Politics In and After Fiscal Squeeze

Author(s):  
David Heald ◽  
Rozana Himaz ◽  
Christopher Hood

This chapter examines what nine cases of fiscal squeeze in different democracies can reveal about the politics of austerity, combining overall quantitative comparisons with a set of qualitative accounts of those nine cases. It argues that fiscal squeeze in democracies is not invariably prompted by economic force majeure, contrary to the view that public spending growth in democracies can only be checked by exogenous forces or constitutional entrenchment. It further argues that there is no standard set of economic and financial preconditions for fiscal adjustment or consolidation, and that while fiscal squeeze often presents blame-avoidance challenges for incumbents, such squeezes do not necessarily produce deep political crisis or political violence. Nor are they invariably marked by major political turning-points or political cross-dressing in the form of ‘Nixon goes to China’ moments. The chapter concludes by reflecting on what policymakers in the next set of fiscal squeezes can and cannot learn from comparative experience.

Subject Uruguay's economic outlook. Significance The government has determined a fiscal adjustment, with tax increases for middle- and high-income earners, delays in public spending plans and a reform of military pensions, in a bid to address worsening public finances. It is the first time that the leftist Frente Amplio (FA), in government since 2005, has faced an adverse economic climate. Impacts Austerity in a context of 'stagflation' will generate political and trade union tensions. Rising unemployment will drive a deterioration in real family incomes. Growth will remain paltry this year and next.


Significance The decision was the latest move by the government to spurn international involvement in its political crisis. Relations between Burundi and the ICC have been deteriorating since the ICC chief prosecutor announced in April an investigation into political violence that has engulfed the country since President Pierre Nkurunziza's controversial decision to seek a third term in office. Impacts Aid suspensions or sanctions could raise the price of isolation, but implementation will require coordination, an uncertain proposition. The president and his supporters will move toward consolidating power, including through constitutional change. Burundi may withdraw its contingent of troops from the AU Mission in Somalia. Renewed insecurity would drive further forced migration above the hundreds of thousands already displaced.


Significance Despite its commitment to a floating exchange rate, the government has been forced to prioritise exchange rate stabilisation. After the change of Central Bank (BCRA) authorities in mid-June failed to stop the latest currency run, the government further tightened monetary policy. Aiming to alleviate fears of a new medium-term debt default, the government is emphasising its commitment to fiscal adjustment, even including the possibility of new taxes, which runs counter to efforts to reduce tax pressure. Impacts Interest rate rises and closer control of monetary aggregates may prompt a recession. Depreciation will help to reduce the current account deficit in 2018 but will worsen debt indicators. Growing political uncertainty and difficulty in cutting public spending will sustain financial volatility.


2018 ◽  
Vol 46 (1) ◽  
pp. 85-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Antunes ◽  
Marco Aurelio Santana ◽  
Luci Praun

The period in which the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores—PT) was in power in Brazil was characterized by limits and contradictions with regard to policies on employment, unions, and the fight against poverty. An analysis of the factors that contributed to the end of the 14-year cycle of consecutive presidential terms highlights the combined impacts of the international economic crisis, a deepening political crisis with charges of corruption, the destabilization of the party’s political alliances, and mass discontent intensified by fiscal adjustment measures that further penalized the already stressed working class. The PT once in power did not motivate resistance, advances in social and union struggles, or social movements, and when it finally attempted to reach out to other social movements it was too late. With the coup represented by the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016, Brazil entered once again into what Florestan Fernandes has called “preventive counterrevolution.” O período durante o qual o PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores) esteve no poder no Brasil caracterizou-se pelos limites e contradições das políticas públicas referentes a emprego, sindicatos e à luta contra a pobreza. Uma análise dos fatores que contribuíram para o fim do ciclo de 14 anos de sucessivas presidências petistas assinala o impacto conjunto da crise econômica internacional, o aprofundamento da crise política com base em acusações de corrupção, a desestabilização das alianças políticas do partido e o descontentamento exa-cerbado pelo ajuste fiscal que penalizou ainda mais a já combalida classe trabalhadora. Uma vez no poder, o PT não encorajou a resistência, ou os avanços nas lutas sindical e social. Quando finalmente tentou ligar-se a outros movimentos sociais já era tarde demais. Com o golpe representado pelo impeachment de Dilma Rousseff em 2016, o Brasil novamente ingressou no que Florestan Fernandes denominou “contra-revolução preventiva.”


Author(s):  
M. O. Turaeva ◽  
I. V. Gorokhova

The article analyzes the changes that the Eurasian transit is undergoing in connection with the consequences of the global COVID-19 pandemic. The authors consider the development of transport communications and the expansion of international transport corridors as a strategically important part of the national Russian economy, which has recently been rapidly gaining momentum, largely due to the pandemic. The demand for Eurasian land routes has increased even more due to the force majeure blocking of theSuez Canalin the spring of 2021. The content analysis of databases, regulatory documents, strategies, expert assessments and up-to-date statistics on the Eurasian cargo container transit was carried out. The latest trends related to the introduction of quarantine restrictions and the potential of countries to adapt to new realities are investigated. The connection between internal processes in the EAEU countries and the growth of container transit through the Russian territory is revealed. The authors identified the reasons for the significant loss in 2020.Kazakhstan's transit competitiveness and shows how the internal political crisis inBelaruscloses its routes for transshipment of goods toEurope. The main priorities in the development of the national transport interests of theRussian Federationhave been formed.


