Egocentric Performance Capture: A Review

2020 ◽  
pp. 64-73
Author(s):  
Shivam Grover ◽  
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Kshitij Sidana ◽  
...  

Performance capture of human beings have been used to animate 3D characters for movies and games for several decades now. Traditional performance capture methods require a dedicated costly setup which usually consists of more than one sensor placed at a distance from the subject, hence requiring a large amount of budget and space to accomodate. This lowers its feasibility and portability by a huge amount. Egocentric (first-person/wearable) cameras, however, are attached to the body and hence are mobile. With a rise of acceptance of wearable technology by the general public, wearable cameras have gotten cheaper too. We can make use of their excessive portability in the performance capture domain. However working with egocentric images is a mammoth task as the views are severely distorted due to the first-person perspective and the body parts farther from the camera are highly prone to being occluded. In this paper, we review the existing state-of-the-art methods about performance capture using egocentric based views.

2013 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 309-343 ◽  
Author(s):  
Irit Meir ◽  
Carol Padden ◽  
Mark Aronoff ◽  
Wendy Sandler

AbstractThe paper examines the role that iconicity plays in the structuring of grammars. Two main points are argued for: (a) Grammar does not necessarily suppress iconicity; rather, iconicity and grammar can enjoy a congenial relation in that iconicity can play an active role in the structuring of grammars. (b) Iconicity is not monolithic. There are different types of iconicity and languages take advantage of the possibilities afforded by them. We examine the interaction between iconicity and grammar by focusing on the ways in which sign languages employ the physical body of the signer as a rich iconic resource for encoding a variety of grammatical notions. We show that the body can play three different roles in iconic forms in sign languages: it can be used as a naming device where body parts represent body parts; it can represent the subject argument of verbal signs, and it can stand for first person. These strategies interact and sometimes compete in the languages under study. Each language resolves these competitions differently, which results in different grammars and grammatical structures. The investigation of the ways in which grammar and iconicity interact in these languages provides insight into the nature of both systems.


2004 ◽  
pp. 147-176
Author(s):  
Stanimir Rakic

In this paper I examine compound names of plants, animals, human beings and other things in which at least one nominal component designates a part of the body or clothes, or some basic elements of houshold in Serbian and English. The object of my analysis are complex derivatives of the type (adjective noun) + suffix in Serbian and componds of the type noun's + noun, noun + noun and adjective + noun in English. I try to show that there is a difference in metaphorical designation of human beings and other living creatures and things by such compound nouns. My thesis is that the metathorical designation of human beings by such compounds is based on the symbolic meaning of some words and expressions while the designation of other things and beings relies on noticed similarity. In Serbian language such designation is provided by comples derivatives praznoglavac 'empty-headed person', tupoglavac 'dullard' debolokoiac 'callos person', golobradac 'young, inexperienced person' zutokljunac 'tledling' (fig), in English chicken liver, beetle brain birdbrain, bonehead, butterfingers, bigwig, blackleg, blue blood bluestocking, eat's paw, deadhead,fat-guts,fathead, goldbrick (kol) hardhat, hardhead, greenhorn, redcoat (ist), redneck (sl), thickhead, etc. Polisemous compounds like eat's paw lend support for this thesis because their designation of human beings is based on symbolic meaning of some words or expressions. I hypothesize that the direction and extend of the possible metaphorization of names may be accounted for by the following hierarchy (11) people - animals - plants - meterial things. Such hierarchy is well supported by the observations of Lakoff (1987) and Taylor (1995) about the role of human body in early experience and perception ofthe reality. Different restrictions which may be imposed in the hierarchy (11) should be the matter of further study, some of which have been noted on this paper. The compounds of this type denoting people have metaphorically meaning conected with some pejorative uses. These compounds refer to some psychological or characteral features, and show that for the classification of people such features are much more important than physical properties. While the animals and plants are classified according to some charecteristics of their body parts, people are usually classified according to psychollogical characteristics or their social functions. I have also noted a difference in structure between compounds designation animals and those designating plants and other things. The designation of animals relies more on metonymy, and that of plants and other things on metaphor based on comparision of noticed similarities. In the compounds designating animals, the nominal component relatively seldom refers to the parts of plants or other things. I guess that the cause may be the fact that the anatomy of plants is very different from the anatomy of animals. As a consequence the structure adjective + noun is much more characteristic of the compounds designating animals in English than the structure noun's + noun, and the same holds, although in a lesser degree for the compounds designating humans. It is also noticeable that in English compounds whose second component a part of body or clothes the first component rarely designates animals. On the other hand the compounds (9), in which the nominal head refers to some superordinate species, the first component often designates animal species, but usually of a very different kind. These data seem to lend support for Goldvarg & Gluksberg's thesis (1998) that metaforical interpretation is favoured if the nominal constituents denote quite different entities.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 247-262
Author(s):  
Nguyen Anh Quoc ◽  
Nguyen Minh Tri ◽  
Nguyen Anh Thuong ◽  
Dinh The Hoang ◽  
Nguyen Van Bung

