scholarly journals Gender fluidity as affordance negotiation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahault Albarracin ◽  
Pierre Poirier
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Probabilistic Models ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Gender Fluidity ◽  
Social Scripts ◽  
Sensorimotor Interaction ◽  
Binary State ◽  
Gender Scripts ◽  
Cultural Niche ◽  
The Brain

Gender is often viewed as static binary state for people to embody, based on the sex they were assigned at birth. However, cultural studies increasingly understand gender as neither binary nor static, a view supported both in psychology and sociology. On this view, gender is negotiated between individuals, and highly dependent on context. Specifically, individuals are thought to be offered culturally gendered social scripts that allow them and their interlocutors the ability to predict future actions, and to understand the scene being set, establishing roles and expectations. We propose to understand scripts in the framework of enactive-ecological predictivism, which integrates aspects of ecological enactivism, notably the importance of dynamical sensorimotor interaction with an environment conceived as a field of affordances, and predictive processing, which views the brain as a predictive engine that builds its probabilistic models in an effort to reduce prediction error. Under this view, script-based negotiation can be linked to the enactive neuroscience concept of a cultural niche, as a landscape of cultural affordances. Affordances are possibilities for action that constrain what actions are pre-reflectively felt possible based on biological, experiential and cultural multisensorial cues. With the shifting landscapes of cultural affordances brought about by a number of recent social, technological and epistemic developments, the gender scripts offered to individuals are less culturally rigid, which translates in an increase in the variety of affordance fields each individual can negotiate. This entails that any individual has an increased possibility for gender fluidity, as shown by the increasing number of people currently identifying outside the binary.

scholarly journals Attenuated sensory precision and contextual prediction error in persistent depression

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Bevan ◽  
Caitlin Hitchcock ◽  
Daniel Mitchell ◽  
Tim Dalgleish
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Covert Attention ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Attention Task ◽  
Sensory Data ◽  
New Information ◽  
Sensory Modalities ◽  
Persistent Depression ◽  
The Brain ◽  
High Uncertainty

Chronic and recurrent forms of clinical depression can persist for a lifetime and often respond poorly to intervention. Psychological formulations implicate rigid, negative expectations of self and world which are resistant to updating with new information, a phenomenology consistent with a Bayesian account of brain function. Bayesian predictive processing models suggest that sensory data which is represented with low precision (high uncertainty) in the brain cannot exert much influence on existing beliefs, giving rise to the hypothesis that persistent forms of depression may be characterised by disturbances in sensory precision optimization. We optimized a computational model with data from a cross-modal (visual, auditory, somatic) covert attention task to estimate sensory precision in persistently depressed participants relative to healthy controls. Results suggested that both sensory precision and the salience of attentional targets were attenuated in depressed participants across sensory modalities, contributing to a suppression of contextual prediction error in this group. These outcomes provide support for a novel theoretical account of depression chronicity and suggest avenues for enhancing the effectiveness of psychological interventions for this population.

Resetting the brain

2021 ◽  
pp. 110-123
Author(s):  
Chris Letheby
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Prediction Error ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Therapeutic Benefits ◽  
High Level ◽  
The Brain

‘Resetting the brain’ examines the hypothesis that (i) large-scale neural networks become stuck in dysfunctional configurations in pathology, and (ii) psychedelics cause therapeutic benefits by disrupting these configurations, providing an opportunity to ‘reset’ the relevant networks into a healthier state. This chapter argues that this view is correct but limited; per Chapter 5, it needs to be supplemented with an account of these networks’ cognitive functions. To this end, the chapter introduces the predictive processing (PP) theory of cognition, which views the brain as an organ for prediction error minimisation. One PP-based theory of psychedelic action claims that (i) the networks targeted by psychedelics encode high-level beliefs, and (ii) psychedelic disruption of these beliefs provides an opportunity to revise them. This is the cognitive process that corresponds to the ‘resetting’ of neural networks. The chapter concludes by proposing that the beliefs most often revised in successful psychedelic therapy are self-related beliefs.

scholarly journals The predictive brain in action: Involuntary actions reduce body prediction errors

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pablo Lanillos ◽  
Sae Franklin ◽  
David W. Franklin
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Sensory Information ◽  
The Body ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Body Ownership ◽  
Prediction Errors ◽  
Uncertain Information ◽  
Energy Principle ◽  
Virtual Hand ◽  
The Brain

