Maimon, Salomon (1753/4–1800)

Author(s):  
Paul Franks

Educated as a rabbi in Lithuania, Shlomo (Salomon) ben Yehoshua migrated to Germany and adopted the surname Maimon in honour of Maimonides. His criticism of Kant’s dualism and his monistic account of the human mind as an imperfect expression of God’s infinite mind influenced Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. Kant regarded him as the critic who understood him best. Maimon’s system combines rational dogmatism with empirical scepticism. As a rational dogmatist, he argues that cognition requires the absolute unity of subject and object. Maimon therefore criticizes Kant’s dualistic divisions between the mental form and extra-mental matter of knowledge, and between the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Experience in Kant’s sense – empirical knowledge – is possible only if these dualisms are merely apparent. Our finite minds must be imperfect expressions of an infinite, divine mind that produces the form and matter of knowledge. Through scientific progress, our minds become more adequate expressions of the infinite mind. Kant has not refuted Hume’s scepticism, which could be refuted only if science became perfect. Perfect science is an ideal for which we must strive but which we will never reach. Maimon is deeply indebted to Maimonides, but he reformulates Maimonidean ideas in light of modern mathematical physics and deploys them within a Kantian investigation of the possibility of experience. The result is a unique encounter between medieval and modern philosophy that decisively influenced German idealism and remains philosophically interesting.

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 252
Author(s):  
Fuad Fuad ◽  
Koento Wibisono S. ◽  
P. Hardono Hadi

The scientific truth can be identified on the Kuhn's normal science as a period of scientific progress, and on the Popper's verisimilitude (the truthlikeness). The Kuhn's thought is a phenomenological hermeneutics due to his understanding of the scientific truth according to the phenomenon of scientific progress, and otherwise, the Popper's is an ontological hermeneutics which acknowledges the absolute truth beyond the scientific explanation. The essential similarity of Kuhn and Popper's hermeneutics is justifying the scientific truth as a relative ideal one (never be the absolute one), and the fundamental difference of both of them caused by Kuhn's hermeneutics based on a descriptive approach and Popper's by the normative one. The Kuhn and Popper's hermeneutics can be contributed to be a philosophical foundation of science, namely: the scientific investigation area (ontological foundation), the dialectic of scientific progress (epistemological foundation), and toward the absolute-transcendental truth (axiological foundation). The hermeneutics can also be contributed to reintegrate science and philosophy, as a correlation and interconnection entity of empirical and metaphysical dimension, and can spontaneously be an understanding frame of the demarcation of science (a system of empirical knowledge) and philosophy (a system of metaphysical one). The hermeneutics can be contributed to implement the integration of Natural Sciences and Humanities (and Social Sciences) in Indonesia, as an IPTEK development strategy which is relevant to the ethical values of the Pancasila's.


Author(s):  
Greta G. Solovieva ◽  
◽  
Zhazira A. Rakhmetova ◽  

Does modern philosophy of art reject the principles and methods of mastering the reality of classical aesthetics, in particular, the category of the beautiful, em­phasizing, on the contrary, the ugly, ugly, terrible, disgusting? The authors strive to find answers in the dialogue of great philosophical masters – “Zeus the Olympian of the German classics” by Hegel and the preacher of “progressive negation” on the border of modernity and postmodernism Theodor Adorno. Hegel insists on the transcendental origin of the beautiful as the coincidence of idea and reality, the sensory phenomenon of the absolute, the resolution of con­tradictions between the subjective and the objective, the universal and the indi­vidual, the finite and the infinite. Adorno opposes, claiming the rights of “beauti­ful negativity”. He abandons the transcendental character of beauty and shifts the emphasis to the social sphere. The ugly, the ugly, the ugly should not be hidden. But to portray him in such a way as to arouse disgust towards him, the desire to create a project of “righteous life” But the development of the dialogue reveals that both thinkers ultimately agree on the main thing: the beautiful is inescapable and remains the defining category of both aesthetics and life.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Cardani

