Miracles

Author(s):  
David Basinger

Does God at times miraculously intervene in earthly affairs? That is, do some events occur because God has entered our space-time continuum and directly modified or circumvented the relevant natural laws? Few philosophers today deny that this is possible. But many question whether we could ever justifiably maintain that such intervention has taken place. According to some philosophers, it is not even necessary to grant that the types of events believers label miracles – for instance, healings or resurrections – actually occur as reported. Since the evidence supporting the occurrence of such events is the personal testimony of a few, possibly biased, individuals, while the basis for doubt is the massive amount of objective research upon which the relevant laws are based, it is always justifiable, according to this view, to conclude that such reports are erroneous. Others contend, however, that the presence of some forms of evidence – for instance, independent confirmation from reputable sources – could make it most reasonable in some cases to acknowledge that even the most unexpected of events had actually occurred. Some philosophers also deny that we could ever justifiably conclude that an event could not have been produced by natural causes alone. Since we will never be in a position to identify all that nature can produce, they declare, it will always be most reasonable for the scientist facing a currently unexplainable counterinstance to a natural law to continue to look for a natural explanation. Many believers, however, are quite willing to grant that nature could in principle produce any event, since what they wish to maintain is only that nature does not do so in the case of miraculous interventions. Finally, while many philosophers acknowledge that belief in direct divine intervention may at times be justifiable for those who already believe that God exists, some also argue that no single event or series of events could ever compel all thoughtful individuals to acknowledge the existence of a perfectly good supernatural causal agent, given all we experience – for instance, the tremendous amount of horrific evil in our world. Many believers, though, are also willing to grant this point.

2015 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Henrique Garbellini Carnio

<p><strong>Resumo:</strong> O presente artigo tem como base a conferência dada por Rudolf von Jhering em 12 de março de 1884 para a Sociedade Jurídica de Viena, intitulada "Sobre o nascimento do sentimento jurídico". O objetivo é demonstrar algumas reflexões surpreendentes e pouco conhecidas deste importante jurista, enfatizando, em especial, a importância que ele atribui ao devir histórico na formação do sentimento jurídico, apostando que o sentido do direito é modelado pela história e não proveniente das leis naturais eternas. Jhering, propondo uma tarefa genealógica, defende de forma contundente um historicismo ético e jurídico que o distancia de um relativismo absoluto como o das clássicas posições jusnaturalistas, completamente ahistóricas, que se revela extremamente interessante para as reflexões atuais sobre a filosofia do direito.</p><p><strong>Palavras-chave:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; sentimento jurídico; historicismo ético-político.</p><p><strong>Abstract:</strong> This article is based on a lecture given by Rudolf von Jhering on March 12, 1884 for the Law Society of Vienna, entitled "About the birth of the legal feeling." The objective is to demonstrate some surprising and little-known reflections of this important jurist, emphasizing, in particular, the importance he attaches to the historical development in the formation of the legal feeling, betting that the sense of law is shaped by history and not from the eternal natural laws. Jhering proposing a genealogical task, forcefully defends an ethical and legal historicism that distances him of the absolute relativism as the way of classic natural law positions, completely ahistorical, that reveals itself highly interesting for the current reflections on the philosophy of law.</p><p><strong>Keywords:</strong> Rudolf von Jhering; legal feeling; ethical and political historicism.</p>


Author(s):  
Florian Müller ◽  
Daniel Wenzl ◽  
Detlef Heck

The increasing complexity of construction projects has inevitably led to site managers are facing ever more complex claims. As a result, they are increasingly occupied with claim management. Their primary task, however, is to carry out the project and claim management is considered a secondary task. Furthermore, site managers often lack both the know-how and the resources required for handling complex claims. Attaining a successful outcome for a claim, demands stringent causal evidence for each single event linked to its effects. This makes documentation and quantification of a complex claim exceptionally difficult. Site managers tend to underestimate the complexity of a claim-causing event and as a consequence may often be too late in notifying internal company experts or external consultants focusing on claim management. This paper aims to categorize deviations causing a claim according to its complexity at the time of its occurrence. To do so, a quantitative survey was handed out to site managers in the Austrian construction industry. Based on the findings, the authors designed a decision-making matrix to classify claim-causing events according to their complexity. This will allow site managers to take necessary measures processing a claim and mitigate possible disputes.


