scholarly journals A dilemma for naturalistic theories of intentionality

2021 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-68
Author(s):  
Michael J. Hegarty
Keyword(s):  
Tree Rings ◽  
Representational Content ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Clear Link ◽  
Naturalistic Account ◽  
The Mind

I argue that a dilemma arises for naturalistic philosophers of mind in the naturalised semantics tradition. Giving a naturalistic account of the mind is a pressing problem. Brentano’s Thesis — that a state is mental if, and only if, that state has underived representational content — provides an attractive route to naturalising the mental. If true, Brentano’s Thesis means that naturalising representation is sufficient for naturalising the mental. But a naturalist who accepts Brentano’s Thesis thus commits to an eliminativism about the category of the mental. This is because naturalistic theories of representation are reductive, and so over-generalise by applying to patently non-mental states. According to these theories, it has been argued, phenomena like tree rings and saliva come out as representational. Only proposing further Naturalistic conditions on representation could avoid the eliminativist conclusion. But this shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress towards naturalising the mental. And if a Naturalist rejects Brentano’s Thesis, then she gives up on a clear link between representation and mentality. Hence, it is incumbent on the Naturalist to propose another, naturalistically acceptable, mark of the mental. This, again, shows that Naturalists have made only limited progress on the issue of naturalising the mental.Keywords: Intentionality, representation, physicalism, eliminativism, Brentano, materialism, naturalism.

scholarly journals Activity in the brain’s valuation and mentalizing networks is associated with propagation of online recommendations

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Elisa C. Baek ◽  
Matthew Brook O’Donnell ◽  
Christin Scholz ◽  
Rui Pei ◽  
Javier O. Garcia ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Social Media ◽  
Word Of Mouth ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Brain Regions ◽  
Prior Work ◽  
Opinion Change ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Mentalizing System

AbstractWord of mouth recommendations influence a wide range of choices and behaviors. What takes place in the mind of recommendation receivers that determines whether they will be successfully influenced? Prior work suggests that brain systems implicated in assessing the value of stimuli (i.e., subjective valuation) and understanding others’ mental states (i.e., mentalizing) play key roles. The current study used neuroimaging and natural language classifiers to extend these findings in a naturalistic context and tested the extent to which the two systems work together or independently in responding to social influence. First, we show that in response to text-based social media recommendations, activity in both the brain’s valuation system and mentalizing system was associated with greater likelihood of opinion change. Second, participants were more likely to update their opinions in response to negative, compared to positive, recommendations, with activity in the mentalizing system scaling with the negativity of the recommendations. Third, decreased functional connectivity between valuation and mentalizing systems was associated with opinion change. Results highlight the role of brain regions involved in mentalizing and positive valuation in recommendation propagation, and further show that mentalizing may be particularly key in processing negative recommendations, whereas the valuation system is relevant in evaluating both positive and negative recommendations.

Luminosity and the KK Thesis

2019 ◽  
pp. 31-48
Author(s):  
Robert C. Stalnaker
Keyword(s):  
Information Theory ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The State ◽  
Simplified Model ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Margin Of Error ◽  
The Mind

A mental state is luminous if and only if being in a state of that kind always puts one in a position to know that one is in the state. This chapter is a critique of Timothy Williamson’s margin-of-error argument that no nontrivial states are luminous in this sense. While I agree with Williamson’s rejection of a Cartesian internalist conception of the mind, I argue that an externalist conception (one based on information theory) can be reconciled with the luminosity of intentional mental states such as knowledge. My argument, which uses an artificial and simplified model of knowledge, is not a direct rebuttal to his argument, as applied to a more realistic notion of the knowledge of human beings, but I argue that it shows that a luminosity assumption is compatible with externalism about knowledge, and it suggest an intuitively plausible strategy for resisting his argument.

Materialism in the philosophy of mind

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Howard Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Subjective Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Main Difficulty ◽  
Ordinary Sense ◽  
Causal Dependence ◽  
Physical Relation ◽  
The Third ◽  
Almost All ◽  
The Mind

Materialism – which, for almost all purposes, is the same as physicalism – is the theory that everything that exists is material. Natural science shows that most things are intelligible in material terms, but mind presents problems in at least two ways. The first is consciousness, as found in the ‘raw feel’ of subjective experience. The second is the intentionality of thought, which is the property of being about something beyond itself; ‘aboutness’ seems not to be a physical relation in the ordinary sense. There have been three ways of approaching these problems. The hardest is eliminativism, according to which there are no ‘raw feels’, no intentionality and, in general, no mental states: the mind and all its furniture are part of an outdated science that we now see to be false. Next is reductionism, which seeks to give an account of our experience and of intentionality in terms which are acceptable to a physical science: this means, in practice, analysing the mind in terms of its role in producing behaviour. Finally, the materialist may accept the reality and irreducibility of mind, but claim that it depends on matter in such an intimate way – more intimate than mere causal dependence – that materialism is not threatened by the irreducibility of mind. The first two approaches can be called ‘hard materialism’, the third ‘soft materialism’. The problem for eliminativism is that we find it difficult to credit that any belief that we think and feel is a theoretical speculation. Reductionism’s main difficulty is that there seems to be more to consciousness than its contribution to behaviour: a robotic machine could behave as we do without thinking or feeling. The soft materialist has to explain supervenience in a way that makes the mind not epiphenomenal without falling into the problems of interactionism.

