The Elizabethan Dramatic Companies

PMLA ◽  
1920 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-159
Author(s):  
Alwin Thaler

Of the several agencies whose joint functioning made possible the Elizaibethan theatre, the most neglected, the least understood, and yet in some respects the most important, is the dramatic company. The history and organization of the playhouses have long since attracted the attention of scholars, and the individual fortune of the playwrights and actors has been studied from many points of view. Research on the dramatic companies, on the other hand, has taken but one direction. Fleay, Maas, and Murray have gone far to establish the chronology of the companies, but their real place in the history of the Elizabethan theatre has not been established. General works on the Elizabethan drama and theatre have failed to give them the attention they deserve, and the general student of the period hardly realizes that upon the companies rested a considerable share of the financial responsibility for the drama and the entire burden of producing it. Nor is it difficult to understand why the dramatic companies have been neglected. Writers upon our period have been content to treat of Elizabethan actors in a manner fitting those of all succeeding periods. The function of the modern actor is to act. The theatrical capitalist and the specialized skill of the producer relieve him of all the financial, and a substantial part of the artistic, responsibility which rested upon Elizabethan actors. If, however, the Elizabethan actor had greater responsibilities, he had also greater opportunities. The Elizabethan drama owes far more than has yet been realized to the fact that many of the playwrights and all of the producing managers were great actors, who knew the audience intimately enough to gauge its capacities, who acknowledged no paymaster or employer but that audience, and whose instincts partook alike of the shrewdness of the successful business man and the daring of the artist. This producing and managerial function of the companies justifies a closer investigation than has yet been made of their place in the theatrical activities of the time and of the business organization which enabled them to hold it.

2009 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-47
Author(s):  
Mark Noble

This essay argues that Ralph Waldo Emerson's interest in the cutting-edge science of his generation helps to shape his understanding of persons as fluid expressions of power rather than solid bodies. In his 1872 "Natural History of Intellect," Emerson correlates the constitution of the individual mind with the tenets of Michael Faraday's classical field theory. For Faraday, experimenting with electromagnetism reveals that the atom is a node or point on a network, and that all matter is really the arrangement of energetic lines of force. This atomic model offers Emerson a technology for envisioning a materialized subjectivity that both unravels personal identity and grants access to impersonal power. On the one hand, adopting Faraday's field theory resonates with many of the affirmative philosophical and ethical claims central to Emerson's early essays. On the other hand, however, distributing the properties of Faraday's atoms onto the properties of the person also entails moments in which materialized subjects encounter their own partiality, limitation, and suffering. I suggest that Emerson represents these aspects of experience in terms that are deliberately discrepant from his conception of universal power. He presumes that if every experience boils down to the same lines of force, then the particular can be trivialized with respect to the general. As a consequence, Emerson must insulate his philosophical assertions from contamination by our most poignant experiences of limitation. The essay concludes by distinguishing Emersonian "Necessity" from Friedrich Nietzsche's similar conception of amor fati, which routes the affirmation of fate directly through suffering.


2021 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 148-154
Author(s):  
Natalia A. Guz ◽  
Yulia G. Babicheva

The purpose of the work is to explore the point of view in Vasily Shukshin's short stories in its systematic and diverse manifestation. Topicality is provided by the exceptional significance of this category in narratology. The study of the point of view based on the material of short stories by Vasily Shukshin has been conducted for the first time. The article briefly traces the history of scientific understanding of the category of point of view in foreign and Russian philology and notes the variety of approaches and definitions in the formulation of the concept. The authors use the classification of Boris Uspenskij for analysis and consider the point of view in Vasily Shukshin's short stories in psychological, ideological (evaluative), spatial-temporal and phraseological terms. The positions of Boris Korman, Yuri Lotman, Wolf Schmid and Franz Karl Stanzel also take into account. The authors note the features of Vasily Shukshin's narration that affect the expression of the point of view in the text. Vasily Shukshin's short stories are characterised by a dynamic and frequent change of points of view, which indicates the technique of “montageˮ and similarities in this regard with cinematic techniques. The conclusions generalise the variety of ways and forms of expression of the point of view in the studied artistic material. The point of view in the considered stories is characterised by variability in the correlation of subjects of speech and subjects of consciousness, alternation of external and internal points of view, mutual transitions from one to the other, text interference and other hybrid phenomena.


