scholarly journals 道徳判断と嫌悪感情 ―神性・清浄基盤に着目して― Moral judgment and disgust with an emphasis on the purity moral foundation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Akiko MATSUO ◽  
Yuri Tanaka

This paper reviews the previous work on disgust from the perspective of moral judgment. Shweder et al. (1987) proposed that morality consists of three dimensions: autonomy, community, and divinity. This interpretation of morality serves as one’s rationale and/or standards in moral judgment. Haidt and his colleagues (2011) extended Shweder’s idea and developed it as Moral Foundations Theory (MFT). The purity foundation of the MFT corresponds to the divinity dimension of Shweder’s theory and is found to evoke disgust. What kind of behavior people should judge as morally wrong in terms of the purity foundation is shared among ingroup members, which makes them bound together; that is a social function of morality. Accordingly, their moral judgment leads violators to be socially excluded. Although understanding the purity foundation helps researchers clarify how ingroup members are eventually excluded, cultural differences in the concept of purity can exist, such as the unique purity orientation among the Japanese. In addition, this paper addresses such concepts relevant to social exclusion as moralization and moral elevation. The theoretical and practical findings from research on moral judgment will contribute to the better understanding of the mechanism of disgust being evoked and social exclusion being processed.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivar Hannikainen

Conservatives and liberals disagree sharply on matters of morality and public policy. We propose a novel account of the psychological basis of these differences. Specifically, we find that conservatives tend to emphasize the intrinsic value of actions during moral judgment, in part by mentally simulating themselves performing those actions, while liberals instead emphasize the value of the expected outcomes of the action. We then demonstrate that a structural emphasis on actions is linked to the condemnation of victimless crimes, a distinctive feature of conservative morality. Next, we find that the conservative and liberal structural approaches to moral judgment are associated with their corresponding patterns of reliance on distinct moral foundations. In addition, the structural approach uniquely predicts that conservatives will be more opposed to harm in circumstances like the well-known trolley problem, a result which we replicate. Finally, we show that the structural approaches of conservatives and liberals are partly linked to underlying cognitive styles (intuitive versus deliberative). Collectively, these findings forge a link between two important yet previously independent lines of research in political psychology: cognitive style and moral foundations theory.


Author(s):  
Annemarie S. Walter ◽  
David P. Redlawsk

AbstractExisting empirical research on voters’ responses to individual politicians’ moral transgressions pays limited attention to moral emotions, although moral emotions are an integral part of voters’ moral judgment. This study looks at U.S. voters’ discrete moral emotional responses to politician’s moral violations and examines how these discrete moral emotional responses are dependent on voters’ own moral principles and the extent to which they identify with a political party. We report on a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment where 2026 U.S. respondents reacted to politicians’ violations of one of five moral foundations defined by Moral Foundations Theory. We randomly vary which moral foundation is violated and the partisanship of the politician. While voters’ own moral principles somewhat condition moral emotional responses, we find that voters’ moral emotional responses mostly depend on partisan identification. When voters share party identity with a politician committing a moral violation, they respond with less anger, contempt, disgust and shame than when they do not share party identity. The effect is greater among strong partisans. However, we find limited evidence that specific moral emotions are activated by violations of particular moral foundations, thereby challenging Moral Foundations Theory.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (6) ◽  
pp. 734-743 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan S. Kemper ◽  
Anna-Kaisa Newheiser

What do people want to do in response to witnessing someone violate a moral norm? Prior research posits that violations of distinct norms elicit specific emotions, specifically anger and disgust. We examined whether moral violations analogously elicit distinct behavioral responses, focusing on desires to confront and avoid moral violators. Participants read scenarios depicting harmful and impure actions (Study 1) or violations of all six content domains proposed by Moral Foundations Theory (Study 2). Bayesian inference revealed that participants expressed distinctively high levels of desire to avoid (vs. confront) violators of purity norms. Violations of other moral norms did not similarly elicit unique patterns of avoidance or confrontation. Thus, behavioral responses to moral violators depend in part on which norm was violated, with impure acts eliciting a uniquely strong avoidance response. Moral judgment can serve as a precursor to strategic action in the face of perceived immorality.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 619-641 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karolina Koszałkowska ◽  
Monika Wróbel

