Aristotle on Substance as Primary in Time
Abstract In a notoriously obscure passage in Metaphysics 7.1 Aristotle claims that substance is primary in time. The only concrete literal interpretation suggested so far of this controversial claim is in terms of existing before and after in time. I argue that this interpretation faces serious problems. I then present a novel literal interpretation, in terms of being an appropriate subject of temporal predications, that is immune to these problems and strongly supported by philosophical and contextual considerations.
1970 ◽
Vol 28
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pp. 280-281
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1977 ◽
Vol 35
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pp. 398-399
1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 32-33
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1988 ◽
Vol 46
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pp. 534-535
1995 ◽
Vol 53
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pp. 428-429
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