scholarly journals El Supremo “alivia” la carga procesal del lesionado y determina el momento de la aparición del daño en la acción de responsabilidad patrimonial contra el legislador

Author(s):  
Mª Consuelo ALONSO GARCÍA

LABURPENA: Lan honek Auzitegi Gorenaren kasazio-doktrina berria aztertzen du, zeinak Sektore Publikoko Araubide Juridikoaren 40/2015 Legeak ezarritako eskakizun batzuk interpretatu eta egokitzen baititu; hala bada, Estatu Legegilearen ondarezko erantzukizuna ikusten du konstituzio-kontrako legeek (eta Europar Batasuneko Zuzenbidea urratzen duten legeek) eragindako kalteak direla eta. Zehazki, Auzitegiak ofizioz berrikustea onartzen du ustez konstituzioaren aurkakoa den lege-xedapena betearazten duen administrazio-jarduna aurkaratzeko errekurtso egoki gisa, hau da, lege-testu horren 32.4 artikuluan aurreikusitako baldintza betetzat jotzeko; eta ordaina jaso dezaketen kalteak egintzat hartzen diren momentua zehazten du, halaber, araua konstituzioaren aurkakoa dela adierazten duen epaia argitaratu baino lehenagoko bost urteko hasierako epea zenbatzeko. Arau beraren 34.1 artikuluaren bigarren paragrafoak aipatzen du muga hori. ABSTRACT: This work examines the innovative doctrine related to appeals delivered by the Supreme Court that interprets by tempering them some of the requirements established by the Act 40/2015 on the Legal Regime of the Public Sector, in order to determine the patrimonial liability of the legislator State for the damages resulting of unconstitutional legislative acts (and acts that infringe EU Law). Specifically, the Court admits the ex officio review as an adequate action to challenge the administrative action that executes an alledgelly unconstitutional legislative provision to the effects of meeting the conditions of art. 32.4 of the aforementioned legal act, and it defines the moment where damages are to be considered inflicted for the purpose of indemnization so as to estimate the onset moment of the five years limit term previous to the publication of the judgment that concludes its unconstitutionality, a time limitation to which art. 34.1, second paragraph, of the same provision refers. RESUMEN: El presente trabajo examina la novedosa doctrina casacional del Tribunal Supremo que interpreta, atemperándolas, algunas de las exigencias que impone la Ley 40/2015, de Régimen Jurídico del Sector Público, para apreciar la responsabilidad patrimonial del Estado Legislador por los perjuicios derivados de leyes inconstitucionales (y de leyes que vulneran el Derecho de la Unión Europea). Concretamente, el Tribunal admite la revisión de oficio como recurso oportuno para impugnar la actuación administrativa que ejecuta la disposición legislativa pretendidamente inconstitucionalidad a los efectos de entender cumplida la condición prevista en el artículo 32.4 de dicho texto legal, y define el momento en el que se entienden producidos los daños indemnizables a fin de contabilizar el plazo inicial de los cinco años anteriores a la fecha de la publicación de la sentencia que declare su inconstitucionalidad, limitación a la que se refiere el artículo 34.1, párrafo segundo, de la misma norma.

Author(s):  
Carmen CHINCHILLA MARÍN

LABURPENA: Sektore Publikoaren Araubide Juridikoari buruzko 40/2015 Legeak arau berria sartu du zigorrak preskribitzeko epearen zenbaketaren inguruan, zigorren aurka jarritako gora jotzeko errekurtsoak administrazioaren isiltasunaren bidez ezesten diren kasuetarako. Hala, lege horren 30.3. artikuluan ezarritakoaren arabera, errekurtsoa ustez ezesten bada, errekurtso horren ebazpena emateko legez aurreikusi den epea amaitu eta hurrengo egunetik aurrera hasi behar da zenbatzen zigorra preskribitzeko epea. Preskripzioari buruzko arau berri horrek, zentzuzkoa denez, ondorioak eduki behar ditu zigorrak betearazteko araubidearen gainean, zigorra bete behar izatea baita zigorra preskribatzeko oinarria. Artikulu honetan, bi berritasun horien berri ematen da, eta kontraesan-arazoa aztertzen, Konstituzio Auzitegiak eta Auzitegi Gorenak errekurtso-bideko isiltasunaren eta isiltasun horrek zigorren preskripzioaren eta bete behar izatearen gainean dituen ondorioen —hobeto esanda, «ondorio-ezaren»— inguruan duten jurisprudentziari dagokionez. RESUMEN: la Ley 40/2015, de Régimen jurídico del Sector público, ha introducido una nueva regla sobre el cómputo del plazo de prescripción de las sanciones en los casos en los que el recurso de alzada interpuesto contra las mismas se desestima por silencio administrativo. Así, a tenor de lo establecido en el artículo 30.3 de esta ley, en el caso de desestimación presunta del recurso, el plazo de prescripción de la sanción comenzará a computarse desde el día siguiente a aquel en el que finalice el plazo legalmente previsto para la resolución de dicho recurso. Esta nueva regla sobre la prescripción lógicamente tiene que producir consecuencias sobre el régimen de ejecutividad de las sanciones, pues la ejecutividad de la sanción constituye el presupuesto de la prescripción de la misma. En este artículo se da cuenta de ambas novedades y se analiza el problema de su contradicción respecto de la jurisprudencia —del Tribunal constitucional y del Tribunal Supremo— sobre el silencio en vía de recurso y sus efectos (más bien, sus «no efectos») sobre la prescripción y la ejecutividad de las sanciones. ABSTRACT: The Act 40/2015 of the legal regime of the Public Sector has introduced a new rule on the calculation of the limitation period to be applied to sanctions in cases where hierarchichal appeal filed against them had been rejected by administrative silence. Thus, within the meaning of section 30.3 of this Act, in case of implied rejection of the appeal, the calculation of the limitation period of the sanction shall begin from the day following the deadline legally established to resolve that appeal. This new rule about the limitation period has logically to have consequences over the enforceability of sanctions, since enforceability of the sanction as such is a prerequisite for the limitation period of it. This article deals with both novelties and analyzes the problem of their contradiction with the case law —by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court— regarding the silence within the appeal and its effects (or rather lack of effects) about the limitation period and enforceability of sanctions.