1970 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 285-288
Author(s):  
Jacek Poznański

Can science, theology and spirituality cooperate with each other? Moreover, can each of them help the other to understand reality? Is it possible to create a coherent view of our world emerging from such different points of view? Some theologians, well-educated both in theology and science and aware of questions that arose in the history of relations between science and theology, have tried to build such consistent views. Among them is William R. Stoeger, Staff Astrophysicist and Adjunct Associate Professor, member of Vatican Observatory Research Group, Steward Observatory, University of Arizona, Tucson.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (46) ◽  
pp. 40-54
Author(s):  
Siegfried Zielinski

In this article, the author examines the contrasting worldviews of specific philosophers, architects, and physicists in an attempt to identify a position that would represent a viable alternative to the concept of universalization. In the history of civilization, he asserts, almost all wars have been of a territorial nature. Territories tend toward uniformity and universalization. He contrasts this worldview with reflections on oceanic thinking, which perceives bodies of water such as the Mediterranean as mediators between continents as well as between opposing worldviews, connecting and dividing at the same time. The sea, however, does not connect in order to homogenize but rather creates distance as an important prerequisite for true communication, thus linking multiplicity in all its variety as a viable alternative to universalism. The author moves on to scrutinize the cosmopolitan attitude as a paradox that on the one hand is oriented to the particular individual and on the other hand to an imaginary world community, that is, the universal. Taking this notion further to consider today’s world that is saturated with the imaginary and symbolic power of the Internet, the author proposes that cosmopolitanism could be understood as an adequate expression for the technologically advanced world community by its capability to strike a balance between the individual and the world as a whole, on one side, and synthetic identity generated by culture and technology, on the other. Nevertheless, deviating from all of these worldviews, the author concludes with a short reflection, inspired by two films, on an alternative to cosmopolitanism that he calls cosmoethics, which employs ethics as the guiding principle of thought and action and commits to a practice that stays in close contact not only with real but also with diverse realities.


1962 ◽  
Vol 21 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-489 ◽  
Author(s):  
John A. Garraty

These papers throw a great deal of light upon the history of biography. There are a number of striking similarities between Chinese biography and that which developed in the Western world. These similarities, at least until recent times, do not seem to have resulted from any influence of one form upon the other, and thus they serve to illuminate the nature of the form itself. First of all, although the traditional Chinese view of the relation of the individual to society seems to have been quite different from that common in the West, the earliest motives in writing biography were essentially the same. Eulogy, for example—what Nivison calls the “paying of final respect to the dead”—seems to be a universal motive for writing biography. So also does the desire to use the life of a person to teach a lesson—the didactic motive which all three of these papers refer to and which dominated Western biography for centuries. The idea mentioned by Nivison of burying a brief biography along with departed worthies has its parallel in the tomb inscriptions of the Egyptian pharaohs.


Discourse ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (6) ◽  
pp. 28-41
Author(s):  
L. A. Pafomova

Introduction. Evolution of views on the value of scientific knowledge in various directions of Western philosophy, from the ancient period to the 20th century is analyzed in the article. The relevance of the article is due to the fact that the view of scientific knowledge as the value of scientific reality is a fairly new phenomenon.Methodology and sources. The methodological basis of the work is the cultural and philosophical analysis of various points of view in the works of both ancient philosophers, philosophers of the Renaissance and the New times (Plato, Aristotle, Pythagoras, F. Aquinas, Leonard da Vinci, F. Bacon, Locke, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza), as well as in the works of O. Comte, Spencer, Mach, Poincare, Pierce, James, Dewey, Jaspers, B. Russell, etc. (i.e. representatives of positivism, existentialism, neo-Thomism).Results and discussion. Today two directions could be distinguished in the relation to science: either its absolutization, that we name scientism, or the cult of an abstract person opposed to science – anthropologism. This is a consequence of the changes in the views on scientific knowledge that have taken place throughout the history of science. Thus, in the ancient period, the value of science was determined, firstly, not in relation to the practical activity of a human being, but only in relation to science to knowledge and cognition, and secondly, as a way of self-development of the individual. In the Middle Ages, science was the “handmaid” of theology. In the Renaissance science faced new challenges: the first was an anti-religious understanding of the essence of a person, the second was the justification of the role of scientific knowledge both for practice and for the worldview as a whole. It was on this understanding of the meaning of scientific knowledge that the concepts of the philosophers of the XVII–XVIII centuries were built, and they dominated until the middle of the XIX century. From this period, a one-sided approach begins to dominate – the ideological role of the value of science was denied and only its pragmatic value is taken. Along with this, there is also a critical attitude towards science, which then develops into anti-scientism. Today, a pessimistic approach (postmodernism, for example) the approach to the consideration of the value of scientific knowledge is characteristic of modern philosophical trends that deny not only the value of scientific knowledge, but also deny knowledge itself.Conclusion. The evaluation of scientific knowledge in Western philosophy has undergone significant changes. If in classical philosophy, with a few exceptions, the recognition of the comprehensive value of science prevailed, i.e. its ideological, humanistic and practical value, then in the future all these three main aspects of the value of scientific knowledge are analyzed. In the extreme forms, this leads to the emergence of antiscientism, for which it is the development of scientific knowledge is perceived as a source of human misery and suffering.


