Re-forming property to address eco-social fragmentation and rift

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (0) ◽  
pp. 13-37
Author(s):  
Margaret Davies

Two concepts that bridge the nature-human divide may help to diagnose and address some of the present and future problems of eco-social change in a legal context. ‘Fragmentation’ refers to loss and degradation of the habitat of nonhuman life. It is also a useful concept for understanding the fracturing of the material conditions for human life in a modern globalised world. The notion of ‘metabolic rift’, derived from Marx by John Bellamy Foster, refers to a break in the human-nonhuman circulation of natural materials, brought on by industrial agriculture and urbanisation. These related ideas provide a frame for exploring the connections between social and environmental justice and the role played by legal forms such as private property. In keeping with the imperative to re-form legal concepts to account for eco-social existence, the article presents a view of property as human and nonhuman habitat. This approach aims to use law to help recreate the conditions for the constructive inter-dependence of social and environmental goods.

Global Jurist ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rossella Esther Cerchia

Abstract It is assumed that comparative legal studies, through its deep and historical analysis of law and its dissociation in legal formants, have contributed to understanding the importance of the different factors that shape legal rules. In this article, emphasis is given to a factor that is sometimes neglected in legal narrations: legal mentality or, more simply, the inherent logical way of thinking and its influence in shaping legal rules. The area of investigation is the legal relationship between principal and agent. It is a narration that selects a specific “fil rouge” to link different “pieces” throughout European history to compose a mosaic of different factors that may have contributed to developing a certain legal mentality in this area of law. The legal mentality is nothing more than the product of the extra-legal contexts in which principal and agent operate. In reference to the extra-legal context, it means the importance, above all, of the situations of proximity between the two parties: proximity that could be “spacial” (i.e., they are part of the same small community), or “relational” governed by extra-legal forms of belonging to the same group, for instance families (broader or narrower ones) or clans. This narration starts with a glance at the ancient agreement of mandatum and its roots in the Roman idea of “friendship” and personal bond. Then it continues by touching on a source of the medieval companies: the family bond, one of the stronger and more trustworthy relationships at the time. It will be shown that some aspects of that relationship are not dissimilar from the ones later formed by the case law of the English Chancery Court in the field of the law of agency. This could be seen as a result of the legacy of the stratification of a certain legal mentality shaped by a context that was created by extralegal relationships. Nowadays the modern fading of the personal bond between principal and agent has highlighted an important evolution: there was proximity then depersonalization: this is reflected in the evolution of legal rules, for instance, in French, Italian and English national law. Finally, the case of the “real” or “absolute” irrevocability of the authority shows that the agency relationship, constructed in a breeding ground characterized by trust and utilized to protect the principal's interest (or even the principal's interest), could become - through related or linked contracts - an instrument of more complex agreements. In these cases, the interest of the agent or third parties (such as creditors, contractual counterparts or “beneficiaries” in the broad sense) could lead those transactions far from the original idea of mandat or mandato or agency. In those situations, the “causa” of the agency  (to use a concept dear to civil law tradition) changes and its roots in personal bond and the principal's interest loses its strength as it is mirrored, once again, in the legal rules.


Problemos ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 76 ◽  
pp. 52-65
Author(s):  
Vytautas Rubavičius