Resumen: La doctrina de Spinoza constituye una de las principales inspiraciones del más célebre entre los idealistas británicos, F.H. Bradley, cuya filosofía se caracteriza a su vez por elementos típicos del idealismo alemán y, en particular, de Hegel. Según A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, la presencia de estas dos tendencias conflictivas reduce el planteamiento de Appearance and Reality a una disposición filosófica esencialmente mística. Sin embargo, a pesar de las reales influencias de Spinoza y Hegel en el contexto del idealismo británico, los cimientos de la metafísica bradleyana (la incognoscibilidad de lo Absoluto, su transcendencia respecto al pensamiento, el rechazo del panteísmo y del panlogismo) sugieren una postura difícilmente identificable con Spinoza o Hegel, o con ambos. Palabras clave: Absoluto - Idealismo británico – Monismo – Panlogismo - Panteísmo.Abstract: Spinoza’s doctrine represents one of the greatest inspirations for the most well-known representative of the British Idealism, F.H. Bradley, whose philosophy is also marked by some of the most typical elements of German Idealism, especially those of Hegel. According to Seth Pringle-Pattison, the presence of these conflictive tendencies reduce the standpoint of Appearance and Reality to an essentially mystic philosophical attitude. However, despite the real influences of Spinoza and Hegel in the context of British Idealism, the foundations of Bradley’s metaphysics (the unknowability of the Absolute and its transcendence, as well as the rejection of pantheism and panlogism) suggest that Bradley is defending a perspective that can hardly be identified with Spinoza or Hegel, or with both of them. Key words: Absolute - British Idealism – Monism – Panlogism - Pantheism.


Philosophy ◽  
1937 ◽  
Vol 12 (48) ◽  
pp. 387-394
Author(s):  
J. H. Muirhead

Some years ago Max Planck published a small book with the titleWhere is Science Going?in vigorous protest against the idea that the doctrine of relativity in general and the new quanta physics in particular mean that “the quest of the absolute becomes eliminated from scientific progress.” That it seems to be time to raise a similar question with regard to philosophy was suggested to me at a recent conference held at Farnham Castle on the relation between science and philosophy, at which the new school of logical positivism was strongly represented by some of the ablest of the younger men.


Dialogue ◽  
1975 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Hanly

Modern philosophy, if it has not settled any other of the chronic disputes that have troubled the history of the subject, appears to have decided once and for all the question of synthetic a priori principles. Logical analysis has demonstrated that synthetic propositions are empirical while a priori propositions are analytical and notational. Nevertheless, a broader survey of the contemporary philosophical scene reveals that the strict meaning of the expression “modern philosophy” above should be rendered “philosophers of one of the current schools of philosophy”. For contemporary European philosophers have not abandoned the notion of synthetic a priori principles altogether. They have modified without abandoning Kant's Copernican discovery of the laws of nature in the human mind. There are, to be sure, two ways of viewing the situation. Either logical analysis has overlooked certain unique phenomena and thus has failed to comprehend the arguments which take their description as premises, or existentialism has persisted in the use of an inadequate logic. The purpose of this paper is to test this issue and in doing so to explore the psychological roots of the idea of synthetic a priori principles. The means adopted is a critical study of the existentialist theory of emotion which claims to have discovered a previously unrecognized basis for synthetic a priori principles in the phenomenelogy of human existence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 83
Author(s):  
ANDRÉ GESKE

This Article Aims To Explore The Notion And The Dynamics Of Self-deception As A Part Of What We Understand As The Noetic Effects Of Sin. Firstly, We Start With A Theological Analysis Of The Consciousness Because Of The Supratemporal Nature Of The Human Heart. Secondly, Through This Analysis, We Can See The Roots Of Self-deception In The Presupposition That The Ego Is Transparent To Itself. Thirdly, One Element Of The Dynamic Of Self-deception Is The Cognitive Parallax That Shows The Distance Between Theory And Reality. Fourthly, Self-deception Can Be Formalized In Theoretical Systems And Create A Legitimizing Discourse To Support Given Positions. Finally, We Try To Redeem Self-deception Through The Revelation That Enlightens The Human Mind. KEYWORDS: Self-deception, noetic effects of sin, Augustine, Herman Dooyeweerd, epistemology, the self, modern philosophy, sensus divinitatis, consciousness, revelation


