Marks of Identity

Author(s):  
Peter Brooks

This chapter begins by looking at a very literal form of marks of identity—fingerprints—then examines the obsession of modern societies with issues of identity. While the notion of identity is not new—especially as a philosophical topic—a widespread concern with one's personal identity, and its relations to “the others” among whom one lives, seems to have emerged with greater intensity with the Enlightenment, and to gain force throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and into modern time. To the extent that a characteristic of modernity is a new valuation of the individual, the obsession with identity follows almost inevitably.

Author(s):  
Jakub Čapek ◽  
Sophie Loidolt

AbstractThis special issue addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint, especially contemporary phenomenological research on selfhood. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke’s initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke. We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the Anglophone debates on personal identity were initially formed by the persistence question and the characterization question, the “Continental” tradition included remarkably intense debates on the individual or the self as being unique or “concrete,” deeply temporal and—as claimed by some philosophers, like Sartre and Foucault—unable to have any identity, if not one externally imposed. We describe the Continental line of thinking about the “self” as a reply and an adjustment to the post-Lockean “personal identity” question (as suggested by thinkers such as MacIntyre, Ricœur and Taylor). These observations constitute the backdrop for our presentation of phenomenological approaches to personal identity. These approaches run along three lines: (a) debates on the layers of the self, starting from embodiment and the minimal self and running all the way to the full-fledged concept of person; (b) questions of temporal becoming, change and stability, as illustrated, for instance, by aging or transformative life-experiences; and (c) the constitution of identity in the social, institutional, and normative space. The introduction thus establishes a structure for locating and connecting the different contributions in our special issue, which, as an ensemble, represent a strong and differentiated contribution to the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological perspective.


2020 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 20190074 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew Beaumont

This article explores the emergence, in late nineteenth-century Britain and the USA, of the ‘insomniac’ as a distinct pathological and social archetype. Sleeplessness has of course been a human problem for millennia, but only since the late-Victorian period has there been a specific diagnostic name for the individual who suffers chronically from insufficient sleep. The introductory section of the article, which notes the current panic about sleep problems, offers a brief sketch of the history of sleeplessness, acknowledging the transhistorical nature of this condition but also pointing to the appearance, during the period of the Enlightenment, of the term ‘insomnia’ itself. The second section makes more specific historical claims about the rise of insomnia in the accelerating conditions of everyday life in urban society at the end of the nineteenth century. It traces the rise of the insomniac as such, especially in the context of medical debates about ‘neurasthenia’, as someone whose identity is constitutively defined by their inability to sleep. The third section, tightening the focus of the article, goes on to reconstruct the biography of one exemplary late nineteenth-century insomniac, the American dentist Albert Kimball, in order to illustrate the claim that insomnia was one of the pre-eminent symptoms of a certain crisis in industrial and metropolitan modernity as this social condition was lived by individuals at the fin de siècle .


Author(s):  
GRAHAM OLIVER

The chapter focuses on the commemoration of the individual in ancient and modern cultures. It argues that the attitude to individual commemoration adopted by the War Graves Commission in the First World War in Britain can be linked to the commemorative practices of ancient Greece, emphasising the importance of the part played by Sir Frederic Kenyon. The chapter draws on examples of commemoration from classical Athens, twentieth-century Britain and the Soviet Union in order to explore the different roles that the commemoration of the individual has played in ancient and modern forms of war commemoration.


2020 ◽  
pp. 56-71
Author(s):  
Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei

This chapter shows the inheritance by existentialism of ideas from the philosophical tradition. Socrates serves for Kierkegaard and Marcel as a model for the authentic practice of philosophy and for initiating interior reflection of the self. Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus debated Stoicism’s understanding of freedom from external circumstances. Husserl and Heidegger interpreted Augustine’s conception of time, while Heidegger along with Beauvoir adapted, in a secular context, features of his conception of religious conversion. Augustine, Shakespeare, and Montaigne explored inner reflection and the nature of the self which came to be critically echoed in existentialist conceptions. The Enlightenment generated a philosophy of human freedom, defending the rational autonomy of the individual. Critical engagement of these ideas is shown to have shaped existentialist conceptions of authenticity, subjectivity, inwardness, freedom, and responsibility.