Man and nature is a unity between body and individual in behavior. Humans are liberty, creative, happy subjects in behavior and labor. By behavior and labor, humans produce tools, spare parts, machines, and robots to replace internal organs, lengthen the senses, and lengthen defective body parts. Evolution is no longer a mutation in the body but the assembly of accessories into organs, senses, and body parts when needed. People use devices that are manufactured to be used for what people want depending on specific conditions and circumstances. Labor and behavior make objectification of people, but alienated behavior and alienated labor make humanize the object. The time to enjoy liberty, creativity, and happiness is human, and the time to perform alienated behavior and alienated labor is the time to live for the non-human. People are corrupted into slavery to standards, money. It is the process of self-torture, torturing oneself; and the nobility of standards, the wealth of money is the unhappy product of life. Humans are liberty, creative and happy subjects; alienated human beings are all helpless, unhappy, deceit. Money, standards are products of helplessness, unhappiness, lies. Standards, money remove people from life.


Author(s):  
Hirotaka Osawa ◽  
◽  
Jun Mukai ◽  
Michita Imai ◽  

We propose an anthropomorphization framework that determines an object’s body image. This framework directly intervenes and anthropomorphizes objects in ubiquitous-computing environments through robotic body parts shaped like those of human beings, which provide information through spoken directions and body language. Our purpose is to demonstrate that an object acquires subjective representations through anthropomorphization. Using this framework, people can more fully understand instructions given by an object. We designed an anthropomorphization framework that changes the body image by attaching body parts. We also conducted experiments to evaluate this framework. Results indicate that the site at which an anthropomorphization device is attached influences human perception of the object’s virtual body image, and participants in experiments understood several instructions given by the object more clearly. Results also indicate that participants better intuited their devices’ instructions and movement in ubiquitous-computing environments.


Author(s):  
Cristóbal Pera

ABSTRACTIf the human body is really a fabric, should surgeons be considered architects, as some surgeons describe themselves today? The author raises and analyzes this question, and he concludes that vsurgeons cannot be considered as such: the architect is the creator of his work —fabric or building—, but the surgeon is not the creator of this complex biological fabric —vulnerable and subject to deterioration and with an expiration date— which is the human body. This body is the object upon which his hands and instruments operate. The surgeon cures and heals wounds, immobilizes and aligns fractured bones in order to facilitate their good and timely repair, and cuts open the body’s surface in order to reach its internal organs. He also explores the body with his hands or instruments, destroys and reconstructs its ailing parts, substitutes vital organs taken from a donor’s foreign body, designs devices or prostheses, and replaces body parts, such as arteries and joints, that are damaged or worn out. In today’s culture, dominated by the desire to perfect the body, other surgeons keep retouching its aging façade, looking for an iconic and timeless beauty. This longing can drive, sometimes, to surgical madness. The surgeon is not capable of putting into motion, from scratch, a biological fabric such as the human body. Thus, he can’t create the subject of his work in the way that an architect can create a building. In contrast, the surgeon restores the body’s deteriorated or damaged parts and modifies the appearance of the body’s façade.RESUMEN¿Si el cuerpo humano fuera realmente una fábrica, podría el cirujano ser considerado su arquitecto, como algunos se pregonan en estos tiempos? Esta es la cuestión planteada por el autor y, a tenor de lo discurrido, su respuesta es negativa: porque así como el arquitecto es el artífice de su obra —fábrica o edificio— el cirujano no es el artífice de la complejísima fábrica biológica —vulnerable, deteriorable y caducable— que es el cuerpo humano, la cual le es dada como objeto de las acciones de sus manos y de sus instrumentos. El cirujano cura y restaña sus heridas, alinea e inmoviliza sus huesos fracturados para que su reparación llegue a buen término, penetra por sus orificios naturales o dibuja sobre la superficie corporal incisiones que le permitan llegar a sus entrañas, las explora con sus manos o mediante instrumentos, destruye y reconstruye sus partes enfermas, sustituye órganos vitales que no le ayudan a vivir por los extraídos de cuerpos donantes, y concibe, diseña y hace fabricar artefactos o prótesis, como recambio fragmentos corporales deteriorados o desgastados, como arterias o articulaciones. Otros cirujanos, en la predominante cultura de la modificación del cuerpo, retocan una y otra vez su fachada envejecida ineludiblemente por el paso del tiempo, empeñados en la búsqueda incesante de una belleza icónica y mediática e intemporal, una pretensión que puede conducir, y a veces conduce, al desvarío quirúrgico. En definitiva, el cirujano es incapaz de poner de pie, ex novo, una fábrica biológica como la del cuerpo humano y, por lo tanto, no puede ser su artífice, como lo es el arquitecto de su edificio. A lo sumo, es el restaurador de sus entrañas deterioradas y el modificador de su fachada, de su apariencia.