Author(s):  
Annabel S. Brett

This chapter explores the concept of natural law, turning first to the Protestant milieu. Alterity—what would in the seventeenth century come to be theorized, and problematized, as “sociability”—is the dominant mood of the humanist and Protestant handling of natural law. It is there even in Thomas Hobbes, whose natural law coincides with moral philosophy and concerns the sphere of one's actions in respect of others. However, the Catholic scholastic tradition presents a very different framing of natural law, one that centers on individual agency and regulates the behavior of individual agents in their aspect as beings of a particular kind. While authors in this tradition grapple equally with the question of animal behavior in relation to law, they do not do so from the social perspective that characterizes Protestant humanist Aristotelians and jurists.


2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patricia Sheridan

Locke's moral theory consists of two explicit and distinct elements — a broadly rationalist theory of natural law and a hedonistic conception of moral good. The rationalist account, which we find most prominently in his early Essays on the Law of Nature, is generally taken to consist in three things. First, Locke holds that our moral rules are founded on universal, divine natural laws. Second, such moral laws are taken to be discoverable by reason. Third, by dint of their divine authorship, moral laws are obligatory and rationally discernible as such. Locke's hedonism, which is developed most fully in his later Essay Concerning Human Understanding, consists in the view that all good amounts to pleasure, with specifically moral good taken to consist in the pleasurable consequences of discharging one's moral duties.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-39
Author(s):  
Isidora Fürst

The understanding of law in Ancient Greece was based on the religious interpretations of human nature and natural laws. Two Greek goddesses were representatives of justice and fairness. In the ancient sources Themis is presented as a goddess and prophetess, one of the Titans and the daughter of Gea and Uranus. She is a symbol of divine order, justice, natural law and good customs. Dike, the daughter of Themis, is the goddess of justice and truth, the protector of rights and courts of justice, the arbiter, the symbol of honor, the goddess of revenge and punishment. In early Greek culture and poetry, the terms themis and dike represented justice in the meaning of cosmic order, natural law, and legality. The paper analyses the Hellenic notions of justice, fairness and legality embodied in the phenomena of themis and dike. Nomos (law) is just only if it is in harmony with themis, and law is valid only if it is just. The paper presents the doctrines of Hellenic writers, poets and playwrights on justice and law, with special reference to the influence of mythology on Hellenic law. Publius Ovidius Naso’s work „Metamorphosis”, which speaks about Themis’ role in the creation of the world and the salvation of the human race is one of the greatest sources about this goddess. In Homer’s „Iliad” and „Odyssey”, epics that sing of the heroic spirit, justice is shown in the motives, intentions and behavior of the participants in the event, mostly heroes. The poet Hesiod, famous for the poems „Theogony” and „Works and Days”, moves away from the heroic virtues of people and portrays the gods as bearers of moral power and guardians of justice. In the light of legislative reforms, Solon’s dike represents the progress and well-being of society through economic reforms, which is why justice and injustice refer only to legal and illegal acquisition of wealth and its effect on the community. Aeschylus’ „Oresteia” shows the principle of justice based on talion, according to which the punishment has to be identical with the committed crime. One of the greatest Ancient Greek playwrights, Sophocles, based his play „Antigone” on the conflict between the laws of men and the laws of gods. According to Herodotus, the greatest Ancient Greek historian, the actions of the gods govern human destinies and historical events. The idea of justice in Ancient Greece was all throughout its transformation based of the universial concept of natural balance.


