Involvement of 'Outsiders' in the Arctic Region

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Aliyeva Incha

Since ancient times people have had access to the Arctic Circle, however, the last few decades have seen recent technological advancements that have allowed the area to be explored more comprehensively. This has created a significantly more complex picture than before as it has been called the new “Great Game.” With the rising interests of eight nations and other non-Arctic countries in the region, overlapping territorial claims have the potential to create new challenges. It is anticipated that increased interest will lead to an increase in the number of vessels transiting the region, despite harsh climate conditions. Meanwhile, the Arctic is experiencing environmental change that is inescapably leading to a new geopolitical reality. Authors, such as Jason Dittmer, have claimed that “The Arctic is evolving from a regional frozen backwater into a global hot issue.” This article discusses the colliding interests and current state of affairs of the three Arctic Council Asian observer countries, China, Japan, and South Korea, as well as those of two observer organizations, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the European Union (EU). Sustainability is one of the major priorities of these countries, which has been reflected in their Arctic policies. The reason for examining China, Japan, and South Korea is that they are growing superpowers and industrialized countries with varying interests in regards to the Arctic region.

2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 16-23
Author(s):  
I. S. Doroshenko

The People’s Republic of China is increasing its influence around the world every day. It’s hard not to notice the aggressive economic expansion being carried out by China in the Asian region. Chinese presence is felt in Africa, South America and even in Europe. By engaging in a trade war with the United States, China thereby challenged the most influential economy in the world, which is confirmed by its ambitions as a world leader. To meet these ambitions, a powerful transport and logistics support is necessary, which gave rise to the “Belts and Ways” initiative. The initiative “One Belt - One Road” combines two projects: “The Economic Belt of the Silk Road” and “The Sea Silk Road of the XXI Century”. This means that, in addition to the traditional land routes of the Silk Road, Beijing is exploring the sea routes along the African continent and in the Pacific Ocean. Since the initiative does not have a clear strategy, the northern routes that have recently become relevant are also considered by the Chinese authorities.The search for an alternative to the Suez Canal has repeatedly prompted researchers to use the Northern Sea Route as a trading artery linking Europe and Asia, but climatic conditions and technical capabilities did not allow this idea to be realized. The current situation in the Arctic region allows us to talk about new development prospects.China is actively interested in the Arctic: since 2013, it has an observer status in the Arctic Council, has been increasing its presence in the region by organizing scientific expeditions, building icebreakers, introducing its own brand “Northern Silk Road”, and also investing in projects like “Yamal LNG». China outlined its presence in the Arctic region in a white paper published in January 2018. One of the main goals that Beijing sets for itself is multilateral cooperation in the development of the Northern Sea Route.The author of the article analyzes the origins of such interest, as well as possible threats to Russia. The study also examines the position of European partners in the participation of the development of the SMP, bilateral relations with the Chinese side and the ratio of the strategy of the European Union, China and Russia in the High North. The author gives a geopolitical rationale for Chinese initiatives that are aimed at creating the conditions for intensive navigation in the northern areas.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 251-267
Author(s):  
Barry S. Zellen

Successful collaboration between the indigenous peoples and the sovereign states of Arctic North America has helped to stabilise the Arctic region, fostering meaningful indigenous participation in the governance of their homeland, the introduction of new institutions of self-governance at the municipal, tribal and territorial levels, and successful diplomatic collaborations at the international level through the Arctic Council. This stability and the reciprocal and increasingly balanced relationship between sovereign states and indigenous stakeholders has yielded a widely recognised spirit of international collaboration often referred to as Arctic exceptionalism. With competition in the Arctic between states on the rise, the multitude of co-management systems and the multi-level, inter-governmental and inter-organisational relationships they have nurtured across the region will help to neutralise new threats to ‘Arctic Exceptionalism’ posed by intensifying inter-state tensions.


Author(s):  
Sofia Khusainova

The subject of this research is the policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. The object is Russia’s chairmanship of the Arctic Council in 2021–2023. The author meticulously analyzes the positions of the state, taking into account national interests and peculiarities of the current international situation in the region. The article examines the domestic legislative acts adopted for regulation of the Arctic Region, as well as international documents aimed at sustainable development of the North. The conditions of collective security dictate moderate and clearly defined policy in the Arctic, which is the central arena for political action with the leading role of the Russian Federation until 2023. The conclusion is drawn that the Arctic Region is currently the most relevant vector of the policy of northern states. Chairmanship of the Russian Federation imposes enormous responsibility on the country, as despite the overall state of security in the region, there remains a range of unresolved issues. The attempts of institutionalization of the Arctic Council may become an implicit threat for the Russian Federation; this is why the systematization of domestic legislation and foreign policy actions on maintaining the health of ecosystem, cultural heritage, and environmental policy have become the priority vectors in the first year of Russia’s chairmanship. The overall responsibility of the leading actor the Arctic does not exclude the existence of classic threats to the security of state’s sovereignty, which requires accurate planning in subsequent years of the chairmanship.


2018 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 380-402
Author(s):  
Natalie Dobson ◽  
Seline Trevisanut

Abstract The effects of global warming in the Arctic region present a particular challenge for the European Union (EU), which seeks to profile itself as a leader in responding to climate change. Although the EU strives to prioritize climate protection, the Arctic region remains one of the EU’s major suppliers of energy, particularly oil and gas. The EU must thus strike a balance between climate change mitigation and adaptation, and energy security. The present article analyses the developments of the EU position in this field, particularly in light of the COP 21 negotiations, and the more recent 2016 Integrated European Union Policy for the Arctic. In doing so it seeks to explore to what extent the EU truly is fulfilling its own leadership aspirations in the field of climate change and energy in the Arctic.