Straipsnyje grindžiama nuomonė, jog postmodernybė yra iš modernybės kylantis kapitalizmo sistemos būvis, kuriam būdinga gyvybės suprekinimas ir suišteklinimas. Postmodernybę charakterizuoja populiariosios ir medijų kultūros išplitimas. Tos kultūros apima ne tik kultūros prekes, bet ir vartojimo būdus, įgūdžius ir jų lavinimą. Pastaruoju metu jos kuria nemirtingumo vaizdiniams bei nuojautoms palankią kultūrinę, intelektinę ir pasaulėvaizdinę terpę, kurioje struktūriškai įsitvirtina genetinis diskursas ir jo nustatomos žmogaus ir jo gyvenamo pasaulio aiškinimo gairės. Svarbus šio diskurso bruožas yra technologinis inžinerinis jo pobūdis, išryškėjęs susiejant nano ir biotechnologijas, kuriomis tikimasi įveikti gyvąją ir negyvąją gamtą skiriančią prarają, iš reikalingų atomų bei molekulių kuriant reikalingų ląstelių dalis ir klonuojant gyvas būtybes. Gyvybė suprekinama ir suišteklinama patentuojant gyvybės elementus – genus ir su jais susijusius procesus. Daroma išvada, jog visi genetikos, informatikos ir kitų mokslų laimėjimai, teikiantys žmogaus gyvenimo ilginimo galimybių, kurios palaiko gundančią nemirtingumo idėją, jau yra persmelkti prekinių santykių, tad ir pats nemirtingumas įmanomas tik kaip prekė. Aptariami kai kurie evoliuciniai ir religiniai techno sapiens sampratos aspektai. Detaliau gvildenamos dvi „nemirtingumo“ versijos: Z. Baumano, kuris nemirtingumo pažadą sieja su kompiuterinės technikos plėtra prasidėjus „Antrajai medijų erai“, ir J. Baudrillard’o, tegiančio, jog klonavimo technologijos „apgręžia“ evoliuciją ir žmogų gundo virusiniu ar vėžiniu belyčiu nemirtingumu.Pagrindiniai žodžiai: genetinis diskursas, klonavimas, medijų kultūra, nanobiotechnologijos, nemirtingumas, suprekinimas.Genetic Discourse in Media Culture: Temptation by Commodified ImmoralityVytautas Rubavičius   SummaryPostmodernity is maintained as a stage of the development of capitalism. The difference between modernity and postmodernity is explained in relation to the new sphere of commodification and resourcification, namely, that of life and of all natural living processes. Postmodern media culture, or popular culture, is peopled by signs of immortality and various kinds of immortals – cyborgs, clones, zombies, immortal human beings and others. Thus, culture accustoms a consumer to immortals and immortality which is concidered as the main goal of a human being and evolution. By nano-bio-technologies and genetic discourse this goal is made scientifically valid, thus reachable. Genetic discourse is becoming the fundamental world-view providing focal landmarks for the emerging future. Media culture supports the spreading of genetic discourse and facilitates its understanding. The temptation by immortality can be considered as a version of modernist ideology of human liberation from various natural, social and heavenly bonds. This liberation, and also secularization, is supported by a scientific genetic technological discourse which is becoming a stimulating factor of postmodern media production. The genetic explanation of the world is particularly handy for technological reflexivity: the entire world is as if encapsulated into human genes, which become the principle explaining the mystery of life, evolution and the future of humanity, thus rendering power to produce the human proper form and the future of people. All the possibilities stemming from the new genetic and biotech discoveries fell under the regulation of property relations by patenting, thus making “immortality” – as a temptation and brand – not only an exeptional commodity, but also a political tool and a commodifying force. As the relationships of private property have penetrated natural biogenetic diversity and, having turned it into a resource, the cognitive subject has reached the goal to secularise the Universe, which he has set for himself: only he as the owner and producer of genes lures people with the eternal shapes of the clones and their genetic information, which will be sustained in any location of the Universe. The temptation by “immortality” will become even stronger when the genetic code is mastered. The future of humanity is related to the mixed forms of life, trans-genic or otherwise genetically modified organisms and techno-human forms that will help to postpone, and later to conquer, death. Even thinkers with religious tendencies perceive the technological improvement of human beings as their evolution towards the techno sapiens and consider such a development as an advancement towards the Kingdom of God. The technologization of human beings is imagined in terms of their divination. Yet in this case the character of contemporary science secularising God and obliterating the perception of divinity is overlooked. Two versions of immortality are analyzed more closely – that of Z. Bauman, who links it with the development of computer technologies, and that of J. Baudrillard, who gives a warning that by cloning technologies humanity is trying to inverse the evolution and to return to the undifferentiated state of cells. The conclusion is drawn that regardless of how we understand ‘immortality,’ argue over its reality or unreality, all possibilities to prolong human life granted by genetics, informatics and other advances in science and technologies, which support the tempting idea of immortality, have already been penetrated by commodity relationships; therefore, “immortality” itself will be available only as a commodity.Keywords: cloning, commodification, genetic discourse, immortality, media culture, nano-bio-technologies.