2016 ◽  
Vol 50 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
David VanDrunen

Despite the technical character of natural law scholarship, most people who live in accord withthe natural law do not do so because they have been persuaded by technical argumentation. How do people truly come to know the natural law? Learning the natural law is essentially thesame process as maturing in wisdom. Building upon theological conceptions of natural lawand wisdom, this article concludes that wisdom is the suitable power by which peopleapprehend subjectively what the natural law prescribes objectively. Thus the way in which wegrow in wisdom – through a communal process of receiving instruction and observing andreflecting upon life experience – is also the primary way in which people come to know andpractice the natural law. This conclusion suggests a revised perspective on how natural lawyerspursue their work as they seek to address the moral fragmentation of our day.


2019 ◽  
pp. 67-80
Author(s):  
Fred Dallmayr

The chapter considers the origin and meaning of “natural law” and “natural rightness,” the core of right conduct, whose origin is sometimes placed in the cogito. This chapter emphasizes, instead, the role of contextual “relationality” in rules, whether “positive” social norms or “divine” rules, such as the Mosaic “laws” which were not imposed unilaterally by a divine potentate but reflected the people’s experience and “common sense” of right conduct. The chapter extends this argument to the work of Thomas Hobbes for whom transit from the “state of nature” to the “civil state” depended on reciprocal and relational “natural laws,” which he called “immutable and eternal” because they originate at the experiential boundary between life and death. Relationality prevails even when human norms are set aside in favor of “higher” rules—as revealed by Antigone of Thebes who appealed beyond state rules to the relationality between brother and sister.


1983 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 633-651 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur M. Melzer

The Social Contract is reinterpreted by emphasizing its relation to Rousseau's other writings and doctrines. In the spirit of Hobbesian realism, Rousseau regards natural law and other forms of “private morality” as ineffectual, invalid, and in practice dangerous tools of oppression and subversion. But, still more realistic than Hobbes, Rousseau thinks it impossible to build a nonoppressive state on men's selfish interests alone and embraces the classical view that morality or virtue is politically necessary (as well as intrinsically good). Rousseau's doctrine of the natural goodness of man, however, which traces all vice to the effects of oppression, leads him to conclude that the non-oppression more or less guaranteed by the absolute rule of general laws is also sufficient to make men virtuous. Thus Rousseau can declare law as such (General Will) infallible and “sovereign”—and he must do so in order to protect rule of law from its greatest danger, the subversive appeal to “natural law.”


Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

In this paper I argue for a rule-of-law-reading of Ulrik Huber’s fundamental law on freedom of property. My aim is to show that there is enough contemporary intellectual and legal context for such a reading. I do so by arguing along three lines: the medieval tradition that rooted the origin of private property in natural law, protection of property in the constitution of Holland in the seventeenth century, and property rights protected by fundamental law in English common law.



Author(s):  
Fabinne Knudsen

To analyse and interpret qualitative data is like putting a puzzle together. In this article it is argued that the most valuable pieces often are those which do not fit into the developing pattern. They are the ones that force one to widen or reconsider one’s hypothesis, and thereby disclose new knowledge. In the first part of the article, this idea is illustrated by use of a report, based mainly on interviews, on incentives and barriers to comply with safety rules in Danish merchant ships. The analysis of the interviews revealed many inconsistencies and contradictions between the answers and even within the same interviews. This reflects ambivalence or contrasting feelings or signals (e.g. contradictory demands from shipowners and authorities or ambivalence toward the shipowner or the foreign crew members). The second part is initiated by setting out the strange feeling acquired in the course of the analysis, that at one time the author stopped mastering what was happening, as if the statements began to interfere independently of her own will. The author utilizes some of the works of Bruno Latour to understand this feeling. What she experienced, with Latour’s words, was a transition from objectivity to “objectory”. In other words the statements the author was trying to analyse began to “object” in an obstinate way. She learned from Latour that she’d better encourage them to do so, instead of trying to imitate an alleged disinterested objective research.  


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document