Abstract The aim of the present study was to analyze the link between the five moral codes proposed in the Moral Foundations Theory and moral judgment of disparagement humor. We presented racist, sexist, homophobic, religion-disparaging and neutral jokes to a group of 108 participants, asking them whether they found laughing at a particular joke moral or immoral. Additionally, participants rated the level of amusement and disgust evoked by each joke. We also measured participants’ moral foundations profiles (Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity). The results confirmed that Care and Fairness were significantly linked to moral judgment of racist, sexist and homophobic jokes, whereas Loyalty, Authority and Sanctity were associated with moral judgment of religion-disparaging jokes. Moreover, these relationships were mediated by emotional responses of amusement and disgust (except for racist jokes, for which we observed no mediating role of amusement).


2019 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 327-340
Author(s):  
Irina N Protasova ◽  
Oleg A Sychev

The article deals with the relation between ethnic tolerance and the moral sphere features on the basis of Moral Foundations Theory by J. Haidt. As a result of theoretical analysis we put forward a hypothesis that ethnic tolerance is entirely compatible with individualizing moral foundations (caring/not doing harm and fairness) but contradicts the binding moral foundations (loyalty, authority, sanctity). To test this hypothesis the research was carried out on a sample of 340 university students. The participants completed a questionnaire packet containing the “Tolerance index” questionnaire by G.U. Soldatova et al. and the “Moral foundations questionnaire” by J. Graham et al. The correlations between variables showed that ethnic tolerance was positively correlated with moral foundations ‘Care’ and ‘Fairness’ and negatively correlated with moral foundation ‘Authority’. Using path analysis we showed that ethnic tolerance is positively correlated with individualizing moral foundations and negatively correlated with binding moral foundations under the control of tolerance as a trait, gender and age. Our results also revealed unsatisfactory reliability of the “Social tolerance” scale of the “Tolerance index” questionnaire indicating the need for further investigation of the psychometric properties of this questionnaire. Our results support the hypothesis that ethnic tolerance is compatible with individualizing moral foundations, but contradicts the binding moral foundations. This fact demonstrates the moral inconsistencies of ethnic tolerance in the context of the individualizing and binding moral foundations.


Author(s):  
Marina Krcmar ◽  
Allison Eden

Abstract. This study explored two main theoretical propositions. First, we tested Hartmann’s (2011 , 2012 ) notion that video games are processed via two separate cognitive systems: System 1, the automatic system, and System 2, the rational system. Specifically, we used a cognitive load manipulation to test if intuitive moral responses such as guilt and anthropomorphism are processed in System 1. Second, we utilized moral foundations theory to test the effect of care salience on guilt and in-game aggression. Using an experimental design ( n = 94), the results indicate that under conditions of cognitive load, players had somewhat lower in-game aggression. Effects on guilt and anthropomorphism were in the same direction, albeit with small effects. In terms of moral foundations, we found that care salience was not negatively related to in-game aggression but was directly related to guilt, indicating that greater emphasis on the moral foundation of care resulted in greater guilt. Also, anthropomorphism was positively related to experienced guilt and negatively related to in-game aggression.


2017 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 667-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrizia Milesi

Based on the view of morality proposed by the Moral Foundations Theory, this paper investigates whether voting intention is associated with moral foundation endorsement in not perfectly bipolar electoral contexts. Three studies carried out in Italy from 2010 to 2013, showed that controlling for ideological orientation, moral foundation endorsement is associated with voting intention. In Study 1 and 3, in fictitious and real national elections, intention to vote for right-wing political groups rather than for left-wing rivals was associated with Sanctity, confirming previous results obtained in the U.S. Furthermore, as a function of the specific competing political groups in each of the examined contexts other moral foundations predicted voting intention. In Study 1, Care and Authority predicted voting intention for the major political groups rather than for an autonomist party that aimed at decreasing central government’s fiscal power in favor of fiscal regional autonomy. In Study 3, Loyalty predicted the intention to vote for the major parliamentarian parties rather than for a movement that aimed at capturing disaffection towards traditional politics. In Study 2, at real regional elections, Loyalty predicted voting intention for the incumbent right-wing governor rather than for the challengers and Fairness predicted voting intention for left-wing extra-parliamentarian political groups rather than for the major left-wing party. Thus multiple moral concerns can be associated with voting intention. In fragmented and unstable electoral contexts, at each election the context of the competing political groups may elicit specific moral concerns that can contribute to affect voting intention beyond ideological orientation.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316801878174 ◽  
Author(s):  
David J. Ciuk