2019 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 525-535
Author(s):  
Kátia Regina de Souza Lima

Abstract This article presents some of the reflections made in a research group of the Graduate Program in Social Work of the Fluminense Federal University in the State of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The reflections are based on bibliographic research and document analysis regarding the different phases of neoliberal counterrevolution in Brazil, discussing the permanent fiscal adjustment policy - that aims to ensure the payment of public debt - and its consequences in public spending on higher education. The conclusions indicate that government actions lead to deepening the precariousness of public universities, expansion of the privatization of higher education, and regression of workers’ rights, suggesting the rise of a new stage of the class struggle in the country.


Author(s):  
Christopher Hood ◽  
Rozana Himaz

This chapter describes a long-drawn-out fiscal squeeze in the 1990s against the background of another sharp recession triggered by financial crisis. This episode spans the reigns of a divided Conservative Government which was unexpectedly re-elected in the 1992 election after changing its leader following a major tax revolt, but nevertheless succeeded in restraining public spending growth relative to growing GDP, and the early years of the succeeding ‘New Labour’ Government led by Tony Blair after a landslide victory in the 1997 election. The episode is notable for post-election tax hikes by both governments and for the fact that spending restraint plans announced by one government were followed by its successor for the first time since the 1920s—following a so-called ‘bear trap’ approach by the Conservatives, of announcing spending targets beyond their electoral term and challenging their political opponents to either accept those targets or face charges of planning a ‘tax bombshell’.


2019 ◽  
Vol 44 (2) ◽  
pp. 110-145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephanie Schwartz

Conflict between returning refugees and nonmigrant populations is a pervasive yet frequently overlooked security issue in post-conflict societies. Although scholars have demonstrated how out-migration can regionalize, prolong, and intensify civil war, the security consequences of return migration are undertheorized. An analysis of refugee return to Burundi after the country's 1993–2005 civil war corroborates a new theory of return migration and conflict: return migration creates new identity divisions based on whether and where individuals were displaced during wartime. These cleavages become new sources of conflict in the countries of origin when local institutions, such as land codes, citizenship regimes, or language laws, yield differential outcomes for individuals based on where they lived during the war. Ethnographic evidence gathered in Burundi and Tanzania from 2014 to 2016 shows how the return of refugees created violent rivalries between returnees and nonmigrants. Consequently, when Burundi faced a national-level political crisis in 2015, prior experiences of return shaped both the character and timing of out-migration from Burundi. Illuminating the role of reverse population movements in shaping future conflict extends theories of political violence and demonstrates why breaking the cycle of return and repeat displacement is essential to the prevention of conflict.


2020 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 8-24
Author(s):  
Luiz Fernando de Paula ◽  
Fabiano Santos ◽  
Rafael Moura

An analysis of the endogenous and exogenous political and economic factors that conditioned the Partido dos Trabalhadores’s (PT) social-developmentalist project in 2003–2016 in the light of financialization and the “confidence game” conditioned by the volatility of external liquidity and commodities prices concludes that the first Lula administration faced the problem of a crisis of confidence and adopted orthodox policies but was able, with the improvement of international conditions, to launch policies of a more interventionist and distributive trend. Dilma Rousseff, facing a downright unfavorable international context, explicitly broke with the confidence game by applying the policy set of the new macroeconomic matrix. In her second term she radically reversed the policy orientation, moving toward a strong fiscal adjustment and monetary orthodoxy, and this eventually undermined her few sources of political support. The economic crisis from the second half of 2014 on undoubtedly contributed to the political crisis, which in turn made infeasible any attempt to implement policies to reverse the situation of economic crisis. Dilma’s impeachment finally interrupted the PT’s developmentalist project, allowing the emergence of new political actors. Uma análise dos fatores endógenos e exógenos, políticos e econômicos que condicionaram o projeto social-desenvolvimentista do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) em 2003–2016 à luz da financeirização e do “confidence game” condicionado pela volatilidade dos ciclos externos de liquidez e preços de commodities conclui que o primeiro governo Lula enfrentou o problema de crise de confiança e adotou políticas ortodoxas, mas pôde, com a melhoria nas condições internacionais, adotar políticas de perfil mais intervencionista e redistributivista. Já Dilma Rousseff, embora enfrentando contexto internacional francamente desfavorável, rompe explicitamente com o “confidence game” ao assumir o conjunto de políticas da Nova Matriz Macroeconômica. Na transição do primeiro para o segundo mandato, Dilma inverteu radicalmente a orientação das políticas, partindo para um forte ajuste fiscal e a ortodoxia monetária, o que acabou minando os poucos focos de sustentação política com os quais contava na sociedade. A crise econômica a partir do segundo semestre de 2014 sem dúvida contribuiu para dar origem à crise política, e esta por sua vez inviabilizou qualquer tentativa de implementação de políticas para reverter o quadro de crise econômica. O impeachment de Dilma, por fim, interrompe o projeto desenvolvimentista do PT, permitindo a emergência de novos atores políticos.


2006 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 315-325 ◽  
Author(s):  
Roberto Briceño-León

This article analyzes the changes in violence in Venezuela during the last forty years. It links the ups and downs of the oil revenues and the political crisis of the country to the changes in the homicide rates, which increased from 7 per 100 thousand inhabitants in 1970 to 12 in 1990, 19 in 1998 and 50 in 2003. The article characterizes Venezuela as a rentist society and shows its trajectory from rural violence to the beginning of urban violence, the guerilla movements of the 60s, the delinquent violence related to the abundance of oil revenues and the violence during the popular revolt and the sackings of 1989 in Caracas. After this, we analyze the coups d'état of 1992 and the influence the political violence exerted upon criminal violence. We describe the political and party changes in the country, their influence upon the stabilization of homicide rates since the mid-90s and their remarkable increase during the H. Chávez government. The article finishes with an analysis of the current situation, the official prohibition to publish statistics on homicides and with some thoughts about the perspective of greater violence in Venezuela.


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