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniele Fanelli

This essay unifies key epistemological concepts in a consistent mathematical framework built on two postulates: 1-information is finite; 2-knowledge is information compression. Knowledge is expressed by a function \( K(Y;X) \) and two fundamental operations, \( \oplus, \otimes \). This \( K \) function possesses fundamental properties that are intuitively ascribed to knowledge: it embodies Occam's razor, has one optimal level of accuracy, and declines with distance in time. Empirical knowledge differs from logico-deductive knowledge solely in having measurement error and therefore a "chaos horizon". The \( K \) function characterizes knowledge as a cumulation and manipulation of patterns. It allows to quantify the amount of knowledge gained by experience and to derive conditions that favour the increase of knowledge complexity. Scientific knowledge operates exactly as ordinary knowledge, but its patterns are conditioned on a "methodology" component. Analysis of scientific progress suggests that classic Popperian falsificationism only occurs under special conditions that are rarely realised in practice, and that reproducibility failures are virtually inevitable. Scientific "softness" is simply an encoding of weaker patterns, which are simultaneously cause and consequence of higher complexity of subject matter and methodology. Bias consists in information that is concealed in ante-hoc or post-hoc methodological choices. Disciplines typically classified as pseudosciences are sciences expressing extreme bias and therefore yield \( K(Y;X) \leq 0 \). All knowledge-producing activities can be ranked in terms of a parameter \(\Xi \in (-\infty,\infty) \), measured in bits, which subsumes all quantities defined in the essay.


Author(s):  
Brunello Lotti

This chapter reconstructs the topic of universals in the English Platonists’ epistemologies and ontologies. More and Cudworth restrict universals to the mental realm, stating that whatsoever exists without the mind is singular. Despite this nominalistic principle, universal concepts are not inductive constructions, but primarily divine thoughts and secondarily a priori innate ideas in the human mind. The archetypal theory of creation and the connection of finite minds to God’s Mind ensure their objective validity, in antithesis to Hobbes’ phenomenalism and sensationalism. Norris shares the archetypal theory of creation, but refuses innatism, and his doctrine of universals is framed in terms of his theory of the ideal world inspired by Malebranche. Both the Cambridge Platonists and Norris, opposing theological voluntarism, discuss the status of ideas in God’s mind, which oscillate from being merely thoughts of the divine intellect to being its eternal objects.


Thesis Eleven ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 157 (1) ◽  
pp. 110-132
Author(s):  
Daniel Andrés López

I reconstruct Lukács’s immanent critique of German Idealism, found within his essay ‘Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat’ (in History and Class Consciousness), in order to foreground his philosophical reflection on the concepts of mediation, logic, genesis and praxis. I situate this reflection within his philosophy of praxis as a whole before highlighting the dialectical development of these terms within it. They are posited initially as abstract, methodological demands and are subsequently concretised and enriched, via Lukács’s critical evaluation of the antinomies he discovers in Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. My reconstruction is both exegetical and critical. I demonstrate that Lukács’s concept of praxis (as the culmination of mediation, logic and genesis) is explicitly intended to both bear the weight of Hegel’s Absolute and overcome it. On this basis, I propose a novel immanent critique of Lukács’s philosophy of praxis, suggesting that while Lukács wishes his concept of praxis to express a living, present and ontologically novel truth, his insight is won – in the fashion of Hegelian philosophy – after the historical event upon which it is built, as a philosophical reflection. Lukács’s self-contradiction is that while he regards his philosophy of praxis as having overcome speculative, Hegelian philosophy, in fact, the position he generates remains firmly but unconsciously within it. Consequently, Lukács’s philosophy of praxis possesses a theological dimension and must be regarded as an example of the kind of ‘conceptual mythology’ he sought to overcome.


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