2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 158-186
Author(s):  
Paula Kovari

The impacts of climate change as well as the increase of economic activities call for effective governance of the Arctic Region. The Arctic Council is the predominant intergovernmental forum in the region. The rotating chairmanships of the Member States have a defining role in the work of the Council. This paper compares the Arctic Council chairmanship programmes of the five Nordic Countries with the organisation’s outputs following the two-year chairmanship periods as expressed in the ministerial Declarations and the SAOs’ reports. The paper finds that the discourse on the studied topics has developed greatly over time and despite the similarities between the countries’ foreign politics in general, there are some notable differences in the way the countries see the future of the Arctic – for example through the region’s vast natural resources or as a unique environment of the Arctic biodiversity. The conclusion of this research is that even though the chair cannot take all the credit for its accomplishments during the chairmanship period in question, nor can it be blamed for all possible failures, the chair’s work does leave its mark on the Arctic Council’s performance.


Polar Record ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (2) ◽  
pp. 191-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen

ABSTRACTThe Arctic Council (AC) has been accorded the status of knowledge holder and knowledge provider for the Arctic region. This paper probes the broader definition-making power of Arctic knowledge, challenging the common notion that this knowledge is value neutral. It argues that attention should be paid to the ways in which power is exercised in, and though, the various reports and assessments published under the auspices of the AC. The specific focus of the paper is human development and gender as an aspect of that development. The research analyses the Arctic Human Development Report (AHDR) in order to examine the ways in which knowledge defines human development and its agents in the Arctic. The paper draws on Foucault-inspired and feminist approaches to analyse three vocabularies of rule in particular: strength of the community, vulnerability and the need for adaptation. These vocabularies are coexistent and share an emphasis on communities. Yet, questions of gender seldom figure in them, a lack of salience that reveals the power of the partiality of knowledge. The politics of knowledge operate by placing in the foreground only certain accounts of Arctic development.


2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 (1) ◽  
pp. 1569-1582
Author(s):  
Hugo Nijkamp ◽  
Saskia Sessions ◽  
Philippe Blanc ◽  
Yannick Autret

ABSTRACT The Arctic is an extremely vulnerable area for oil pollution. Because of global warming and the resulting retreating ice, new economic shipping and Exploration & Production activities are likely to develop in the coming years and decades. Both governments (e.g. Arctic Council) and the oil industry (e.g. Arctic Response Technology Joint Industry Programme) are preparing for increased oil spill response capabilities in the Arctic region, and are looking to join forces for more efficiency and effectiveness. In connection to oil spill response planning in the Arctic both onshore and offshore, attention should be given to oiled wildlife response preparedness in this region. The Arctic is characterized by unique ecosystems and biodiversity, either marine or terrestrial, with a large proportion of migratory species. So although species diversity is assumed to be low compared to other regions, Arctic wildlife is very sensitive to the effects of oil pollution. Additionally the Arctic is a remote and extreme area for setting up a wildlife response in the framework of an oil spill response. This paper explores what the limitations of an Arctic oiled wildlife response would be (physical/logistical, health & safety, environmental monitoring, ecosystems understanding, biodiversity data, sensitivity mapping, etc.), and identifies how current gaps in response preparedness could be filled. Special emphasis is laid on investments into the capabilities of specialised responders and their equipment, including creation of a specialised Arctic Wildlife Response Strike Team.


2013 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 299-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Corine Wood-Donnelly

Abstract The 2011 ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic’ (henceforth SAR Agreement) is the first instrument of hard law produced by the eight states of the Arctic Council. While the agreement ostensibly addresses search and rescue related issues for the Arctic region, it is capable of being understood in a variety of legal, political and cultural contexts. Three elements are teased out in particular – the SAR Agreement as a legal policy document, as indicative of evolving Arctic international relations, and as indicative of particular geopolitical logics. As the paper concludes, however, the SAR Agreement has not been entirely free of political intrigue.


2013 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gorm Harste

In order to describe the Arctic system I propose using a concept functionally equivalent to territoriality, namely aquatoriality. Whether communicating about territoriality or aquatoriality, concepts and delimitations are both contingent to forms of communication systems. I will distinguish between six communications systems that differentiated from each other could become involved in the new deals emerging around the Arctic. Apart of an economic communication code about the Arctic, a legal code, ecological communication codes, and tourist communication codes, I will cope with the military coding of the Arctic. These codes could then appear structurally coupled to a political system that in an organizational way appears in the Arctic Council.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 128-150 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cécile Pelaudeix

Initiated in 2008, the EU’S Arctic policy acknowledges the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region and intends to secure the EU’S trade and resource interests as new actors like China enter the Arctic arena. This paper shows that China’s growing assertiveness in the Arctic has impacted upon both EU Arctic policy and EU foreign policy. The new China’s trade interests in the Arctic, in particular the sensitive issue of rare earth elements, have triggered various moves in the EU in terms of trade and cooperation policies. The use of international law gives the EU some leeway to manage legal tensions with China which may still remain in some sectors, and which may also arise in connection with China’s legitimate aspirations in terms of becoming a rule maker as well. On an institutional level, engaging in an ambitious agenda with China also proves that the European External Action Service has gained in efficiency and internal coherence. Finally, this article also shows that the increasing connection of the EU’S Arctic policy with major bilateral relations calls for strengthened EU diplomatic attention in order to respect the principles guiding the EU’S action on the international scene as stated in the Treaty of the European Union, and to avoid a Eurocentric attitude that could undermine the ability of the EU to be a global actor. EU-China cooperation on Arctic issues certainly relies on a strong potential for cooperation, but it also represents additional challenges for the integrated EU Arctic policy that is expected by the end of 2015.


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