1040 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Alt

This article replicates and extends earlier work on the politics of macroeconomic policy by considering political effects on unemployment in 14 western industrial nations between 1960 and 1983. Changes of party control of government display broadly the expected effects, namely that unemployment falls under left-wing governments and rises under right-wing governments. However, the principal conclusions of this article are that partisan effects on unemployment in open economies (that is, economies heavily dependent on trade with other countries) can only be satisfactorily estimated relative to the constraint imposed by the level of world economic activity, and that in addition to politicians' strategic incentives, political institutions and economic regime constraints also determine whether partisan effects on unemployment will be sustained, transitory, or absent. With respect to the latter, on the whole no effects are found where no such effects were promised by the new government before taking office; where one-party or dominant-partner coalitions form, the effect on unemployment is transitory, whereas where broad coalitions form, it is sustained or absent. Finally, ceteris paribus, any partisan effects are more likely where governments secure parliamentary majorities.

2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (8) ◽  
pp. 1661-1685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Casey Crisman-Cox

I examine how the chief executive’s political party affects domestic terrorism within democracies. In particular, I contribute to the literature on terrorism within democracies by arguing that domestic terrorist groups prefer attacking when right-wing parties hold office. I find evidence for this claim as well as results indicating that left-wing executives are more likely to cut deals with domestic terrorist groups. These trends suggest that domestic terrorist groups attack during right-wing governance to build their reputation and reduce violence during left-wing governance to appear moderate and get a deal. These results contribute to literatures on differences between left and right parties, how political institutions affect terrorism, and differences between domestic and transnational terrorism.


2020 ◽  
pp. 50-84
Author(s):  
Jonathan Hopkin

This chapter analyzes the electoral successes of anti-system forces, looking at how differences in the social, economic, and political institutions in rich democracies determine the extent and nature of anti-system support. Anti-system politics is stronger in countries that are structurally prone to run trade deficits, have weak or badly designed welfare states, and have electoral rules that artificially suppress the range of political options voters can choose from. The chapter also shows that the ways in which welfare systems distribute exposure to economic risks predict whether anti-system politics takes a predominantly left-wing or right-wing direction. Right-wing anti-system politics is successful in creditor countries with very inclusive welfare states. Meanwhile, left-wing anti-system politics is stronger in debtor countries with “dualistic” welfare states.


2018 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-110
Author(s):  
Federico Tomassi

Social and economic inequalities between the city centre and peripheral belts persist for many years in Rome districts, in parallel to the on-going suburban sprawl. That yields political effects too, since electoral results from 2000 to 2018 highlight sharp political polarization: votes for left-wing (right-wing or Five Star Movement) candidates are inversely (directly) proportional to distance from Capitoline Hill. Notably, in 2018 general election, the left-wing coalition prevailed in central districts only, where education levels and personal income are very high, and (even if only slightly) in historical periphery, where it keeps consensus on progressive, inclusive and liberal policies. The opposite holds for the new populist Five Star Movement, that prevailed in low-density periphery inside the Orbital, in far-off sprawled districts and in Ostia coastal area. However, the right-wing coalition won in Rome as a whole, by more homogeneous and even inter-classist consensus, and prevailed outside the Orbital thanks to the League, that had for the very first time many votes in the Roman peripheries. As a matter of facts, both right-wing and populist policies seem easier to the extent that suburban citizens feel deprived since harmed by economic crisis, unsafe and worried about immigrants, far from elected bodies, scarcely endowed with public services.


Author(s):  
A. Bunina

The article examines the evolution of right-wing radicalism and extremism in the United States during the period from 2015 to January 2021 and their destructive impact on elections and power transit. The main drivers of radicalization are explored, with special attention paid to the role of conspiracy theories, in particular the QAnon phenomenon. The article analyzes how the Internet in general and social networks in particular created echo chambers and accelerated the spread of radical ideas. Distinctions are made between the more traditional forms of radicalism and the new generation of radicals (that flourished under the Donald Trump administration). Righ-wing radicalism of the new generation is dominated by cultural libertarianism, comprised of “alt-right” and “alt-light” movements, antagonistic towards left-wing radicalism. While the Trump administration underplayed the rise in right-wing extremism, it considerably overstated the threat of left-wing radicalism. Special attention is paid to thе role of the media, including its growing lack of neutrality and emergence of the ecosphere for conservative viewers where fakes and conspiracy mindsets thrive. Anti-democratic behavior of the president and the Republican Party are explored, including deliberate misleading of voters and denial of the presidential election results. The storming of the Capitol on January 6, 2021 is interpreted as a natural progression of the above-mentioned trends. In conclusion, the forecast of future trends is made. These trends include persistence of populist sentiments, the increasing role of the alt-right, persistence of street violence, and the growing acceptance of anti-democratic behavior. All of this presents a serious challenge not only for the Republican Party, but also for the U.S. political institutions in general.


2009 ◽  
pp. 26-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Glaziev

The article analyzes fundamental reasons for the world economic crisis in the light of global technological shifts. It proves that it is caused by the substitution of technological modes. It is shown that sharp increase and slump in stock indices and prices for energy resources are typical of the process of technological substitution which occurs regularly according to the rhythm of long-wave fluctuations of the world economic activity. The article rationalizes a package of anti-crisis measures aimed at stimulating the new technological mode. Its structure and role of the locomotive factor of the new long wave of economic growth are revealed.