Mind, identity theory of

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Jackson
Keyword(s):  
Central Nervous System ◽  
Nervous System ◽  
Identity Theory ◽  
Brain Activity ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Ontological Categories ◽  
Great Merit ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain

We know that the brain is intimately connected with mental activity. Indeed, doctors now define death in terms of the cessation of the relevant brain activity. The identity theory of mind holds that the intimate connection is identity: the mind is the brain, or, more precisely, mental states are states of the brain. The theory goes directly against a long tradition according to which mental and material belong to quite distinct ontological categories – the mental being essentially conscious, the material essentially unconscious. This tradition has been bedevilled by the problem of how essentially immaterial states could be caused by the material world, as would happen when we see a tree, and how they could cause material states, as would happen when we decide to make an omelette. A great merit of the identity theory is that it avoids this problem: interaction between mental and material becomes simply interaction between one subset of material states, namely certain states of a sophisticated central nervous system, and other material states. The theory also brings the mind within the scope of modern science. More and more phenomena are turning out to be explicable in the physical terms of modern science: phenomena once explained in terms of spells, possession by devils, Thor’s thunderbolts, and so on, are now explained in more mundane, physical terms. If the identity theory is right, the same goes for the mind. Neuroscience will in time reveal the secrets of the mind in the same general way that the theory of electricity reveals the secrets of lightning. This possibility has received enormous support from advances in computing. We now have at least the glimmerings of an idea of how a purely material or physical system could do some of the things minds can do. Nevertheless, there are many questions to be asked of the identity theory. How could states that seem so different turn out to be one and the same? Would neurophysiologists actually see my thoughts and feelings if they looked at my brain? When we report on our mental states what are we reporting on – our brains?

Complexity is a cue to the mind

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (4) ◽  
pp. 585-586
Author(s):  
George Kampis
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
General Framework ◽  
Dynamical Behavior ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Target Article ◽  
The Mind

The relevance of chaotic itinerancy and other types of exotic dynamical behavior described by Tsuda (2001) certainly goes beyond the scope of his target article. These concepts of dynamics may offer a general framework for the understanding of complexity, which could help to restructure the analysis and conceptualization of mental states in novel ways, providing insights for the philosophy of mind.

Metaphysics of Mind

Philosophy ◽  
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Darragh Byrne
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Other ◽  
Intrinsic Properties ◽  
Psychological Phenomena ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Physical Phenomena ◽  
Metaphysics Of Mind

Philosophy of mind addresses fundamental questions about mental or psychological phenomena. The question held by many to be most fundamental of all is a metaphysical one, often labeled the “mind-body problem,” which concerns the relation between minds and material or physical phenomena. Physicalists (and/or materialists) contend that mental phenomena are physical, or at least that they may be accounted for in terms of physical phenomena (brains, for example). Dualists deny this, maintaining that mental phenomena have fundamentally nonphysical natures, so that to account for minds we must assume the existence of nonphysical substances or properties. Nowadays physicalism is more widely espoused than dualism, but physicalists differ over which physical states/properties should be considered relevant, and over the precise nature of the relation between physical and mental phenomena. This is one of four bibliography entries on the philosophy of mind, and this particular entry concentrates on this metaphysical issue of the relation between mental and physical/material phenomena. Inevitably, there is a good deal of overlap between this and topics covered in the other three entries. For example, this entry includes authors who attack physicalism by arguing that it cannot account for the distinctive phenomenal qualities of conscious experiences; but that line of antiphysicalist argument features even more prominently in the entry on consciousness. Moreover, the other entries feature various issues that might perfectly properly be categorized as concerning the metaphysics of mind: for example, the debate between internalists—philosophers who hold that propositional attitudes (mental states such as beliefs and desires, which have representational contents) are intrinsic properties of minds/brains—and externalists, who think of certain attitudes as extrinsic or relational, is surely a question about the metaphysics of mind: but this is discussed in the entry on intentionality instead of here.

scholarly journals The Relationship between Mind-Body Dualism and Personal Values

