scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Mechanism on Complex Networks of Green Agricultural Production under Intensive Management Pattern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianguo Du ◽  
Zhuoyun Zhou ◽  
Lingyan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Complex Networks ◽  
Agricultural Production ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Intensive Management ◽  
Production Network ◽  
Management Pattern ◽  
The Government ◽  
Agricultural Operation

The diffusion of green agricultural production under intensive management pattern is an interactive process of strategy comparison and learning on complex networks among traditional farmers and new agricultural operation entities. Based on the theory of evolutionary game and complex networks, we construct evolutionary game models on the scale-free networks to simulate the evolution process of green agricultural production under the market mechanism and the government guidance mechanism, respectively. The comparison analysis results in different scenarios show that the stable state of the green agricultural production network is determined by interactions among the subjects. Detailed experimental results indicate that the double-score system under government guidance mechanism has a significant effect on the diffusion of the green agricultural production, of which the extra reward or penalty obtained from government is crucial. Besides, the diffusion of the green agricultural production under the market mechanism is mostly affected by the net profit of green agricultural production. These results are of great significance for increasing efficiency of government’s incentive and promoting the initiatives of traditional farmers and new agricultural operation entities in the green agricultural production.

scholarly journals The Behavior Mechanism of the Urban Joint Distribution Alliance under Government Supervision from the Perspective of Sustainable Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Xiangxiang Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang
Keyword(s):  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Distribution Operations ◽  
The Government

Urban joint distribution is closely related to the national economy and people’s livelihood, and governments and enterprises play an active role in the process of urban joint distribution. From the perspective of government regulations, this paper explores the mechanism and evolution law of the behavior of an urban joint distribution alliance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, a model of homogeneous enterprises participating in urban joint distribution operations under the guidance of government regulations is constructed. The mechanism and follow-up of alliance behavior are analyzed through the simulation of the relationship between parameters. It is found that, firstly, from the perspective of government regulations, in the early stage of the implementation of urban joint distribution projects, when the benefits of synergetic cooperation of enterprise alliances are relatively low and the costs are relatively high, it is necessary for the government to formulate incentive policies to improve government subsidies or to increase the penalties for non-cooperation of enterprises; Once a benign logistics environment and market mechanism are formed, the cooperation benefits increase, and the costs decrease, the government can then withdraw its supervision. Secondly, in the process of establishing urban joint distribution alliance under government supervision, it is better for the enterprises to actively achieve alliance cooperation and obtain government subsidies instead of passively accepting government supervision and paying penalties, in order to promote the formation of logistics ecological environment and market mechanism.

scholarly journals Menace of Middlemanship in the Light of Islamic Teachings

2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-77
Author(s):  
Khalid Mahmood Lodhi ◽  
Naeem Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Production ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Agriculture Sector ◽  
Food Items ◽  
Food Market ◽  
The Government ◽  
Essential Food

Despite abundant agricultural production, the prices of fruits, vegetables, and other agricultural items remain high, keeping these products out of the a common man’s reach. Although small and poor farmers work hard throughout the year, yet they remain indebted and poor. There might be various reasons for their plight such as the extraordinarily high prices of agri-food items; however, the role of the middleman (Arhti) seems to be the most damaging in this regard. This paper analyses the role palyed by the middleman in Pakistan in the light of Islamic teachings and primary (through survey questionnaire) and secondary data. The study found that generally, the middleman is a cruel character and causes distortions in the economy, particularly in the agro-food market. He deprives poor farmers of meaningful profit, keeps them under the pressure of debt, and causes price hikes of essential items which leads to artificial inflationary pressures in the economy. Ultimately, this phenomenon exerts pressure on the government as well. The current study also found that the presence of middleman in the supply chain of agro-food items deprives poor farmers of their right of earning genuine profit.Moreover, it also increases the price of essential food items. Hence, in the light of Shariah guidelines, unnecessary brokering needs to be restricted so that farmers are able to sell their produce themselves. Furthermore, the middleman’s role needs to be curtailed for the welfare of the farmers, improvement of the agriculture sector, and the betterment of the economy. The study recommends the framing of comprehensive long-term policies for the purchase of crops, monitoring of fruit / vegetable markets, provision of interest-free loans to farmers, setting up of an efficient market mechanism, establishment of effective consumer courts, and the improvement of the transportation system.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Responding to the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

Energies ◽  
2022 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 427
Author(s):  
Tao Huang ◽  
Zhixin Liu ◽  
Tian Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Policy Design ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Sensitivity Analyses ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Eu Countries ◽  
Adjustment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
Border Adjustment