Author(s):  
Charles B. Guignon

The term ‘existentialism’ is sometimes reserved for the works of Jean-Paul Sartre, who used it to refer to his own philosophy in the 1940s. But it is more often used as a general name for a number of thinkers in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who made the concrete individual central to their thought. Existentialism in this broader sense arose as a backlash against philosophical and scientific systems that treat all particulars, including humans, as members of a genus or instances of universal laws. It claims that our own existence as unique individuals in concrete situations cannot be grasped adequately in such theories, and that systems of this sort conceal from us the highly personal task of trying to achieve self-fulfilment in our lives. Existentialists therefore start out with a detailed description of the self as an ‘existing individual’, understood as an agent involved in a specific social and historical world. One of their chief aims is to understand how the individual can achieve the richest and most fulfilling life in the modern world. Existentialists hold widely differing views about human existence, but there are a number of recurring themes in their writings. First, existentialists hold that humans have no pregiven purpose or essence laid out for them by God or by nature; it is up to each one of us to decide who and what we are through our own actions. This is the point of Sartre’s definition of existentialism as the view that, for humans, ‘existence precedes essence’. What this means is that we first simply exist - find ourselves born into a world not of our own choosing - and it is then up to each of us to define our own identity or essential characteristics in the course of what we do in living out our lives. Thus, our essence (our set of defining traits) is chosen, not given. Second, existentialists hold that people decide their own fates and are responsible for what they make of their lives. Humans have free will in the sense that, no matter what social and biological factors influence their decisions, they can reflect on those conditions, decide what they mean, and then make their own choices as to how to handle those factors in acting in the world. Because we are self-creating or self-fashioning beings in this sense, we have full responsibility for what we make of our lives. Finally, existentialists are concerned with identifying the most authentic and fulfilling way of life possible for individuals. In their view, most of us tend to conform to the ways of living of the ‘herd’: we feel we are doing well if we do what ‘one’ does in familiar social situations. In this respect, our lives are said to be ‘inauthentic’, not really our own. To become authentic, according to this view, an individual must take over their own existence with clarity and intensity. Such a transformation is made possible by such profound emotional experiences as anxiety or the experience of existential guilt. When we face up to what is revealed in such experiences, existentialists claim, we will have a clearer grasp of what is at stake in life, and we will be able to become more committed and integrated individuals.


Philosophy ◽  
1976 ◽  
Vol 51 (195) ◽  
pp. 47-55
Author(s):  
Geoffrey Madell

In ‘The Concept of a Person’ Ayer presents a theory of personal identity which has never, to my knowledge, attracted the close attention which it deserves. The theory puts forward bodily continuity as the central criterion of personal identity. In this, of course, Ayer does not differ from many other philosophers who have written on this subject. The real interest of Ayer's view is that it is quite explicit that the body is taken as the principle of unity underlying one's experiences, as that in virtue of which a series of experiences are the experiences of one person. Without the body, ‘not only is it not clear how the individual experiences are to be identified, but there appears to be no principle according to which they can be grouped together; there is no answer to the question what makes two experiences which are separate in time the experiences of the same self’ (pp. 113–114). Some link between experiences there must be. Memory cannot serve as this link, since remembering an experience already implies thinking of it as one's own. The only acceptable candidate is the body.


1998 ◽  
Vol 19 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 35-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Neuhouser

My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel's claim that ethical life (Sittlichkeit) does not simply negate but rather incorporates, or preserves, crucial elements of the Enlightenment conception of moral subjectivity that Hegel associates with the standpoint of Morality (Moralität). More specifically, the part of Hegel's view I want to examine here is his claim that individual moral conscience (Gewissen) has its place within the rational social order as depicted in Part III of The Philosophy of Right, “Ethical Life”. There is a widespread perception among Hegel's liberal critics that his vision of the rational social order allows no place for the genuine expression of moral conscience. This is the view expressed, for example, in Ernst Tugendhat's recent charge that Hegel's view excludes the possibility of “adopting a rational perspective” on a society's prevailing norms and practices’: “Hegel does not allow for the possibility of a responsible, critical relation to the … state. Instead he tells us that existing laws have an absolute authority. The independent conscience of the individual must disappear, and trust takes the place of reflection. This is what Hegel means by the Aufhebung of morality into ethical life”.