2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 126
Author(s):  
Gunne Grankvist ◽  
Petri Kajonius ◽  
Bjorn Persson
Keyword(s):  
Personal Values ◽  
Mental States ◽  
The Body ◽  
The Other ◽  
Self Report ◽  
Beliefs And Values ◽  
Mind And Body ◽  
The Mind ◽  
And Control ◽  
The Relationship

<p>Dualists view the mind and the body as two fundamental different “things”, equally real and independent of each other. Cartesian thought, or substance dualism, maintains that the mind and body are two different substances, the non-physical and the physical, and a causal relationship is assumed to exist between them. Physicalism, on the other hand, is the idea that everything that exists is either physical or totally dependent of and determined by physical items. Hence, all mental states are fundamentally physical states. In the current study we investigated to what degree Swedish university students’ beliefs in mind-body dualism is explained by the importance they attach to personal values. A self-report inventory was used to measure their beliefs and values. Students who held stronger dualistic beliefs attach less importance to the power value (i.e., the effort to achieve social status, prestige, and control or dominance over people and resources). This finding shows that the strength in laypeople’s beliefs in dualism is partially explained by the importance they attach to personal values.</p>

scholarly journals Music Composition from the Brain Signal: Representing the Mental State by Music

2010 ◽  
Vol 2010 ◽  
pp. 1-6 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Wu ◽  
Chaoyi Li ◽  
Yu Yin ◽  
Changzheng Zhou ◽  
Dezhong Yao
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Music Composition ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Arousal Level ◽  
Sleep Stages ◽  
Biofeedback Therapy ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The Mind ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Potential Tool

This paper proposes a method to translate human EEG into music, so as to represent mental state by music. The arousal levels of the brain mental state and music emotion are implicitly used as the bridge between the mind world and the music. The arousal level of the brain is based on the EEG features extracted mainly by wavelet analysis, and the music arousal level is related to the musical parameters such as pitch, tempo, rhythm, and tonality. While composing, some music principles (harmonics and structure) were taken into consideration. With EEGs during various sleep stages as an example, the music generated from them had different patterns of pitch, rhythm, and tonality. 35 volunteers listened to the music pieces, and significant difference in music arousal levels was found. It implied that different mental states may be identified by the corresponding music, and so the music from EEG may be a potential tool for EEG monitoring, biofeedback therapy, and so forth.

scholarly journals Mentalizing Based on External Features in Borderline Personality Disorder Compared With Healthy Controls: The Role of Attachment Dimensions and Childhood Trauma

2019 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 736-750 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martijn Van Heel ◽  
Patrick Luyten ◽  
Celine De Meulemeester ◽  
Dominique Vanwalleghem ◽  
Rudi Vermote ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Borderline Personality Disorder ◽  
Personality Disorder ◽  
Childhood Trauma ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Borderline Personality ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Healthy Controls ◽  
Avoidant Attachment ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Attachment Dimensions

Extant research suggests that borderline personality disorder (BPD) is associated with impairments in mentalizing, that is, comprehending behavior in terms of underlying mental states. However, the precise nature of these impairments remains unclear. The literature is mixed concerning mental-izing based on external features of others, and specifically facial emotion recognition (FER) in BPD patients. This study investigated FER differences in 79 BPD patients and 79 matched healthy controls using the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET). The authors also investigated attachment dimensions and childhood trauma in relation to mentalizing based on external features. Results showed that BPD patients performed worse on positive and negative emotions. Furthermore, avoidant attachment was negatively related to FER for neutral emotions, particularly in the control group. Trauma was negatively related to FER at trend level, particularly in BPD patients. The implications for this understanding of mentalizing based on external features in BPD are discussed.

Reading What the Mind Thinks From How the Eye Sees

2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 494-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel H. Lee ◽  
Adam K. Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Optical Function ◽  
Emotional Information ◽  
Basic Emotions ◽  
Lower Face ◽  
Social And Emotional ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Human Eyes

Human eyes convey a remarkable variety of complex social and emotional information. However, it is unknown which physical eye features convey mental states and how that came about. In the current experiments, we tested the hypothesis that the receiver’s perception of mental states is grounded in expressive eye appearance that serves an optical function for the sender. Specifically, opposing features of eye widening versus eye narrowing that regulate sensitivity versus discrimination not only conveyed their associated basic emotions (e.g., fear vs. disgust, respectively) but also conveyed opposing clusters of complex mental states that communicate sensitivity versus discrimination (e.g., awe vs. suspicion). This sensitivity-discrimination dimension accounted for the majority of variance in perceived mental states (61.7%). Further, these eye features remained diagnostic of these complex mental states even in the context of competing information from the lower face. These results demonstrate that how humans read complex mental states may be derived from a basic optical principle of how people see.

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