Author(s):  
Bas van der Vossen ◽  
Jason Brennan

The chapter defends economic liberties such as the right to private property and freedom of contract as basic human rights, which the authors refer to as productive human rights. Despite being largely ignored or criticized in the theory and practice of human rights, they serve all the key functions that human rights generally serve. Using a basic interest framework, the chapter show that productive rights qualify as human rights because they both directly serve the interests of individual rights-holders, as well as the interests of people across the societies in which they are upheld. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the theoretical implications of a theory of justice that omits productive rights, and focuses only on things like meeting people’s needs. Such a theory will end up distorting important truths about human life and agency.


Author(s):  
Stephen J. Morse

Stephen J. Morse argues that neuroscience raises no new challenges for the existence, source, and content of meaning, morals, and purpose in human life, nor for the robust conceptions of agency and autonomy underpinning law and responsibility. Proponents of revolutionizing the law and legal system make two arguments. The first appeals to determinism and the person as a “victim of neuronal circumstances” (VNC) or “just a pack of neurons” (PON). The second defend “hard incompatibilism. ” Morse reviews the law’s psychology, concept of personhood, and criteria for criminal responsibility, arguing that neither determinism nor VNC/PON are new to neuroscience and neither justifies revolutionary abandonment of moral and legal concepts and practices evolved over centuries in both common law and civil law countries. He argues that, although the metaphysical premises for responsibility or jettisoning it cannot be decisively resolved, the hard incompatibilist vision is not normatively desirable even if achievable.


Etyka ◽  
1970 ◽  
Vol 6 ◽  
pp. 113-131
Author(s):  
Zbigniew Kuderowicz

The article deals with the attitude of Marx and Engels towards the appraisal of labour as a value, and the relation between labour and the implementation of the principle of universal development of the individual personality. First, the changes in their views on the appraisal of labour are discussed. In his Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx understood labour as a spontaneous expression of human thought and the formation of a new environment in which man recognizes his own qualities. In that period Marx considered value to be an affirmation of human life and a requirement put to the individual and to society. In his later, mature works Marks refused to consider an act of labour as value and defined it as conquering nature. The act of labour was to Marx no longer a value but a process which is giving value to human products and, therefore, is a necessary condition of human existence in all social systems. Marx did not regard the act of labour as a postulate or an ideal. In his opinion, the act of labour acquired value depending on its effects for the universal development of all individuals. The Marxian ideal of a perfect man implied a series of postulates relating to the organization of labour. The author criticizes Raymond Aron’s interpretation of Marxian humanism. In the works of Marx, Aron perceives a contradiction between the postulate of universal labour and the postulate of leisure in the meaning of condition in which the idea of the perfect man is realized. According to the author, from the ideal of a perfect man results the postulate of obligatory labour for all members of the society, i.e., that everybody should contribute to the development of the productive forces in order to secure the material conditions for the development of their personality. The realization of Marxian humanism requires also the maintenance of definite proportions between labour determined by the social division of labour (necessary in this sense), and leisure which should imply not only resting but also activity towards a free development of various individual abilities. In the works of Marx there is no contradiction but a complementary relation between labour and leisure. Pobierz