The European Union (EU) views the carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) as a measure to tackle carbon leakage, which will have a profound impact on non-EU countries’ exports. Policymakers are faced with the question of how to deal with the CBAM. In contrast to previous studies, we explore the effects of the CBAM on non-EU countries from a dynamic game perspective. This study analyzed the potential effects of the CBAM on China and found that the government and export companies are the two main stakeholders. We found that they can both choose whether to respond actively or passively. Based on their interactive relationship, we adopted an evolutionary game to model the nexus between the government and export companies. We analyzed the evolutionary stable state of each stakeholder and the whole game with the replicator dynamic equation system. To make the system evolve to the optimal state where the government reacts actively and export companies implement low-carbon production, we provide a policy mechanism for how to set key parameters’ values. We used numerical simulation to verify the policy design and to conduct sensitivity analyses of the key parameters. Our results show that, when two stakeholders positively react to the CBAM, it is necessary to increase their profits and to reduce their costs. Therefore, some suggestions are proposed, including optimizing the trade structure, strengthening cooperation with the EU, improving the current carbon market, and adopting carbon tax.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Models on Multiagent Collaborative Mechanism in Responsible Innovation

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Kun Yang ◽  
Wan Wang ◽  
Bin Hu
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Responsible Innovation ◽  
Behavioral Strategies ◽  
Dynamics Modeling ◽  
Exogenous Variables ◽  
The Public ◽  
Behavior Strategy ◽  
Strategic Stability ◽  
The Government

Innovation is a game process; in particular, the behavior among multiple agents in responsible innovation is susceptible to the influence of benefits, risks, responsibilities, and other factors, resulting in unstable collaborative relationships. Therefore, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model including the government, enterprises, and the public, combined with system dynamics modeling to simulate and analyze the tripartite behavior strategy and sensitivity to relevant exogenous variables. The study shows that the tripartite game eventually converges to a stable state of the government active supervision, enterprises making responsible innovation, and the public’s positive participation. The positive participation of the public drives rapidly the game to a steady state, while the behavioral strategies of enterprises are more susceptible to the behavior of the government. Supervision cost, penalty amount, and value compensation are the most critical factors influencing the change of the corresponding agents’ behavior strategy, and the final strategic stability of tripartite is affected by multiple exogenous variables.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Trust in Public-Private Partnership Project Networks

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Xiangtian Nie ◽  
Kai Feng ◽  
Guoxiang Zhao ◽  
Tianyu Fan ◽  
Shengnan Wang
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Management Practice ◽  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Trust Model ◽  
Public Private Partnership ◽  
Private Partnership ◽  
Project Networks ◽  
The Government

In public-private partnership (PPP) projects, the government plays a role as both regulator and participant. Trust between the government and the private sector is important as it may affect project performance and even cause the problem of a breach of contract, which may lead to project failure. Little is known, however, about the formation and evolution mechanisms of trust in this context. This study analyses the complex evolution of trust in PPP project networks. An evolutionary game of trust model between government and the private sector is established and analysed, the strategic equilibrium points are obtained by solving the replication dynamic equation, and the Jacobian matrix and differential equation stability theory are introduced to analyse the stability of the equilibrium points. The results reveal the relationships among the stable state of trust, the initial state of trust, and the payment matrix, indicating that the payment matrix can effectively shape the evolution process and stable state of trust to influence performance. This study provides a novel contribution in solving the complex trust problem in PPP project networks and it provides a new analytical tool for PPP project management practice.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game of Government Subsidy Strategy for Prefabricated Buildings Based on Prospect Theory

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Yu Liu ◽  
Dong Cai ◽  
Chunxiang Guo ◽  
Haizhen Huang
Keyword(s):  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Evolutionary Games ◽  
Environmental Benefits ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Government ◽  
Prefabricated Building

Based on the prospect theory, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of government and construction units for the problem of poor subsidy construction of government-subsidized construction units and uses the replication dynamic equation to analyse the strategic choice of evolutionary games. The research shows that the evolutionary game system of the construction unit and the government cannot meet the government incentives, and the construction unit also adopts the stable state of the prefabricated building. In the long run, the government subsidy cannot determine whether or not the construction unit will adopt the prefabricated building, and it is the construction cost of the prefabricated building that determines. Therefore, the government's work should shift from subsidies to targeted incentives forconstruction units to reduce the cost of construction of prefabricated buildings. The unit levies an environmental tax and appropriately restricts the income from the traditional cast-in-place construction units, and, on the other hand, it increases the popularization of low-carbon and environmental protection of the fabricated buildings, so that more consumers can recognize the environmental benefits brought by the assembled buildings. It provides a reference for the government to promote the development of prefabricated buildings.

