Militarism and Repression

1981 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-144 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Randle

The thesis of this essay is that militarism is related to repression, both instrumental and structural. Not only is the military directly used in many countries to keep the population under brutal subjection; the very process of raising and maintaining armed forces (through such practices as conscription, special legislation restricting freedom of information and discussion related to military preparations, and elaborate devices for maintaining discipline and administering justice within the services) threatens, and often actually curtails, people's liberties. Structural repression is brought into play by militarism influencing social, economic and political life in ways that make coercion unavoidable. In the Third World, for instance, militarism has created a cycle of impoverishment, external dependence and exploitation. Similarly, in industrialized countries hyper-militarization (more markedly of the superpowers and their major allies) helps sustain, both directly and indirectly, the unequal global division of labour, under which the major economic role of the South is that of providing raw materials (including those which are non-renewable) at cheap prices to the North.

Author(s):  
Tatyana S. Denisova

The radicalization of Islam in Cameroon is quickly changing the country's religious landscape and contributing to the spread of religious intolerance. Unlike, for example, neighboring Nigeria and the Central African Republic, previously Cameroon rarely faced serious manifestations of sectarian tensions, but over the past 10-15 years traditional Sufi Islam has been increasingly supplanted by the ideology of Wahhabism. Wahhabism is rapidly spreading not only in the north of the country, but also in the south, which until recently was inhabited mainly by Christians and animists. The spread of Wahhabism is actively supported and funded by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and Egypt. Sufism, the followers of which mainly include Fulani living in the northern regions, is gradually losing its position. The specific interpretation of Islam leads to the destabilization of religious and public political life, and Koranic schools and refugee camps become "incubators of terrorists". The growing influence of radical Islam in Cameroon is largely due to the expansion of the terrorist organization Boko Haram into the country; one of the consequences of this is the broadening affiliation of Cameroonians, inspired by calls for the cleansing of Islam and the introduction of Sharia law, with this armed Islamist group. As in other African countries, the radicalization of Islam is accompanied by the intensification of terrorist activities, leading to an exacerbation of the internal political situation, an increase in the number of refugees, and the deterioration of the socio-economic situation of the population, etc. The failure of the Cameroonian government to counter terrorist activities in the north of the country in the near future may lead to an escalation of the military-political conflict on religious grounds in the context of political instability that Cameroon is experiencing at the moment.


1993 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 283-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jorge Zaverucha

The state of civil–military relations in the world, especially in the Third World, is very well summed up by Mosca's statement that civilian control over the military ‘is a most fortunate exception in human history’.All over the globe, the armed forces have frequently preserved their autonomous power vis-à-vis civilians. They have also succeeded in maintaining their tutelage over some of the political regimes that have arisen from the process of transition from military to democratic governments, as in Argentina and Brazil. Spain is a remarkable exception. Today, Spain, despite its authoritarian legacy, is a democratic country. The constituted civil hierarchy has been institutionalised, military áutonomy weakened, and civilian control over the military has emerged. Spain's newly founded democracy now appears quite similar to the older European democracies.


normally only gradually, and this situation is not universally the case. There is growing understanding of the need for security arrangements which underpin the economic and political co-operation whose value is so clear to most decision-makers. Those who wish to see greater co-operation from the Latin American states in the non-proliferation and arms control fields should attempt to understand these phenomena and make a greater effort to bring the Latin Americans along. The North can help a great deal in educating key members of the civilian elites in these countries about defence matters. This would go a long way to easing some of the issues of civil-military relations mentioned. Showing more transparency ourselves in the working of arms control groupings can help to reduce concerns in these countries about their ability to resist excessive northern pressures if they accept the objectives sought by those countries in such groups. Working with nascent but interested elements of civil society, from universities and research centres for example can help to build the constituency for these objectives in key countries. And efforts to show the military that collaboration does not necessarily mean the end of a legitimate degree of armed forces influence in the security area and more widely in foreign policy, and that arms control does not necessarily imply ruin for them and their families, need to be made and indeed should be more closely studied in order to address these real concerns. There is thus a good deal which can be done. But culture remains formative and vital to states and individuals. These societies are the result of a lived historic experience and only an understanding of the very real security concerns they have will allow us to obtain more support from them in security fields which are, as in the past, still offering great challenges globally and regionally.

2012 ◽  
pp. 193-196

1974 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 167-177
Author(s):  
Willy Østreng

This article examines the possible political and economic effects of large-scale mineral extraction from the seabed. The findings presented indicate that development in new territories may conceivably serve to exacerbate existing conflict dimensions, notably the North/South dimension in global politics. Because of the developed countries' monopoly on know-how and economic capability, exploration and exploitation of the inorganic resources of the ocean floor has de facto been the exclusive domain of these countries. On the basis of this the author shows that if large-scale production of seabed resources should become a reality in the near future, the underdeveloped countries will be forced to watch it from the sidelines. As a consequence, the exploitation of offshore raw materials will probably contribute to the further widening of the gap between developed and underdeveloped countries. Further commenting on the fact that the latter today are the main producers of the most promising seabed resources, the author expresses the view that exploitation will have a detrimental effect on the economics of the Third World countries, since it might lead to overproduction and price reductions.