Moral foundations theory (MFT) claims that individuals use their intuitions on five “virtues” as guidelines for moral judgment, and recent research makes the case that these intuitions cause people to adopt important political attitudes, including partisanship and ideology. New work in political science, however, demonstrates not only that the causal effect of moral foundations on these political predispositions is weaker than once thought, but it also opens the door to the possibility that causality runs in the opposite direction—from political predispositions to moral foundations. In this manuscript, I build on this new work and test the extent to which partisan and ideological considerations cause individuals’ moral foundations to shift in predictable ways. The results show that while these group-based cues do exert some influence on moral foundations, the effects of outgroup cues are particularly strong. I conclude that small shifts in political context do cause MFT measures to move, and, to close, I discuss the need for continued theoretical development in MFT as well as an increased attention to measurement.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohammad Atari ◽  
Jesse Graham ◽  
Morteza Dehghani

Most moral psychology research has been conducted in Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD) societies. As such, moral judgment, as a psychological phenomenon, might be known to researchers only by its WEIRD manifestations. Here, we start with evaluating Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, and follow up by building a bottom-up model of moral values, in Iran, a non-WEIRD, Muslim-majority, understudied cultural setting. In six studies (N = 1,945) we examine the structural validity of the Persian translation of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire, compare moral foundations between Iran and the US, conduct qualitative interviews regarding moral values, expand the nomological network of “Qeirat” as a culture-specific set of moral values, and investigate the pragmatic validity of “Qeirat” in Iranian culture. Our findings suggest an additional moral foundation in Iran, above and beyond the five foundations identified by MFT. Specifically, qualitative studies highlighted the role of “Qeirat” values in Iranian culture, which are comprised of guarding and protectiveness of female kin, romantic partners, broader family, and country. Significant cultural differences in moral values are argued in this work to follow from the psychological systems that, when brought to interact with particular socio-ecological environments, produce different moral structures. This evolutionarily-informed, cross-cultural, mixed-methods research sheds light on moral concerns and their cultural, demographic, and individual-difference correlates in Iran.


2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 185-193
Author(s):  
O. A. Sychev ◽  
E. V. Zhikhareva

The paper features relations between extremist attitudes and moral sphere. The study was based on J. Haidt’s Moral Foundations Theory. Most researchers are interested in the problem of right-wing extremist attitudes, e.g. xenophobia, nationalism, religious fanaticism, authoritarianism, etc. However, the existing evidence of the link between such attitudes and some particularities of the moral sphere doesn't take into account modern psychological approaches toward moral. On the basis of moral foundations theory, the authors hypothesized that binding moral foundations may be linked with rightwing extremist attitudes. This hypothesis was tested on 397 university students (women – 83 %). The participants answered the Moral Foundations Questionnaire by J. Graham et al. and Young Men Extremist Attitudes Questionnaire by K. V. Zlokazov. The results of the correlation analysis showed that individualizing moral foundations (Harm and Fairness) were inversely correlated with right-wing extremist attitudes, while binding moral foundations (Loyalty and Authority) showed direct correlation. Such moral foundation as Sanctity showed contradictory correlations with extremist attitudes. Using structure linear modeling the authors demonstrated the significant impact of two moral foundations (Authority and Harm) on extremist attitudes. Authority was associated with a relatively high level of religious fanaticism, xenophobia, and authoritarianism. Care was associated with a low level of fanaticism, xenophobia, and nationalism. The obtained results proved that such violencecondemning values as care and harm avoidance oppose right-wing extremist attitudes. However, such values as respect for authorities and traditions may have potentially negative side effects, e.g. justification and support of right-wing extremist attitudes.


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