Author(s):  
Jorge FONDEVILA ANTOLÍN

Laburpena: Auzitegi Gorenaren (Lan Arloko Sala) 2019ko urtarrilaren 24ko 1067/2019 Epaiaren oinarri juridikoetan ageri diren hutsuneak eta hutsaltasunak aztertzen ditu lan honek. Izan ere, epai horren arabera, ez dago zertan Espainiako Konstituzioan eta Enplegatu Publikoaren Oinarrizko Estatutuan aurreikusitakoa bete, sozietate publikoetan enplegua eskuratzeko konstituzio-bermeari eta -kontrolari dagokienez. Horrek atzerapauso handia eragiten du berme juridikoetan, eta bide ematen die klientelismoari eta arbitrariotasunari. Resumen: Este trabajo examina las inconsistencias y deficiencias de la fundamentación jurídica del Auto 1067/2019, de 24 de enero de 2019 del Tribunal Supremo (Sala de lo Social), cuyo contenido supone una quiebra a la configuración de un empleo público profesional y objetivo, en un ámbito tan importante con el Sector público del conjunto de las administraciones públicas, que tiene una gran importancia en términos económicos y de número de efectivos personales en el conjunto de los servicios públicos. Así, al amparo del citado Auto, se declara la exención de sometimiento a las previsiones de la Constitución Española y del Estatuto Básico del empleado público con relación al control y garantías constitucionales en el acceso al empleo en las sociedades públicas, lo que supone un claro retroceso en las garantías jurídicas y una apertura al clientelismo y arbitrariedad, en detrimento de los derechos de los ciudadanos al acceso al empleo público, en condiciones de igualdad, mérito y capacidad. Abstract: This paper examines the inconsistencies and deficiencies of the legal basis of Order 1067/2019, of January 24, 2019 of the Supreme Court (Social Chamber), whose content implies a breakdown of the configuration of a professional and objective public employment, in such an important area with the public sector of all public administrations, which is of great importance in economic terms and given the number of staff in all public services. Thus, under the aforementioned Order, the exemption from subjection to the provisions of the Spanish Constitution and the Basic Statute of public employees is declared in relation to the control and constitutional guarantees in the access to employment in public societies, which is a clear setback in legal guarantees and an openness to clientelism and arbitrariness, to the detriment of the rights of citizens to access public employment, under conditions of equality, merit and capacity.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Imelda Maher ◽  
Ronan Riordan

2021 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. Christopher-Vajda
Author(s):  
Christopher Vajda

Following the expiry on 31 December 2020 of the ‘transition period’ under the UK/EU Withdrawal Agreement, the relationship between UK and EU law had changed. Whilst much EU legislation at that date will continue to apply in UK law as ‘retained EU law’ and judgments of the EU courts handed down before that date will remain binding on UK courts as ‘retained EU case law’, the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court can depart from that case law. Whilst EU court judgments handed down after that date are not binding on UK courts, they may be taken into account. This article considers both the status of EU retained case law and when the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal may depart from it, and the future of EU law that is not ‘retained EU case law’ and how judgments of the European Courts and national courts of its Member States may influence UK judges in the future.


2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-111
Author(s):  
Don Dunoon

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to review and critique three conventional assumptions about leadership and put forward an alternative framing, with leadership presented as a distinct form of intervention in particular moments to management. The paper also presents a structure for supporting leadership action by individuals and groups as an alternate to management action, which is seen as the dominant form. Design/methodology/approach Reflects an elaboration and distillation of concepts developed by the author since an earlier paper on essentially the same topic, drawing on his 20-plus years’ experience as a leadership developer. Findings Although not an empirical account, the paper seeks to demonstrate how, when conventional but infrequently challenged assumptions about leadership are “peeled back”, a new way of understanding leadership, especially in connection with management, is revealed. Research limitations/implications Suggestions are offered as to how the concepts and tools presented here could be evaluated, including in comparison with established leadership frameworks. Practical implications Outlines three practices for supporting leadership action in public sector organisations. These practices are working from observation, attributing reasonableness (allowing that others are reasonable) and speaking with authenticity. Collectively, these are known as the OBREAU Tripod (with “OBREAU” comprised of the first two letters in each of the pivotal words, observation, reasonableness and authenticity). Originality/value Conceiving of leadership as a different form of in-the-moment action to management in a public sector context is a distinctive contribution to the literature.


