When science becomes too easy: Science popularization inclines laypeople to underrate their dependence on experts

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (8) ◽  
pp. 1003-1018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa Scharrer ◽  
Yvonne Rupieper ◽  
Marc Stadtler ◽  
Rainer Bromme

Science popularization fulfills the important task of making scientific knowledge understandable and accessible for the lay public. However, the simplification of information required to achieve this accessibility may lead to the risk of audiences relying overly strongly on their own epistemic capabilities when making judgments about scientific claims. Moreover, they may underestimate how the division of cognitive labor makes them dependent on experts. This article reports an empirical study demonstrating that this “easiness effect of science popularization” occurs when laypeople read authentic popularized science depictions. After reading popularized articles addressed to a lay audience, laypeople agreed more with the knowledge claims they contained and were more confident in their claim judgments than after reading articles addressed to expert audiences. Implications for communicating scientific knowledge to the general public are discussed.

Author(s):  
Nicholas Rescher

Fallibilism is a philosophical doctrine regarding natural science, most closely associated with Charles Sanders Peirce, which maintains that our scientific knowledge claims are invariably vulnerable and may turn out to be false. Scientific theories cannot be asserted as true categorically, but only as having some probability of being true. Fallibilists insist on our inability to attain the final and definitive truth regarding the theoretical concerns of natural science – in particular at the level of theoretical physics. At any rate, at this level of generality and precision each of our accepted beliefs may turn out to be false, and many of them will. Fallibilism does not insist on the falsity of our scientific claims but rather on their tentativity as inevitable estimates: it does not hold that knowledge is unavailable here, but rather that it is always provisional.


2015 ◽  
Vol 738-739 ◽  
pp. 1303-1308
Author(s):  
Jing Hua Han ◽  
Ming Jia Li

Plant is not only closely related to human beings’ life, but also an integral part of raw materials in production. Protection of nature and plant resources is an increasingly urgent needs around the world. Cognition is a prerequisite for the protection of plant. But the way of plant science popularization is old, the knowledge of plant is too obscure to the general public. The system of plant science popularization based on the QR code spreads the knowledge of plant with illustrations interactively, to facilitate ordinary users to learn, understand and identify plant species. The article will detail all aspects of development of the system, allowing more scholars to understand the digitized plant science popularization under the new media.


Author(s):  
Anzelika Smagina ◽  
◽  
Iveta Ludviga ◽  

Defining craft entrepreneurship has been a challenge for many scholars and researchers in different countries. Not only because of the multidimensional nature of entrepreneurship, but also because of the differences in national regulations setting boundaries for each sector of the economy. Thus, in some countries, craft is a part of the Creative Industries, but in others it is considered as an independent sector of the economy. Understanding what craft is and how craft products can be differentiated and defined has also been a daunting task. Thus, consolidating theoretical knowledge on entrepreneurship and craft entrepreneurship gained from the literature with the results of an empirical study carried out among craft entrepreneurs and consumers of craft products, this study aims to conceptualize craft entrepreneurship and to develop propositions for the definition of craft entrepreneurship by integrating the meaning attributed to craft entrepreneurship and its specifics by craft entrepreneurs with the perception and meaning assigned to craft products and services by consumers. This study applies qualitative methodology and data gathered using semi-structured interviews and open-ended survey questions. 20 craft entrepreneurs represent a perspective of entrepreneurs about entrepreneurship and its specifics in the craft sector, whereas 445 consumers reflect the opinion of the general public about craft and craft-related products. The results of the study indicate that craft entrepreneurship is undoubtedly connected to handmade products, national traditions, small ventures and craft markets and fairs, where craft entrepreneurs commercialize their produce. Although numerous scholars have already attempted to conceptualize craft entrepreneurship theoretically, the contribution of this study is in its integrated application of theoretical and empirical data reflecting the perspectives of entrepreneurs and consumers.


2021 ◽  
pp. 97-121
Author(s):  
Gale M. Sinatra ◽  
Barbara K. Hofer

In everyday encounters with new information, conflicting ideas, and claims made by others, one has to decide who and what to believe. Can one trust what scientists say? What’s the best source of information? These are questions that involve thinking and reasoning about knowledge, or what psychologists call “epistemic cognition.” In Chapter 5, “How Do Individuals Think About Knowledge and Knowing?,” the authors explain how public misunderstanding of scientific claims can often be linked to misconceptions about the scientific enterprise itself. Drawing on their own research and that of others, the authors explain how individuals’ thinking about knowledge influences their science doubt, resistance, and denial. They explain how educators and communicators can enhance public understanding of science by emphasizing how scientific knowledge is created and evaluated and why it should be valued.