scholarly journals Feasibility analysis of water resources market transaction of water diversion project based on evolutionary game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mengkai Liu ◽  
Acai Yan
Keyword(s):  
Project Management ◽  
Water Resources ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Source Area ◽  
Water Source ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Water Diversion ◽  
Water Price ◽  
Water Diversion Project ◽  
The Government

Abstract Water diversion project realize the change of water right ownership by diverting water resources, but most of the water diversion projects are dominated by the government in the operation stage, which can't realize complete market-oriented transaction of resources. In this study, the water source area, project management department and users involved in water resources trading of water diversion project are regarded as stakeholders, and an evolutionary game model is established to analyze the feasibility and restrictive conditions of the free trading of water resources in the water diversion project. The research results show that the three parties can realize the balance and stability of interests (water source area supplies good water, project management department supplies sufficient water, users take water according to the supply), which means that the feasibility of water market transactions. Meanwhile, it also gives clear restrictions on the water price of three parties transaction, project management department buys water price is less than on the premise of lower than + , sells water price is not higher than The free trading of water resources in the water diversion project under the market mechanism is of great significance for clarifying the water rights and reducing the financial pressure of the government.

scholarly journals Stakeholder Conflict Amplification of Large-Scale Engineering Projects in China: An Evolutionary Game Model on Complex Networks

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-17
Author(s):  
Zhengqi He ◽  
Dechun Huang ◽  
Junmin Fang ◽  
Bo Wang
Keyword(s):  
Complex Networks ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Information Dissemination ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Small World ◽  
Game Model ◽  
Small World Network ◽  
Stakeholder Conflict ◽  
The Government ◽  
Engineering Projects

Large-scale engineering projects make tremendous contributions to China’s social and economic development; meanwhile, due to the diversity of stakeholders, the dispersion of time and space, and the complexity of information dissemination, large-scale engineering projects are easy to cause conflicts among stakeholders that affect social stability. The previous studies on stakeholder conflicts of large-scale engineering projects mainly focused on the game model among stakeholders, without considering the influence of stakeholders’ interaction complex networks formed by social relations on the conflict amplification. For the two main stakeholders of the government and the resident that play a key role in China’s large-scale engineering projects, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of the main stakeholder conflict amplification and analyzes the evolutionary results of the conflict between the government and the resident in different situations. The small-world network is chosen as the complex network type of the simulation study since it is very similar with the topology of the realistic social network. Based on the NetLogo simulation platform, the stakeholder conflict amplification process of large-scale engineering projects on the small-world network is analyzed, and relevant management measures are proposed to defuse the stakeholder conflict of large-scale engineering projects. By using the evolutionary game model on complex networks, this paper studies the stakeholder conflict on the small-world network, providing reference for stakeholder conflict management of large-scale engineering projects in China.

scholarly journals Analysis on the evolution of decision-making behavior of green operation and management subject

2021 ◽  
Vol 248 ◽  
pp. 02008
Author(s):  
Wang Cong
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
High Energy ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Operation Management ◽  
Office Buildings ◽  
Property Management ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
The Government ◽  
Operation And Management

In view of the current situation of high energy consumption and unsatisfactory energy-saving effect of existing large commercial office buildings, green operation management is applied to the operation and management process of existing large commercial office buildings. By constructing an evolutionary game model between owners and property management enterprises under market mechanism and government incentive, this paper explores the acceptance degree of owners and property management enterprises to green operation management under different circumstances, as well as their strategic choices and changing trends. Finally, the paper proposes that the government should actively play a leading role and encourage the development of green operation management.

An analysis of major environmental threats to human security in Nepal

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-139
Author(s):  
Naresh Bhakta Adhikari
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Agricultural Production ◽  
Human Security ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Environmental Security ◽  
Government Action ◽  
Environmental Threats ◽  
Environmental Threat ◽  
Analytical Research ◽  
The Government

The paper mainly analyses the environmental threats focusing on climate change to human security in Nepal. Major aspects of human security are interlinked and interconnected in our context. Among them, human security offers much to the vibrant field of environmental security in Nepal. Environmental threats are linked to the overall impact on human survival, well-being, and productivity. A great deal of human security is tied to peoples’ access to natural resources and vulnerabilities to environmental change. The major environmental threats in our context is the climate change which have widespread implications for Nepal, causing impacts to water availability, agricultural production, forestry, among many other detrimental effects. The critical threat of environmental security needs to be taken into serious consideration to save our succeeding generation. This article primarily interpreted the government action towards emerging environmental threat based on realist approach. For the study of theme of this article, descriptive and analytical research has been used to draw present major environmental threats in Nepal. With consideration to factors, this article attempted to identify the major environmentally vulnerable areas that are likely to hamper the overall status of human security in Nepal. This paper also tried to suggest the measures to enhance the environmental security considering prospects and policy focusing on Nepalese diverse aspects.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document