Author(s):  
O. Kravchuk ◽  
I. Ostashchuk

The oath of a judge as an oath of office and as an element of judicial symbolism is considered in the article. The oath of a judge belongs to the categories of oaths of office, taken by an official upon taking office. At the same time, it belongs to the judicial oaths used in the justice process and is an element of judicial symbols. The oath of a judge as an oath of office symbolizes the endowment of a judge as an official by the state (judicial) power, the moment of his acquisition of powers (it is the inauguration ceremony), and the duty of a judge as an official to perform his duties properly. The oath of a judge as a judicial symbol represents a public and solemn obligation of the judge to exercise a fair trial in all its manifestations, including: independence and impartiality of the court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and the rule of law. The judge takes the oath in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of senior officials (in Ukraine – in the presence of the President of Ukraine). It is an important ritual – a symbol of giving a person judicial power. The oath itself is a symbolic action of conscious choice of responsible and impartial observance of the law in the professional functions of realization of the rule of law for the good of all people. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that gathering a large number of people in one room can be problematic, so the oath ceremony was held even outdoors. It is stated that holding a ceremony in one of the judicial bodies, for example, in the premises of the Supreme Court or (subject to quarantine restrictions) in the territory of the Supreme Court may symbolize the independence of the judiciary and each judge from other branches of power. The peculiarity of the oath of a judge in Ukraine is its one-time nature. It should be taken only by a person first appointed to the position of a judge. In case of an appointment or transfer to another court, the judge shall not take the oath again. In this aspect, the oath of a judge is similar to the oath of a civil servant, which is taken only by persons recruited for the first time.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (70) ◽  
pp. 33-49
Author(s):  
Sebastian Czechowicz

The article is devoted to determine the authority competent to carry out the execution of the obligation to vaccinate, as well as the authority competent to apply for punishment of those who persistently evade preventive vaccinations on the basis of the Code of Misdemeanours in Poland. After analysing the competencies of the public administration bodies and comparing them with the judicial decisions of the administrative courts and the Supreme Court issued in cases involving mandatory preventive vaccination, which present an inconsistent line of jurisprudence, the author concludes that the enforcement body is the province governor. However, it is necessary to postulate legislative changes, primarily in the area of the possible transfer of competencies from the province governor to the State Sanitary Inspection.


1982 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-435
Author(s):  
David I. Shapiro

AbstractThe Supreme Court of the United States and other courts currently are considering the question of the extent to which the health care field should be subject to antitrust rules. This Article explores the special characteristics of the health care field, and the problems they create for antitrust analysis. Two current cases—Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society (awaiting decision by the Supreme Court) and Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. (pending in the District of Massachusetts)—illustrate the issues raised by efforts to contain health care costs through the setting of maximum fees. This Article suggests that traditional antitrust principles should and will prevail over arguments that such restraints are in the public interest.


Author(s):  
Michael P. McDonald ◽  
Micah Altman

This chapter discusses the history of public mapping. The earliest reform efforts in redistricting were made possible because districts were primarily drawn out of large geographic units such as counties, which greatly simplified the redistricting task. That task grew more complex in the early 1960s, when the Supreme Court ruled that districts had to be of roughly equal population: counties would now often have to be split between two or more districts. The increasing computational demands effectively shut the public out of redistricting, since redistricting could be performed only on extremely costly computer systems. The reemergence of public mapping began in the 1990s, when states began offering public access to computer terminals loaded with their redistricting software and data. Eventually, two technological innovations by 2010 made public mapping available to the general public. Organizations and individuals are now able to leverage high-speed internet and open-source software to disseminate easy-to-use redistricting systems through the Web.


2020 ◽  
pp. 15-58
Author(s):  
Neal Devins ◽  
Lawrence Baum

This chapter develops the argument that is summarized in chapter 1. One lesson of social psychology is that Supreme Court justices are not single-mindedly devoted to making good law or good policy. Rather, they have multiple goals that include a concern for their reputations, especially how they are regarded by the elite groups of which they are part. As a result, while the general public may have an impact on the justices, they respond primarily to fellow elites. Indeed, the Court’s decisions on most controversial social issues such as affirmative action and same-sex marriage are more consistent with the policy positions of highly educated people than the positions of the public as a whole. Starting with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, elites have become less homogeneous; over the past 25 years, today’s elites increasingly reflect the growing partisan divide among liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans. Nonetheless, norms within the elite legal profession such as collegiality and legally oriented decision making shape the behavior of justices, sometimes counteracting the effects of ideology.


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