AbstractThe perception of our body in space is flexible and manipulable. The predictive brain hypothesis explains this malleability as a consequence of the interplay between incoming sensory information and our body expectations. However, given the interaction between perception and action, we might also expect that actions would arise due to prediction errors, especially in conflicting situations. Here we describe a computational model, based on the free-energy principle, that forecasts involuntary movements in sensorimotor conflicts. We experimentally confirm those predictions in humans by means of a virtual reality rubber-hand illusion. Participants generated movements (forces) towards the virtual hand, regardless of its location with respect to the real arm, with little to no forces produced when the virtual hand overlaid their physical hand. The congruency of our model predictions and human observations shows that the brain-body is generating actions to reduce the prediction error between the expected arm location and the new visual arm. This observed unconscious mechanism is an empirical validation of the perception-action duality in body adaptation to uncertain situations and evidence of the active component of predictive processing.Author SummaryHumans’ capacity to perceive and control their body in space is central in awareness, adaptation and safe interaction. From low-level body perception to body-ownership, discovering how the brain represents the body and generates actions is of major importance for cognitive science and also for robotics and artificial intelligence. The present study shows that humans move their body to match the expected location according to other (visual) sensory input, which corresponds to reducing the prediction error. This means that the brain adapts to conflicting or uncertain information from the senses by unconsciously acting in the world.

Experienced Wholeness

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wanja Wiese
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Second Step ◽  
Error Minimization ◽  
Gestalt Theory ◽  
Bodily Experiences ◽  
Prediction Error Minimization ◽  
Hierarchical Bayesian Inference ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Phenomenal Unity

The unity of the experienced world and the experienced self have puzzled humanity for centuries. How can we understand this and related types of phenomenal (i.e., experienced) unity? This book develops an interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity. It focuses on examples of experienced wholes such as perceived objects (chairs and tables, but also groups of objects), bodily experiences, successions of events, and the attentional structure of consciousness. As a first step, the book investigates how the unity of consciousness can be characterized phenomenologically: what is it like to experience wholes, what is the experiential contribution of phenomenal unity? This raises conceptual and empirical questions. In addressing these questions, connections are drawn to phenomenological accounts and research on Gestalt theory. As a second step, the book suggests how phenomenal unity can be analyzed computationally, by drawing on concepts and ideas of the framework of predictive processing. The result is a conceptual framework, as well as an interdisciplinary account of phenomenal unity: the regularity account of phenomenal unity. According to this account, experienced wholes correspond to a hierarchy of connecting regularities. The brain tracks these regularities by hierarchical prediction error minimization, which approximates hierarchical Bayesian inference.

scholarly journals A Predictive Processing Account of Bottom-Up Visual Saliency Using Cross-Predicting Autoencoders

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Beren Millidge ◽  
Richard Shillcock
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Visual Saliency ◽  
Generative Models ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Bottom Up ◽  
Low Level ◽  
Sense Data ◽  
Saliency Maps ◽  
Human Participants ◽  
The Brain

We propose a novel predictive processing account of bottom-up visual saliency in which salience is simply the low-level prediction error between the sense-data and the predictions produced by the generative models in the brain. We test this with modelling in which we use cross-predicting deep autoencoders to create salience maps in an entirely unsupervised way. The resulting maps closely mimic experimentally derived human saliency maps and also spontaneously learn a centre bias, a robust viewing behaviour seen in human participants.

scholarly journals Cerebral hierarchies: predictive processing, precision and the pulvinar

2015 ◽  
Vol 370 (1668) ◽  
pp. 20140169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryota Kanai ◽  
Yutaka Komura ◽  
Stewart Shipp ◽  
Karl Friston
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Message Passing ◽  
Predictive Coding ◽  
Gain Control ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Special Focus ◽  
First Order ◽  
Neuronal Populations ◽  
Neurobiological Substrates ◽  
The Brain

This paper considers neuronal architectures from a computational perspective and asks what aspects of neuroanatomy and neurophysiology can be disclosed by the nature of neuronal computations? In particular, we extend current formulations of the brain as an organ of inference—based upon hierarchical predictive coding—and consider how these inferences are orchestrated. In other words, what would the brain require to dynamically coordinate and contextualize its message passing to optimize its computational goals? The answer that emerges rests on the delicate (modulatory) gain control of neuronal populations that select and coordinate (prediction error) signals that ascend cortical hierarchies. This is important because it speaks to a hierarchical anatomy of extrinsic (between region) connections that form two distinct classes, namely a class of driving (first-order) connections that are concerned with encoding the content of neuronal representations and a class of modulatory (second-order) connections that establish context—in the form of the salience or precision ascribed to content. We explore the implications of this distinction from a formal perspective (using simulations of feature–ground segregation) and consider the neurobiological substrates of the ensuing precision-engineered dynamics, with a special focus on the pulvinar and attention.