1993 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 350-358 ◽  
Author(s):  
Manjit S. Yadav ◽  
Kent B. Monroe

Although bundling, the selling of two or more products and/or services at a single price, has a history of economic research, marketing-oriented investigations have appeared only recently. This paper examines buyers’ perceptions of overall savings when they evaluate a bundle offer. Such perceptions of overall bundle savings may consist of two separate perceptions of savings, each with a different relative influence: (1) perceived savings on the individual items if purchased separately and (2) perceived additional savings on the bundle. Results of an experiment indicate that additional savings offered directly on the bundle have a greater relative impact on buyers’ perceptions of transaction value than savings offered on the bundle's individual items. The effect of each saving is also influenced by the magnitude of the other saving.


2001 ◽  
Vol 7 (S2) ◽  
pp. 608-609
Author(s):  
J.Paul Robinson

Introduction This presentation will follow the pathways to convergence of two very complementary technologies - flow cytometry and imaging. Interestingly, each technology has evolved and matured almost exclusively isolated from the other. in the past several years it has become increasingly clear that these technologies are able to deliver complementary solutions and that when combined the end value of each exceeds the sum of the individual components.History of development Flow cytometry has a rich history over the past 40 years. Ironically, as a technology, flow cytometry was almost a consolation prize to its imaging cousins. in fact, it seems that it might only have been because imaging solutions proved to be technologically difficult that flow cytometry not only thrived, but left the imaging field well behind for nearly 20 years. Initial interest in evaluating differences between normal and cancer cells was almost exclusively attempted by imaging techniques.


1863 ◽  
Vol 8 (44) ◽  
pp. 535-545
Author(s):  
J. Crichton Browne

At the close of our last paper on personal identity we had just turned to the consideration of those apparent morbid divisions of the unity of consciousness which are sometimes, though happily rarely, brought under the notice of medical psychologists. Double consciousness, as we have already hinted, is essentially a result of diseased action, and comprehends a variety of conditions, distinguished from each other by differences in the mental symptoms, and by the relations to each other of the lucid and insane or of the two insane “oscillations.” In all of them, however, there is, for the time, a change, a perversion, or an exaltation, of the mental identity of the individual, of that principle which is, as it were, a centre round which the other faculties of mind revolve, and about which memories cluster. In the intensest forms of double consciousness, so called, mental identity is separated or multiplied into two distinct parts, so that two identities reside in the same individual, while in the milder manifestations of this condition there is a partial division of the same principle, a confusion of two natures in the same person. Where two alternating, though altogether unconnected, lives are lived by the same being, there is afforded, we think, a proof that mental identity is something more than consciousness, and so far independent in its affections. Indeed, it appears to us that the morbid states at present under examination would have been more aptly described as instances of double identity rather than of double consciousness. The phrase double consciousness is a contradiction in terms, for it is manifestly absurd to suppose that the mind can exist in two different states at the same moment. It is also a misleading expression, for this is not, of course, the meaning which it is intended to convey, nor is it at all descriptive of the conditions to which it is applied. These conditions are not necessarily characterised by any alteration of consciousness; that is to say, if consciousness is regarded as having reference simply to the present existing operation of the mind, for the man who inhabits alternately two distinct mental spheres may be perfectly conscious in both of them. In both of them his eyes, his ears, and all his organs of sense, may be normally active. In both of them, with equal accuracy, he may appreciate his surroundings, govern his movements, and express his ideas. In both of them he may be equally conscious, but he is not similarly conscious. The same world is inspected from different points of view in each. In the one it may be the real world, as it is to the perceptions of ordinary people; in the other, the world clad in the unsubstantial figments of a feverish fancy; or in both, a shadowy world, made up of metamorphosed realities. But whatever the metamorphoses may be, they arise, not from errors of perception, but of the personality—perceiving. A man who has passed into the abnormal phase of double consciousness sees all the familiar faces that surround him, but he does not recognise them; he hears loved and well-known voices, but they fall upon his ears as strange sounds; he beholds his household gods, but these do not, as they were wont, awaken emotion in his mind; in short, he regards everything in a new light and apart from former associations. The mind, shorn of its past, begins to learn the lessons of life anew, and perceives every object in relation to its new condition, the result of internal changes. The outward creation becomes subordinate to the inward idea, and is regarded only as it harmonises with the reigning delusion.


1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 64-81
Author(s):  
Albrecht Wellmer

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.


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