Evolutionary strategies of consumer federation and manufacturer under recall mechanism

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-13
Author(s):  
Chuanxu Wang ◽  
Changqun Song ◽  
Lang Xu
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Penalty Coefficient ◽  
High Penalty ◽  
The Cost

Based on an unqualified product recalling process in a supply chain, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model between consumer federation and manufacturer, as well as analyzes the effects of manufacturer’s pricing strategy and consumer federation’s supervision on the decision-making and dynamic tendency. Under this structure, the manufacturers’ pricing strategies on recalls mechanism have two scenarios: the high penalty and low penalty from consumer federation. Results shows that, when the consumer federation adopts high penalty measures, there will be an ESS for consumer federation that can both minimize the cost and protect consumers’ rights. Further, the probability of manufacturer adopting “recall” strategy is positively correlated with the change in the product price, and both the probability of consumer federation adopting “regulate” strategy and manufacturer adopting “recall” strategy are positively correlated with the penalty coefficient.

The effect on pricing strategies in the process of strategic decision making in view of cost of produced goods

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (7) ◽  
pp. 1705-1727
Author(s):  
Syed Mohammad Faisal ◽  
Ahmad Khalid Khan
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Fair Value ◽  
Strategic Decision ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Sources Of Information ◽  
Pricing Policy ◽  
Secondary Sources ◽  
Pricing Decision ◽  
The Cost

This research examined the effect of the cost of produced goods on pricing strategies in the process of strategic decision. Also examined in this research is the extended effect of pricing strategies on consumers purchase decision making. The research aimed to answer questions on the extent to which cost of produced goods affects pricing strategies of products, how decision makers realize the value-based pricing strategy of corporations and the extent to which pricing policy help consumers to make purchase decisions. This research being historical and descriptive depended basically on secondary sources of information. The research used a historical and descriptive method and depended basically and simply on secondary devices as sources of data. Results from the data acquired reference that customers have an understanding of fair value reflected in prices of the firm's products. The researcher will use both analytical and descriptive methods which appropriate the context of the current research which is generally based on the theoretical underpinnings and fieldwork. The outcomes indicate that the cost of produced products used in organizations provides quality information; there is an effect of this information on the pricing decision-making; there are parts in which pricing strategy much relied on the information provided by the cost systems.

scholarly journals Research on Cooperative Innovation Behavior of Industrial Cluster Based on Subject Adaptability

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaohui Jia ◽  
Minghui Jiang ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Steady State ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Industrial Cluster ◽  
Industrial Clusters ◽  
Government Support ◽  
Correlated Equilibrium ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Cooperative Innovation ◽  
The Cost ◽  
The Impact

From the perspective of the interactive cooperation among subjects, this paper portrays the process of cooperative innovation in industrial cluster, in order to capture the correlated equilibrium relationship among them. Through the utilization of two key tools, evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics equations, this paper considers the cost and gains of cooperative innovation and the amount of government support as well as other factors to build and analyze a classic evolutionary game model. On this basis, the subject’s own adaptability is introduced, which is regarded as the system noise in the stochastic evolutionary game model so as to analyze the impact of adaptability on the game strategy selection. The results show that, in the first place, without considering subjects’ adaptability, their cooperation in industrial clusters depends on the cost and gains of innovative cooperation, the amount of government support, and some conditions that can promote cooperation, namely, game steady state. In the second place after the introduction of subjects’ adaptability, it will affect both game theory selection process and time, which means that the process becomes more complex, presents the nonlinear characteristics, and helps them to make faster decisions in their favor, but the final steady state remains unchanged.

Revenue Sharing Contract of Green Supply Chain under Manufacturer Risk-Aversion

2014 ◽  
Vol 697 ◽  
pp. 482-487
Author(s):  
Shi Ying Jiang ◽  
Chun Yan Ma
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing Contract

Background on two stages green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, considering the degree of risk aversion and product greenness, consumer preferences and other factors, the centralized decision-making game model and manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model are established.Then two game models are compared. The interaction of product greenness, wholesale price, product price,and risk aversion utility for manufacturers and retailers are also disscussed. Finally, the revenue sharing contract is applied to coordinate the green supply chain . The results show that:(1) In the centralized decision-making model, there is a critical value of the product green degree; (2)In manufacturer-leading Stackelberg game model, the higher the green degree of the product, the higher the manufacturer's wholesale price,and the wholesale price increases as risk aversion degree of manufacturers improves;(3)The revenue sharing contract can coordinate this type of green supply chain under manufacturers risk-averse.

scholarly journals Research on the Collaborative Application of BIM in EPC Projects: The Perspective of Cooperation between Owners and General Contractors