2016 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 618-645
Author(s):  
Michael Hines

Even though the black community of antebellum New York City lived in a society that marginalized them socially and economically, they were intent on pursuing the basic privileges of American citizenship. One tactic African Americans employed to this end was the tenacious pursuit of education, which leaders believed would act both as an aid in economic advancement and as a counterargument against the widely assumed social inferiority of their race. The weekly newspaper, Freedom's Journal, the first African American owned and operated newspaper in the United States, was an avid supporter of this strategy of social elevation through education. From 1827 to 1829, the paper's editors, John Russwurm and Samuel Cornish, used their platform to advertise for a range of schools, editorialize on the importance of learning, and draw connections between the enlightenment of the individual and the progress of the race.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 168-172
Author(s):  
N.G. Grigorieva ◽  
◽  
S.M. Drutckaya ◽  

The article considers the classification of causes of professional self-determination, analyzes the psychological essence of professional self-determination and the influence of this phenomenon on the life trajectory of the individual. The causes of professional self-determination and their role in the formation of students' learning motivation are studied. The article describes an empirically determined hierarchy of factors of professional self-determination according to their significance for the individual


10.14201/3033 ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio Bernal Guerrero

RESUMEN: En este estudio, replanteamos, vinculándolo a su dimensión moral, el problema de la identidad personal. Analizamos los elementos esenciales para la comprensión del fenómeno moral y proponemos el reconocimiento de la identidad en sentido formal, fundamento para el reconocimiento de la identidad de los demás, como alternativa a la tradicional perspectiva sustancializadora y al enfoque posmoderno que propone su disolución. Desde esta fundamentación del constructo identidad personal, se plantea la posibilidad de la construcción de la dimensión moral como parte central de la configuración positiva, humanizadora, de la identidad de la persona. Como componente esencial de un proyecto de educación moral, tratamos de delimitar las competencias generales que configuran la identidad moral del sujeto. Desde un enfoque educativo que asume la complejidad y la incertidumbre de los fenómenos humanos, las competencias propuestas se dirigen a la construcción posible de una persona moralmente autónoma.ABSTRACT: This study approaches the problem of personal identity linked to its moral dimension. We analyse the elements that are essential for understanding the moral phenomenon and we propose the recognition of identity in a formal sense, the basis for the recognition of the identity of others as an alternative to the traditional substantialising focus and to the post-modern focus that proposes its dissolution. From this basis for the personal identity construct, we propose the possibility of constructing the moral dimension as a central element of the positive, humanising configuration of the individual. As an essential component of a moral education project, we try to define the general responsibilities that configure the subject's moral identity. The proposed responsibilities are directed towards the possible construction of a morally autonomous individual from an educational approach that is fully aware of the unpredictable nature of human phenomena.SOMMAIRE: Dans cette étude, nous posons une fois de plus, en le rattachant à sa dimension morale, le problème de l'identité personnelle. Nous analysons les éléments essentiels en vue de la compréhension du phénomène moral et nous proposons la reconnaissance de l'identité dans son sens formel, comme fondement de la reconnaissance de l'identité des autres, comme alternative au point de vue substancialisateur et d'une optique post-moderne qui propose sa dissolution. À partir du fondement de la constructivité de l'identité personnelle, on envisage la possibilité de la construction de la dimension morale comme partie centrale de la configuration positive, humanisatrice, de l'identité de la personne. Comme compétence essentielle d'un projet d'éducation morale, nous essayons de délimiter les compétences générales qui configurent l'identité morale du sujet. D'un point de vue éducatif qui assume la complexité et l'incertitude des phénomèmes humains, les compétences proposées visent à la construction possible d'une personne moralement autonome.


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