Author(s):  
Stephen M. Downes

Originally proposed by sociologists of science, constructivism or social constructivism is a view about the nature of scientific knowledge held by many philosophers of science. Constructivists maintain that scientific knowledge is made by scientists and not determined by the world. This makes constructivists antirealists. Constructivism here should not be confused with constructivism in mathematics or logic, although there are some similarities. Constructivism is more aptly compared with Berkeley’s idealism. Most constructivist research involves empirical study of a historical or a contemporary episode in science, with the aim of learning how scientists experiment and theorize. Constructivists try not to bias their case studies with presuppositions about how scientific research is directed. Thus their approach contrasts with approaches in philosophy of science that assume scientists are guided by a particular method. From their case studies, constructivists have concluded that scientific practice is not guided by any one set of methods. Thus constructivism is relativist or antirationalist. There are two familiar (and related) criticisms of constructivism. First, since constructivists are self-avowed relativists, some philosophers argue that constructivism fails for the same reasons that relativism fails. But many philosophers of science note that relativism can be characterized in various ways and that versions of relativism can be useful in the interpretation of science. Therefore, constructivism’s relativism does not by itself render it unacceptable. Second, constructivists are accused of believing that scientists literally ‘make the world’, in the way some make houses or cars. This is probably not the best way to understand constructivism. Rather, constructivism requires only the weaker thesis that scientific knowledge is ‘produced’ primarily by scientists and only to a lesser extent determined by fixed structures in the world. This interprets constructivism as a thesis about our access to the world via scientific representations. For example, constructivists claim that the way we represent the structure of DNA is a result of many interrelated scientific practices and is not dictated by some ultimate underlying structure of reality. Constructivist research provides important tools for epistemologists specializing in the study of scientific knowledge.


2020 ◽  
Vol 46 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 300-321 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ye Sun ◽  
Zhongdang Pan

Abstract Publication bias has been recognized as a threat to the validity of meta-analytic findings and scientific knowledge in general. Given the recent rise in meta-analytic research in communication, how well publication bias concerns are addressed by communication meta-analysts merits attention. In this essay, after a brief overview of publication bias and some major methods of assessment, we provide a systematic review of meta-analyses published in six major communication journals between 2005 and 2018. The review focuses on two aspects of addressing publication bias in meta-analyses: (a) reducing the potential impact of bias via an inclusive literature search; and (b) empirically assessing the extent and impact of bias in meta-analytic findings. Our review shows that the current practices in communication meta-analyses are inadequate in both aspects. We offer recommendations on ways of improving practices in meta-analyses, as well as in research and publication processes, to better safeguard knowledge claims.


Author(s):  
Fritz Wallner

Traditional convictions regarding science (such as universalism, necessity and eternal validity) are currently in doubt. Relativism seems to destroy scientific claims to rationality. This paper shows a way to keep the traditional convictions of scientific knowledge while acknowledging relativism. With reference to the practicing scientist, we replace descriptivism with constructivism; we modify relative validity with the claim to understanding; and, we offer methodological strategies for acquiring understanding. These strategies we call strangification, which means taking a scientific proposition system out of its context and putting it in another context. We can thus see the implicit presuppositions of the given proposition system by means of the problems arising out of the application of this procedure. Such a change in the understanding of science holds important consequences.


2017 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 58-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomás Undurraga

Based on a multi-site ethnography of two influential newspapers in Brazil, this article examines how Brazilian journalists mediate knowledge claims made by experts, policy makers and the lay public. It asks whether and how these journalists experience themselves as knowledge-makers. More specifically, it argues that Brazilian journalists index their production of knowledge in reference to four main characteristics: depth, authorship, influence, and expertise. Journalists tend to consider newsmaking a contribution to knowledge when: (1) they have the resources to do proper investigative reporting (depth); (2) they are able to help define the public agenda through their reporting and to express their opinion (authorship); (3) they have impact on the polity, the economy or other fields they cover (influence) and (4) their journalistic knowledge is recognized by readers and by specialists (expertise). In practice, however, there are multiple obstacles that make Brazilian journalists hesitant about their contribution to knowledge, including intensified working conditions, the lack of plurality within the mainstream presses, and their informal methods for dealing with knowledge claims from other fields. This research reveals that Brazilian journalists have different understandings of the nature of knowledge in journalism. These understandings cluster around two distinct poles: an expert notion of knowledge associated with disciplinary boundaries, and a distinct conception associated with journalists’ capacity to mediate between jurisdictions. When journalists’ production is assessed from the former point of view, the informality of their methods is seen as undermining their knowledge credentials. By contrast, when journalists’ contribution is assessed from the latter point of view, their ‘interactional expertise’ comes to the fore.


Author(s):  
Martin Carrier

The social organization of science as a topic of philosophy of science mostly concerns the question of which kinds of social organization are most beneficial to the epistemic aspirations of science. Section 1 addresses the interaction among scientists for improving epistemic qualities of knowledge claims in contrast to the mere accumulation of contributions from several scientists. Section 2 deals with the principles that are supposed to organize this interaction among scientists such that well-tested and well-confirmed knowledge is produced. Section 3 outlines what is supposed to glue scientific communities together and how society at large is assumed to affect the social organization of these communities. Section 4 attends to social epistemology (i.e., to attempts to explore the influence of social roles and characteristics on the system of scientific knowledge and confirmation practices).


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