2021 ◽  
pp. 14-24
Author(s):  
Maria Georgieva

The peculiarities of the formation of new organizational and production structures of the agricultural sector of the Bulgarian economy in terms of integration into the European Union are considered. One of the conditions for ensuring the competitiveness of Bulgarian agriculture was the creation of a significant number of farms of various organizational and legal forms. Peculiarities of creation and functioning of private agricultural enterprises against the background of privatization of former labor cooperatives and state farms with observance of a clearly regulated legislative procedure are studied. The peculiarities of creating private agricultural farms in two forms are generalized: private households and large agro-firms. Of course, there were some difficulties with the privatization of agricultural machinery, equipment, technical and farm buildings. Also, difficulties arose with the management of agricultural commodity production due to the long absence of a tradition of private property in agriculture. It is proved that one of the features of the formation of new organizational and production structures was their creation on the basis of decolectivization and privatization. The main task of this process was to create an efficient and competitive environment for the development of the agricultural sector. The basis of agricultural management in Bulgaria in the period 1996-2007 were private agricultural enterprises, which were more efficient in their activities than other organizational and legal forms of management. However, the imperfection of the management system of the agricultural sector did not allow to accelerate the process of productivity of the industry, to attract the latest scientific advances and more efficient use of logistics. In the pre-integration period, no program of management actions for the functioning of agricultural enterprises was developed, which did not contribute to the growth of their financial and economic indicators and the competitiveness of these farms.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 21-30
Author(s):  
A. V. Kornev

The paper examines activity as the most important component of human life. The author elucidates the features of activity from the standpoint of various fields of knowledge: philosophy, psychology, sociology. The preference is given to the activity approach, which is based on the category of “substantive activity.” It is substantive in nature and does not simply define the activity as human interaction with the outside world, but reflects the changes that constitute the result of human activity. Various aspects of theoretical and practical activity are touched upon on the example of legal activity, which is of a complex intellectual nature. Legal activity is often characterized through legal practice — one of the varieties of social practices. Some similarities of these categories are reflected, as well as differences between them. The paper gives the author’s definition of legal activity focused on professional legal activity. The definition cannot claim to be universal due to various types of professional legal activity. Nevertheless, it is specified that professional legal activity is always an activity carried out on the basis of law, in legal forms; it is aimed at achieving the goals determined by law. The author demonstrates the impact of digital technologies on various types of legal activities. Especially in the conditions of the pandemic when traditional forms of communication have given way to virtual ones. It is noted that this influence is of a dual nature, that is, on the one hand, it increases the efficiency of communications, and, on the other hand, it leads to some risks and problems, in particular, against the background of the fact that a significant part of our population still does not have access to modern information and communication systems.


2021 ◽  
pp. 147488512110506
Author(s):  
Alexander Bryan

While it is a point of agreement in contemporary republican political theory that property ownership is closely connected to freedom as non-domination, surprisingly little work has been done to elucidate the nature of this connection or the constraints on property regimes that might be required as a result. In this paper, I provide a systematic model of the boundaries within which republican property systems must sit and explore some of the wider implications that thinking of property in these terms may have for republicans. The boundaries I focus on relate to the distribution of property and the application of types of property claims over particular kinds of goods. I develop this model from those elements of non-domination most directly related to the operation of a property regime: (a) economic independence, (b) limiting material inequalities, and (c) the promotion of common goods. The limits that emerge from this analysis support intuitive judgments that animate much republican discussion of property distribution. My account diverges from much orthodox republican theory, though, in challenging the primacy of private property rights in the realization of economic independence. The value of property on republican terms can be realized without private ownership of the means of production.


Author(s):  
Gregory S. Alexander

The power to expropriate land for the common good can be understood in terms quite different from those that are usually offered. The justification for expropriation here rests on a conception of property’s underlying purpose as promoting human flourishing. The forced sale of land is necessary to create and maintain the material conditions that are necessary prerequisites for all members of society to have well-lived lives. Specifically, these material conditions include a certain physical infrastructure that is necessary for individuals to develop human capabilities. Kelo v. City of New London is an appropriate case to use as a vehicle for considering how the human flourishing theory addresses the public use requirement. This chapter examines Kelo from a comparative perspective, using German constitutional law to see how a more overtly purposive method of reasoning can clarify when it is legitimate for the state to force sales of private property and when it is not.


Author(s):  
Gustaaf van Nifterik

In this paper I argue for a rule-of-law-reading of Ulrik Huber’s fundamental law on freedom of property. My aim is to show that there is enough contemporary intellectual and legal context for such a reading. I do so by arguing along three lines: the medieval tradition that rooted the origin of private property in natural law, protection of property in the constitution of Holland in the seventeenth century, and property rights protected by fundamental law in English common law.



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