scholarly journals World economy 2000-2005: Basic indicators

2005 ◽  
Vol 57 (4) ◽  
pp. 484-504
Author(s):  
Mladjen Kovacevic ◽  
Vladimir Grecic

The authors analyze the developments in the world economy during the second half of the 20th century and the first five years of the 21st century. Based on the statistical data published in the editions of international organizations - primarily UN, IMF and WTO, they explain the causes of recession in the world economy at the beginning of this century after it achieved an impressive growth in the second half of the 20th century. The authors also point to the factors that contributed to the accelerated recovery of the world economy and world trade in 2004 and 2005.

2003 ◽  
Vol 185 ◽  
pp. 9-16

The outlook for world growth this year has deteriorated since April, due to a sharp contraction in world trade in the first quarter of the year and failure to sustain the revival in private sector investment seen in the fourth quarter of 2002. We have as a consequence revised our projections for world growth this year down by ¼ percentage point. This reflects sharp downward revisions of ½–¾ percentage points in the Euro Area and Canada, both of whose exchange rates have continued to appreciate in effective terms, while the outlook for the US and Japan is broadly unchanged. Growth in Japan and the Euro Area stagnated in the first half of 2003, with recessions in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Austria appearing likely. The US and Canada, on the other hand, continued to expand, albeit more slowly than in the second half of 2002. Following two years of exceptional weakness, Latin American growth has started to revive, although Venezuela is still suffering from the 2 month stoppage in the oil industry earlier this year and Argentina has lost competitiveness due to a strong appreciation against the dollar. Growth has slowed in several Asian economies, notably South Korea, but China continues to expand rapidly, spurred by the competitiveness impact of the dollar depreciation and infrastructure preparations for the 2008 Olympics. This has helped sustain export growth from the rest of Asia despite the more widespread slowdown in world trade.


1998 ◽  
Vol 165 ◽  
pp. 35-42
Author(s):  
Nigel Pain

Developments in the Asian economies have clearly begun to be felt in the wider global economy in recent months. It has always been expected that the OECD economies would be affected by the aftermath of the capital market turmoil last year, although the timing and magnitude of the impact was difficult to predict. Domestic demand in the affected Asian economies has proved much weaker than expected, with the effects magnified by a continued downturn in Japan. GDP fell by 5¾ per cent in Korea in the first quarter of this year and by 1¼ per cent in Japan. The aggregate volume of merchandise imports in Asia is expected to decline by around 5½ per cent this year, with falls of up to 25 per cent in countries such as Korea, Thailand and Indonesia. This largely accounts for our projected decline in world trade growth to under 6 per cent this year from an estimated 9¾ per cent in 1997.


2010 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sérgio de Oliveira Birchal ◽  
Âmara Fuccio de Fraga e Silva

European direct investment in Brazil dates back to the discovery of the country and has been since then either hegemonic or more important than a superficial observation can grasp, as this work aims at showing. During the 20th century, the United States has replaced Britain as the worlds economic superpower and the largest direct investor. US dominance in the world economy and geographical proximity to Brazil would suggest that US investments were by far the largest in the country during that century. Furthermore, as Japan had become the second largest economy in the world in the 1980s, we would expect that this would be reflected in the data of the largest multinationals in Brazil. However, as our investigation suggests, Western European direct investment has been as large (and in many occasions even larger) as that of the USA and Japanese firms have never had a prominent presence among the largest firms in Brazil, at least until the late 1990s.


Equilibrium ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elżbieta Czarny ◽  
Paweł Folfas

We analyse potential consequences of the forthcoming Trade and Investment Partnership between the European Union and the United States (TTIP) for trade orientation of both partners. We do it so with along with the short analysis of the characteristics of the third wave of regionalism and the TTIP position in this process as well as the dominant role of the EU and the U.S. in the world economy – especially – in the world trade. Next, we study trade orientation of the hypothetical region created in result of TTIP. We use regional trade introversion index (RTII) to analyze trade between the EU and the U.S. that has taken place until now to get familiar with the potential changes caused by liberalization of trade between both partners. We analyze RTII for mutual trade of the EU and the U.S. Then, we apply disaggregated data to analyze and compare selected partial RTII (e.g. for trade in final and intermediate goods as well as goods produced in the main sectors of economy like agriculture or manufacturing). The analysis of the TTIP region’s orientation of trade based on the historical data from the period 1999-2012 revealed several conclusions. Nowadays, the trade between the EU and the U.S. is constrained by the protection applied by both partners. Trade liberalization constituting one necessary part of TTIP will surely help to intensify this trade. The factor of special concern is trade of agricultural products which is most constrained and will hardly be fully liberalized even within a framework of TTIP. Simultaneously, both parties are even now trading relatively intensively with intermediaries, which are often less protected than the average of the economy for the sake of development of final goods’ production. The manufactured goods are traded relatively often as well, mainly in consequence of their poor protection after many successful liberalization steps in the framework of GATT/WTO. Consequently, we point out that in many respects the TTIP will be important not only for its participants, but for the whole world economy as well. TTIP appears to be an economic and political project with serious consequences for the world economy and politics.