From many to one: Meditation and the plasticity of the predictive mind

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruben Laukkonen ◽  
Heleen A Slagter
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Enhancement ◽  
The Self ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Focused Attention ◽  
Conceptual Processing ◽  
Current State ◽  
Contemplative Science ◽  
Open Monitoring ◽  
Living Organisms ◽  
The Brain

How profoundly can humans change their own minds? In this paper we offer a unifying account of meditation under the predictive processing view of living organisms. We start from relatively simple axioms. First, the brain is an organ that serves to predict based on past experience, both phylogenetic and ontogenetic. Second, meditation serves to bring one closer to the here and now by disengaging from anticipatory processes. We propose that practicing meditation therefore gradually reduces predictive processing, in particular counterfactual cognition—the tendency to construct abstract and temporally deep representations—until all conceptual processing falls away. Our Many- to-One account also places three main styles of meditation (focused attention, open monitoring, and non-dual meditation) on a single continuum, where each technique progressively relinquishes increasingly engrained habits of prediction, including the self. This deconstruction can also make the above processes available to introspection, permitting certain insights into one’s mind. Our review suggests that our framework is consistent with the current state of empirical and (neuro)phenomenological evidence in contemplative science, and is ultimately illuminating about the plasticity of the predictive mind. It also serves to highlight that contemplative science can fruitfully go beyond cognitive enhancement, attention, and emotion regulation, to its more traditional goal of removing past conditioning and creating conditions for potentially profound insights. Experimental rigor, neurophenomenology, and no-report paradigms combined with neuroimaging are needed to further our understanding of how different styles of meditation affect predictive processing and the self, and the plasticity of the predictive mind more generally.

scholarly journals Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Deery
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Mental Event ◽  
The World ◽  
Predictive Approach ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.

Priors and Prejudice: How prior knowledge shapes intergroup perception

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh McGovern ◽  
Marte Otten
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Prior Knowledge ◽  
Cognitive Processes ◽  
Social Neuroscience ◽  
Intergroup Bias ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Future Research ◽  
Intergroup Perception ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Processing Framework

Bayesian processing has become a popular framework by which to understand cognitive processes. However, relatively little has been done to understand how Bayesian processing in the brain can be applied to understanding intergroup cognition. We assess how categorization and evaluation processes unfold based on priors about the ethnic outgroup being perceived. We then consider how the precision of prior knowledge about groups differentially influence perception depending on how the information about that group was learned affects the way in which it is recalled. Finally, we evaluate the mechanisms of how humans learn information about other ethnic groups and assess how the method of learning influences future intergroup perception. We suggest that a predictive processing framework for assessing prejudice could help accounting for seemingly disparate findings on intergroup bias from social neuroscience, social psychology, and evolutionary psychology. Such an integration has important implications for future research on prejudice at the interpersonal, intergroup, and societal levels.

The Embodiment of Concepts

2018 ◽  
pp. 640-660
Author(s):  
Michiel Van Elk ◽  
Harold Bekkering
Keyword(s):  
Prediction Error ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Prediction Errors ◽  
Conceptual Representation ◽  
Recurrent Processing ◽  
Different Dimensions ◽  
Prior Models ◽  
Processing Framework

We characterize theories of conceptual representation as embodied, disembodied, or hybrid according to their stance on a number of different dimensions: the nature of concepts, the relation between language and concepts, the function of concepts, the acquisition of concepts, the representation of concepts, and the role of context. We propose to extend an embodied view of concepts, by taking into account the importance of multimodal associations and predictive processing. We argue that concepts are dynamically acquired and updated, based on recurrent processing of prediction error signals in a hierarchically structured network. Concepts are thus used as prior models to generate multimodal expectations, thereby reducing surprise and enabling greater precision in the perception of exemplars. This view places embodied theories of concepts in a novel predictive processing framework, by highlighting the importance of concepts for prediction, learning and shaping categories on the basis of prediction errors.

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