2020 ◽  
pp. 003329411989990
Author(s):  
Burcu Tekeş ◽  
E. Olcay Imamoğlu ◽  
Fatih Özdemir ◽  
Bengi Öner-Özkan

The aims of this study were to test: (a) the association of political orientations with morality orientations, specified by moral foundations theory, on a sample of young adults from Turkey, representing a collectivistic culture; and (b) the statistically mediating roles of needs for cognition and recognition in the links between political orientation and morality endorsements. According to the results (a) right-wing orientation and need for recognition were associated with all the three binding foundations (i.e., in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity); (b) right-wing orientation was associated with binding foundations also indirectly via the role of need for recognition; (c) regarding individualizing foundations, left-wing orientation and need for cognition were associated with fairness/reciprocity, whereas only gender was associated with harm/care; and (d) left-wing orientation was associated with fairness dimension also indirectly via the role of need for cognition. The cultural relevance of moral foundations theory as well as the roles of needs for cognition and recognition are discussed.


2021 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 163-185
Author(s):  
Sung Min Han ◽  
Mi Jeong Shin

AbstractIn this article, we argue that rising housing prices increase voter approval of incumbent governments because such a rise increases personal wealth, which leads to greater voter satisfaction. This effect is strongest under right-wing governments because those who benefit from rising prices—homeowners—are more likely to be right-leaning. Non-homeowners, who are more likely to vote for left-leaning parties, will view rising housing prices as a disadvantage and therefore feel the government does not serve them well, which will mitigate the advantage to left-wing governments. We find support for our arguments using both macro-level data (housing prices and government approval ratings in 16 industrialized countries between 1960 and 2017) and micro-level data (housing prices and individuals’ vote choices in the United Kingdom using the British Household Panel Survey). The findings imply that housing booms benefit incumbent governments generally and right-wing ones in particular.


Genealogy ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 60
Author(s):  
Anna Miglietta ◽  
Barbara Loera

We analyzed the relationship between modern forms of populism and citizen support for exclusive welfare policies and proposals, and we focused on support for left-wing- and right-wing-oriented welfare policies enacted or proposed during the Lega Nord (LN)–Five Star Movement (FSM) government in Italy (2018–2019). In light of the theoretical perspective of political ideology as motivated by social cognition, we examined citizens’ support for the two policies considering adherence to populist attitudes, agreement on the criteria useful to define ingroup membership, and personal values. We also took into account the role of cognitive sophistication in populism avoidance. A total of 785 Italian adults (F = 56.6; mean age = 35.8) completed an online survey in the summer of 2019 based on the following: support for populist policies and proposals, political ideologies and positioning, personal values, and ingroup boundaries. We used correlation and regression analyses. The results highlight the relationships between populism and political conservatism. Populism was related to the vertical and horizontal borders defining the “people”; cognitive sophistication was not a relevant driver. We identified some facilitating factors that could promote adherence to and support for public policies inspired by the values of the right or of the left, without a true ideological connotation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 107-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Baris Kesgin

Scholars and policymakers have long used the shorthand of hawks and doves to characterize leader personalities that correspond to a particular political inclination, whereby hawks are considered right-wing and more aggressive in foreign policy, and doves are left-wing and more peaceful. This article posits that a sound discussion of who hawks and doves in foreign policy are requires an engagement with research on political leadership. It promises a less superficial understanding of the dichotomy of hawks and doves, and uses leadership trait analysis to explore hawkish and dovish leaders’ qualities. The article profiles Israel’s prime ministers since the end of the Cold War, where in a high security environment, these words are most often used to describe its domestic and foreign matters and its cooperative and conflictual actions. This article’s findings encourage an unpacking of these commonly used shorthand labels with political leadership approaches. They are also useful to highlight, most notably, the significance of complexity and distrust in understanding hawkish and dovish leaders. Hawks think simpler and are more doubtful of others than doves, this article finds. Future research, the article suggests, will benefit from looking deeper than simple, dichotomous use of this analogy, and exploring ways to operationalize individual-level measurements of hawks and doves in foreign policy.


Thesis Eleven ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 072551362110059
Author(s):  
Tamir Bar-On

In this paper, I argue that the Alt-Right needs to be taken seriously by the liberal establishment, the general public, and leftist cultural elites for five main reasons: 1) its ‘right-wing Gramscianism’ borrows from the French New Right ( Nouvelle Droite – ND) and the French and pan-European Identitarian movement. This means that it is engaged in the continuation of a larger Euro-American metapolitical struggle to change hearts and minds on issues related to white nationalism, anti-Semitism, and racialism; 2) it is indebted to the metapolitical evolution of sectors of the violent neo-Nazi and earlier white nationalist movements in the USA; 3) this metapolitical orientation uses the mass media, the internet, and social media in general to reach and influence the masses of Americans; 4) the ‘cultural war’ means that the Alt-Right’s spokesman Richard Spencer, French ND leader Alain de Benoist, and other intellectuals see themselves as a type of Leninist vanguard on the radical right, which borrows from left-wing authors such as Antonio Gramsci and their positions in order to win the metapolitical struggle against ‘dominant’ liberal and left-wing political and cultural elites; and 5) this ‘cultural war’ is intellectually and philosophically sophisticated because it understands the crucial role of culture in destabilizing liberal society and makes use of important philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche, Carl Schmitt, Julius Evola and others in order to give credence to its revolutionary, racialist, and anti-liberal ideals.


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