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Chengshuang Sun ◽  
Min Wang ◽  
Fengyong Zhai
Keyword(s):  
Numerical Simulation ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Dynamic Method ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Final Decision ◽  
Game Model ◽  
General Contractors ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
Reducing Costs ◽  
Collaborative Application

As an effective way to reduce costs and increase efficiency of EPC projects, BIM technology has drawn a lot of attention in numerous countries. Existing studies have failed to reveal the BIM decision-making mechanisms of owners and general contractors in EPC projects in a dynamic method. This study investigates the underlying logic of the collaboration application of BIM by analyzing the dynamic behaviors of owners and general contractors based on evolutionary game model. The results show that the most effective suggestions to promote the BIM collaboration application in EPC projects are “increasing the proportion of BIM application initially strategies,” “increasing incremental revenue of BIM collaborative application,” “reducing costs of BIM collaboration application,” “avoiding excessive hitchhiking,” and “establishing reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.” On the basis of numerical simulation to illustrate the influence of the different initial strategies and parameters on the final decision in different situations, five solutions were proposed for the effective BIM collaboration application between owners and general contractors. This article can facilitate researchers pondering the dynamics of collaboration among stakeholders in projects, and it can also facilitate participants picking up proper strategies for improved collaboration.

scholarly journals GAME THEORY BASED MULTI CRITERIA DECISION MAKING PROBLEM UNDER UNCERTAINTY: A CASE STUDY ON INDIAN TEA INDUSTRY

2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 154-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Animesh DEBNATH ◽  
Abhirup BANDYOPADHYAY ◽  
Jagannath ROY ◽  
Samarjit KAR
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Market Volatility ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Multi Criteria Decision Making ◽  
Tea Industry ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Indian Tea

The long-term evolution of multi agent multi criteria decision making (MCDM) and to obtain sustainable decision a novel methodology is proposed based on evolutionary game theory. In this paper multi agent MCDM is represented as an evolutionary game and the evolutionary strategies are defined as sustainable decisions. Here we consider the problem of decision making in Indian Tea Industry. The agents in this game are essentially Indian Tea Estate owner and Indian Tea board. The replicator dynamics of the evolutionary game are studied to obtain evolutionary strategies which could be defined as sustainable strategies. The multi agent MCDM in Indian Tea Industry is considered under different socio-political and Corporate Social Responsibility scenario and groups of Indian Tea Industry. Again, the impacts of imprecision and market volatility on the outcome of some strategies (decisions) are studied. In this paper the imprecision on the impact of the strategies are modelled as fuzzy numbers whereas the market volatility is taken into account as white noise. Hence the MCDM problem for Indian Tea Industry is modelled as a hybrid evolutionary game. The probabilities of strategies are obtained by solving hybrid evolutionary game and could be represented as a Dempster-Shafer belief structure. The simulation results facilitate the Decision Makers to choose the strategies (decisions) under different type of uncertainty.

scholarly journals A Pricing Strategy of E-Commerce Advertising Cooperation in the Stackelberg Game Model with Different Market Power Structure

Algorithms ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ling Zhu ◽  
Jie Lin
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Power Structure ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Total System ◽  
Product Price ◽  
Numerical Studies ◽  
Advertising Effort ◽  
The Cost

A lot of research work has studied the auction mechanism of uncertain advertising cooperation between the e-commerce platform and advertisers, but little has focused on pricing strategy in stable advertising cooperation under a certain market power structure. To fill this gap, this paper makes a study of the deep interest distribution of two parties in such cooperation. We propose a pricing strategy by building two stackelberg master-slave models when the e-commerce platform and the advertiser are respectively the leader in the cooperation. It is analyzed that the optimization solution of the profits of both parties and the total system are affected by some main decision factors including the income commission proportion, the advertising product price and the cost of advertising effort of both parties’ brand in different dominant models. Then, some numerical studies are used to verify the effectiveness of the models. Finally, we draw a conclusion and make some suggestions to the platforms and the advertisers in the e-commerce advertising cooperation.

Trust strategy simulation of corporation–NPO cross alliance using evolutionary game theory

Kybernetes ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 46 (3) ◽  
pp. 450-465 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yidan Chen ◽  
Lanying Sun
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Decision Making ◽  
Nonprofit Organizations ◽  
Bounded Rationality ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Strategies ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Trust Relationships