1997 ◽  
Vol 159 ◽  
pp. 28-56
Author(s):  
Julian Morgan ◽  
Nigel Pain ◽  
Florence Hubert

There are now widespread signs that activity in the world economy has begun to recover steadily from the pause in growth apparent at the beginning of 1996. Output rose by 0.6 per cent in the North American economies in the third quarter of last year and by 0.8 per cent in Europe. Business and consumer sentiment has improved gradually in recent months in most of the major economies. We expect world economic growth to pick up further over the course of this year as the contractionary effects from the downturn in world trade and prolonged inventory adjustment come to an end and as the effects from a more relaxed monetary stance begin to outweigh those from ongoing fiscal consolidation. Recent currency movements should help to stimulate external demand in Germany, France and Japan, but may act to constrain growth within the UK, Italy and the US. For both this year and 1998 we expect growth of around 2½ per cent per annum in the OECD economies.


Author(s):  
W. W. Rostow

I have tried in this book to summarize where the world economy has come from in the past three centuries and to set out the core of the agenda that lies before us as we face the century ahead. This century, for the first time since the mid-18th century, will come to be dominated by stagnant or falling populations. The conclusions at which I have arrived can usefully be divided in two parts: one relates to what can be called the political economy of the 21st century; the other relates to the links between the problem of the United States playing steadily the role of critical margin on the world scene and moving at home toward a solution to the multiple facets of the urban problem. As for the political economy of the 21st century, the following points relate both to U.S. domestic policy and U.S. policy within the OECD, APEC, OAS, and other relevant international organizations. There is a good chance that the economic rise of China and Asia as well as Latin America, plus the convergence of economic stagnation and population increase in Africa, will raise for a time the relative prices of food and industrial materials, as well as lead to an increase in expen ditures in support of the environment. This should occur in the early part of the next century, If corrective action is taken in the private markets and the political process, these strains on the supply side should diminish with the passage of time, the advance of science and innovation, and the progressively reduced rate of population increase. The government, the universities, the private sector, and the professions might soon place on their common agenda the delicate balance of maintaining full employment with stagnant or falling populations. The existing literature, which largely stems from the 1930s, is quite illuminating but inadequate. And the experience with stagnant or falling population in the the world economy during post-Industrial Revolution times is extremely limited. This is a subject best approached in the United States on a bipartisan basis, abroad as an international problem. It is much too serious to be dealt with, as it is at present, as a domestic political football.


2013 ◽  
Vol 59 (No. 4) ◽  
pp. 183-193 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. Smutka ◽  
J. Burianová

World trade underwent a significant shock within the recent years, which caused a decline in the world economy primarily in the year 2009. Within the following years (2010 and 2011), the high rate of growth from the years preceding the crisis could not be restored. The crisis had an impact on all segments of the merchandise trade, whereby the trade in agricultural and food products was affected the least by the crisis. In the case of the Czech Republic, the crisis of the global and national economy was reflected in the case of agricultural trade primarily by the way of a decline in the rate of the growth of export, which was very high in the period prior to the crisis. As far as the territorial structure and commodity structure of agricultural trade is concerned, their development in the years 2008–2011 was not affected in any largely significant manner. In relation to the main objective of this article, which was to identify the effects of the crisis on the competitiveness of Czech agricultural trade, it may be stated that the crisis itself did not worsen the competitiveness of agricultural trade in any significant manner.  


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Yoshiko Naiki

Abstract The rise and proliferation of private standards have been recognized in international trade law, and various concerns have been raised. Existing literature analyses how the World Trade Organization (WTO), particularly the SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitary) Committee and the TBT (Technical Barriers to Trade) Committee, have responded (or cannot respond) to the proliferation of private standards. This paper goes one step further by focusing specifically on the meta-regulatory function performed by regional and international organizations other than the WTO. This paper sheds light on three types of governance techniques that can serve as meta-regulatory activities in relation to private standards by regional and international organizations: (1) governance by delegation; (2) governance by information; and (3) governance by soft law. This paper analyses features of these governance techniques and considers the relation between these governance techniques and the WTO's approach.


Author(s):  
Ray Kurzweil

I have been involved in inventing since I was five, and I quickly realized that for an invention to succeed, you have to target the world of the future. But what would the future be like? To find out, I became a student of technology trends and began to develop mathematical models of different technologies: computation, miniaturization, evolution over time. I have been doing that for 25 years, and it has been remarkable to me how powerful and predictive these models are. Now, before I show you some of these models and then try to build with you some of the scenarios for the future—and, in particular, focus on how these will benefit technology for the disabled—I would like to share one trend that I think is particularly profound and that many people fail to take into consideration. It is this: the rate of progress—what I call the “paradigmshift rate”—is itself accelerating. We are doubling this paradigm-shift rate every decade. The whole 20th century was not 100 years of progress as we know it today, because it has taken us a while to speed up to the current level of progress. The 20t h century represented about 20 years of progress in terms of today’s rate. And at today’s rate of change, we will achieve an amount of progress equivalent to that of the whole 20th century in 14 years, then as the acceleration continues, in 7 years. The progress in the 21st century will be about 1,000 times greater than that in the 20th century, which was no slouch in terms of change.


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