Nature as the World of Action, Not of Speculation
The essay traces closely Schelling’s criticism of Kant’s postulates, to wit, that Kant cannot consistently hold that theoretical reason’s cognition of the Unconditioned from the practical perspective (i.e., the assent of theoretical reason to the postulates) is possible while having the same conception of ‘weak’ theoretical reason to which the same cognition from the theoretical perspective remains closed. Schelling’s solution is a demand to realize the Absolute, i.e., the Unconditioned that grounds the unity of the realm of freedom and the realm of nature, solely through one’s own action. By the latter Schelling does not understand a moral action but the action of a ‘creative reason’. Critical philosophy conceived thusly, to wit, in its complete form, would be able to “deduce from the essence of reason” both systems: dogmatism (the Unconditioned as the object of theoretical knowledge) and criticism (the Unconditioned as the object of infinite realization in moral practice).