Author(s):  
Maiah Jaskoski

Under Ecuador’s “third wave” democracy that began in 1979, the armed forces have exhibited considerable autonomy vis-à-vis civilians in government, as measured by (a) military intervention in politics and (b) the armed forces’ spread into internal security. Perhaps most noteworthy, military participation in politics and internal security increased significantly during the second half of the 1990s, in a permissive environment: as a result of their rule in the 1970s, the armed forces enjoyed a positive reputation within society as an institution capable of getting things done, without committing human rights abuses. Within that context, a traumatic military role crisis prompted the armed forces to expand their political and internal security roles. The armed forces lost their traditional mission of defending Ecuador’s southern border against Peru in the late 1990s, due to the resolution of that border dispute. In its search for institutional justification, the military proactively intensified its participation in politics and internal security. That extensive internal security work not only served as an indicator of military autonomy vis-à-vis civilians but it also made the armed forces ineffective and unreliable in responding to the civilian government’s basic national defense requirements, as evinced by the military’s response to a new sovereignty threat. When Colombian guerrilla crossings into northern Ecuador became a salient border threat in the 2000s, the armed forces focused on internal security in the north and not border defense.


Subject The impact of the failed July coup on civilian-military relations. Significance The psychological impacts of the attempted coup across political life cannot be understated; it has far-reaching implications for the political, bureaucratic and even ideological structures of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). In the aftermath of the attempted putsch, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is more determined than ever to alter the civilian-military machinery of government in Turkey radically. Impacts The purge and radical reforms will bring into question the TSK's operational and strategic reliability for Western partners. A permanently weakened TSK would ease the way for constitutional reforms strengthening Erdogan's grip on the state. It will take years to rebuild the confidence and prestige the military has lost among broad swathes of Turkish society. Any criticism of the TSK reforms, domestically or from abroad, will meet the authorities' fierce condemnation.


1980 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 99-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Ravenhill

The continuing prominence of coups d'état in the political life of the Third World has sustained interest in the question of whether, and in what circumstances, the armed forces are capable of making a positive contribution to modernisation. During the 1960s, a number of scholars began to take a favourable view of the military's modernising potential based on ideal-typical conceptions of armed-force organisations which, in Henry Bienen's felicitous phrase, were ‘unencumbered by empirical detail’.1 A second dimension of support for the positive image was perceived in the attitudes and class background of the officer corps.2 Critics of this viewpoint questioned the accuracy of these characterisations given the impact that transfer to a different socio-economic and political context has on institutional performance. Case-studies of Third-World militaries found that many lacked a single corporate identity, suffering from factionalism along cleavages of age, ethnicity, and regionalism; organisational cohesion was undermined by a proliferation of patron-client relationships.3 The motives for staging coups also were questioned, the military being perceived as particularly well-equipped to defend and pursue its corporate interests.1


Author(s):  
Marcos Napolitano

Since its establishment in 1889, the history of the Brazilian republic was marked by the centrality of the armed forces, particularly the army, in political life. But between 1964 and 1985, the military was in direct command of the state, imposing indirectly elected generals as president. After overthrowing the reformist center-left government of João Goulart on March 31, 1964, the military installed a tutelary authoritarian regime to control civil society and the political system, serving as a political model for similar regimes in Latin America during the Cold War. The military passed arbitrary laws and severely repressed left-wing political groups and social movements while also seeking to accelerate capitalist development and the “national integration” of Brazil’s vast territory. They intended to modernize Brazilian industry and carry out bold infrastructure projects. On the other hand, they faced strong opposition from civil society, led by political groups, artists, intellectuals, and press outlets of diverse ideological backgrounds (Marxists, liberals, socialists, and progressive Catholics). These groups were divided between total refusal to negotiate with the military and critical adherence to the policies of the generals’ governments, composing a complex relationship between society and the state. Understanding the role of the military regime in Brazilian history requires a combination of historical research and historiographic criticism in light of the disputes over memory that continue to divide social and political actors.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 103-139 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Gunn

Coups d’état were a relatively common means of regime change during the Cold War. From 1945 through 1985, 357 attempted coups d’état occurred in the Third World, and 183 succeeded. The high frequency of coups during this period is unsurprising, especially considering the advantageous position of the military during the rapid and destabilizing pace of modernization and decolonization in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Coups d’état were not exclusive to the Third World, however. They also occurred in members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Surprisingly, however, few scholars have explored why these extra-constitutional regime changes were tolerated, or how they were even possible, within NATO. This article attempts to answer these questions within the context of the 1960 coup in Turkey by closely evaluating the notion that the United States had no knowledge or warning that a coup was about to unfold.


2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (10) ◽  
pp. 147-168
Author(s):  
Bogusław Jagusiak ◽  
Agata Jagiello-Tondera

The English language has become the lingua franca of the contemporary world; a global language. The process of globalisation has also influenced the increasing demand for learning English. The demand involves not only general language but also language for specific purposes, including language of the military environment, Military English. English has also become the language of interoperability in NATO. The North Atlantic Alliance has always paid particular attention to the knowledge of foreign languages, which was expressed, among others, by the establishment of the BILC International Language Coordination Office and the development of language standards applicable to all Member States, STANAG 6001. Language education in the armed forces in Poland follows the Alliance’s guidelines. The correct use of military language and its understanding creates a successful administrative and operational military environment. On account of appropriate application of terminology, potential misunderstandings or misinterpretations of military activities can be avoided. Language education is one of the elements of language policy in the field of security.


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