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the dynamics and evolution of trust in organizational cross alliances. Design/methodology/approach In alliances between corporations and nonprofit organizations, trust in decision-making is a dynamic process. Using the replicated dynamics model of evolutionary game theory, this paper provides a trust decision model and analyzes four scenarios under different parameters. A numerical simulation is developed to present an intuitive interpretation of the dynamic development of trust decisions and the effects of incentive and punishment mechanisms. Findings Under different parameters, bounded rationality and utilities result in different but stable evolutionary strategies; the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy leads directly to whether participants adopt the strategy when the system reaches stability after continued games; and incentive and punishment mechanisms can significantly reduce the initial probability of adopting a trust strategy where the system evolves to meet stable state needs. Practical implications The establishment of trust relationships is an important influence on the stable and coordinated development of an alliance. The proposed model can help the alliance build closer trust relationships and provide a theoretical basis for the design of the trust mechanism. Originality/value Incentive and punishment bound by some degree of trust are introduced to address the problems of trust decisions and their dynamics; the model created reflects the bounded rationality and utility of each game stage. Useful evolutionary stable strategies using different variables are proposed to address the decision-making problems of trust in cross alliances.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Model of Stock Price Synchronicity from Investor Behavior

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Yue Dong ◽  
Yuhao Zhang ◽  
Jinnan Pan ◽  
Tingqiang Chen
Keyword(s):  
Stock Market ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Replicator Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Individual Investors ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Stock Price Synchronicity ◽  
The Cost

Institutional and individual investors are the two important players in the stock market. Together, they determine the price of the stock market. In this paper, an evolutionary game model that contains the two groups of players is proposed to analyze the stock price synchronicity considering the impacts of investors’ decisions on stock investment. Factors affecting investors’ decisions include the potential revenue or loss, the probability of gain or loss, and the cost of corresponding behavior. The proposed game model is analyzed by replicator dynamics equations and simulation of the evolutionary equilibrium strategy under different circumstances. The analysis shows that the operating cost of institutional investors, the cost of information collection before trading, and the expected loss that may be punished by regulators are the key factors that affect the evolutionary game system between institutional investors and individual investors. In addition, reducing the speculation in the market and increasing the information access of investors through the serious operation mode of institutional investors and the strengthening of the market information disclosure mechanism are beneficial to alleviate price synchronicity in stock market.

scholarly journals The Decision-Making Analysis on End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling and Remanufacturing under Extended Producer Responsibility Policy

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (20) ◽  
pp. 11215
Author(s):  
Syed Abdul Rehman Khan ◽  
Danish Iqbal Godil ◽  
George Thomas ◽  
Muhammad Tanveer ◽  
Hafiz Muhammad Zia-ul-haq ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Expected Profit ◽  
Third Party ◽  
Game Model ◽  
The Third ◽  
Evolutionary Stable Strategies ◽  
Dual Cycle ◽  
The Government

This research develops a dual-cycle ELV recycling and remanufacturing system to better understand and improve the efficiency of the ELV recycling and remanufacturing businesses. For the flawless operation of this system, the researchers employed evolutionary game theory to establish a game model between original vehicle manufacturers (OVMs) and third-party recyclers with the government involved. This research presents evolutionary stable strategies (ESS) that could promote an ELV recycling and remanufacturing system. Results show that OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing and not choosing authorization is crucial in their ESS. The licensing fee plays a part of OVMs’ expected profit difference. Based on the results, optimal ESS could be achieved when the OVMs’ expected profit difference between choosing authorization and not choosing authorization and the third-party recyclers’ profit when paying the licensing fee are both positive. Then, the two groups’ involvement in dual-cycle ELV recycling and the remanufacturing system can be ensured. This research implicates the government to devise appropriate reward and punishment strategy to encourage OVMs and third-party recyclers to collaborate for efficient recycling and remanufacturing systems. Particularly, the government is suggested to impose strict restrictions on OVMs to carry ELV recycling and provide support to promote recycling quantity standards. Hence, the ELV recycling and remanufacturing system would be strengthened, thus improving waste management which is crucial for both environmental and resource efficiency.

scholarly journals Evaluating the Pricing Strategy for Change Orders between General Contractors and Subcontractors Using ET-SD Model

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chien-Liang Lin ◽  
Yu Che Lai
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Dynamics ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Pricing Strategy ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Change Orders ◽  
Construction Engineering ◽  
Root Cause ◽  
General Contractors ◽  
Payoff Structure ◽  
Sd Model

Change orders have received considerable attention from researchers thus far, but none have considered pricing strategies of change orders through the interaction between general contractors and subcontractors. Previous studies found that contractors’ opportunistic bidding considering beyond-contractual reward (BCR) in the execution stage can be reduced by improving the construction management system and strengthening the supervision of contractors’ performance. However, the BCR remains in ecology of construction engineering. This study proposes an integrated evolutionary game theory-system dynamics model (ET-SD model) and simulates the pricing strategy of change orders between general contractors and subcontractors to explore the root cause of BCR phenomenon. Sensitivity analysis on the evolutionary dynamics of payoff is explored. Results reveal that change orders with BCR maintain Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) unless changing the payoff structure between general and subcontractors’ pricing strategies. This study presents important managerial insights from the evolutionary game perspectives, nature of change orders, and payoff of the alternative.

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