2012 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-335
Author(s):  
Bistoon Abasi ◽  
Amer Gheitury

Human body as a universal possession of human beings constitutes an interesting domain where questions regarding semantic categorisations might be sought crosslinguistically. In the following, we will attempt to describe the terms used to refer to the body in Hawrami, an Iranian language spoken in Paveh, a small township in the western province of Kermanshah near Iraqi borders. Due to the scarcity of written material, the inventory of 202 terms referring to external and internal body parts were obtained through a field work, which took a long time, and techniques, such as the “colouring task”, observation and recording the terms as used in ordinary conversations and informal interviews with native speakers. The semantic properties of the terms and the way they are related in a partonymy or locative relationship were also investigated. As far as universals of body part terms are concerned, while conforming to ‘depth principle’ concerning the number of levels each partonomy may consist of, Hawrami violates an important feature of this principle by not allowing transitive relations between different levels of partonomic hierarchies. In addition, Hawrami lacks a term for labelling the ‘whole’.


2014 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 425-446
Author(s):  
Ayelet Even-Ezra

In the Second Epistle to the Corinthians, Paul writes: It is doubtless not profitable for me to boast. I will come to visions and revelations of the Lord: I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago—whether in the body I do not know, or whether out of the body I do not know, God knows—such a one was caught up to the third heaven. And I know such a man—whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows—how he was caught up into Paradise and heard inexpressible words, which it is not lawful for a man to utter. Of such a one I will boast; yet of myself I will not boast, except in my infirmities. (2 Cor 12:1–5 nkiv) This brief and enigmatic account is caught between multiple dialectics of power and infirmity, pride and humility, unveiling and secrecy. At this point in his letter Paul is turning to a new source of power in order to establish his authority against the crowd of boasting false apostles who populate the previous paragraphs. He wishes to divulge his intimate, occult knowledge of God, but at the same time keep his position as antihero that is prevalent throughout the epistle. These dialectics are enhanced by a sophisticated play of first and third person. The third person denotes the subject who experienced rapture fourteen years ago, while the first person denotes the narrator in the present. Only after several verses does the reader realize that these two are in fact the same person. This alienation allows Paul the intricate play of boasting, for “of such a one I will boast, yet of myself I will not boast.”


2007 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 371-382 ◽  
Author(s):  
Radhika Rao

The legal status of the human body is hotly contested, yet the law of the body remains in a state of confusion and chaos. Sometimes the body is treated as an object of property, sometimes it is dealt with under the rubric of contract, and sometimes it is not conceived as property at all, but rather as the subject of privacy rights. Which body of law should become the law of the body? This question is even more pressing in the context of current biomedical research, which permits commodification and commercialization of the body by everyone except the person who provides the “raw materials.” The lack of property protection for tangible parts of the human body is in stark contrast to the extensive protection granted to intellectual property in the body in the form of patents upon human genes and cell lines. Moreover, even courts that reject ownership claims on the part of those who supply body parts appear willing to grant property rights to scientists, universities, and others who use those body parts to conduct research and create products.


Philosophies ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 100
Author(s):  
Brentyn J. Ramm

Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither does my somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa.


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