scholarly journals Analysis on the evolution of decision-making behavior of green operation and management subject

2021 ◽  
Vol 248 ◽  
pp. 02008
Author(s):  
Wang Cong
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
High Energy ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Operation Management ◽  
Office Buildings ◽  
Property Management ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
The Government ◽  
Operation And Management

In view of the current situation of high energy consumption and unsatisfactory energy-saving effect of existing large commercial office buildings, green operation management is applied to the operation and management process of existing large commercial office buildings. By constructing an evolutionary game model between owners and property management enterprises under market mechanism and government incentive, this paper explores the acceptance degree of owners and property management enterprises to green operation management under different circumstances, as well as their strategic choices and changing trends. Finally, the paper proposes that the government should actively play a leading role and encourage the development of green operation management.

scholarly journals Game Analysis of the Multiagent Evolution of Existing Building Green Retrofitting from the Perspective of Green Credit

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Liwen Chen ◽  
Mengjia Zhang ◽  
Shiwen Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Large Scale ◽  
Simulation Analysis ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Payoff Matrix ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Existing Building ◽  
The Sustainable Development ◽  
Factors Affecting ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
The Government

Existing building green retrofitting can reduce building energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions, which is conducive to the sustainable development of the construction industry. The financing dilemma of the existing building green retrofitting hinders the large-scale development of green retrofitting in China. This paper establishes the perceived payoff matrix and evolutionary game model of the government, Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), banks, and owners. Through simulation analysis, the primary factors affecting the choice of game strategy and the stable strategy under different conditions are discussed. The results show that the strategic choices of the government, ESCOs, banks, and owners influence each other in the two game models. Government regulations will have an impact on the strategic choices of ESCOs, banks, and owners. The owners’ strategy choice is closely related to the perceived benefits and costs of retrofitting. Based on the results, corresponding suggestions are proposed to provide theoretical support for the development of the existing building green retrofitting market.

scholarly journals The Behavior Mechanism of the Urban Joint Distribution Alliance under Government Supervision from the Perspective of Sustainable Development

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (22) ◽  
pp. 6232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Na Zhang ◽  
Xiangxiang Zhang ◽  
Yingjie Yang
Keyword(s):  
Joint Distribution ◽  
Early Stage ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
Distribution Operations ◽  
The Government

Urban joint distribution is closely related to the national economy and people’s livelihood, and governments and enterprises play an active role in the process of urban joint distribution. From the perspective of government regulations, this paper explores the mechanism and evolution law of the behavior of an urban joint distribution alliance. Based on the evolutionary game theory, a model of homogeneous enterprises participating in urban joint distribution operations under the guidance of government regulations is constructed. The mechanism and follow-up of alliance behavior are analyzed through the simulation of the relationship between parameters. It is found that, firstly, from the perspective of government regulations, in the early stage of the implementation of urban joint distribution projects, when the benefits of synergetic cooperation of enterprise alliances are relatively low and the costs are relatively high, it is necessary for the government to formulate incentive policies to improve government subsidies or to increase the penalties for non-cooperation of enterprises; Once a benign logistics environment and market mechanism are formed, the cooperation benefits increase, and the costs decrease, the government can then withdraw its supervision. Secondly, in the process of establishing urban joint distribution alliance under government supervision, it is better for the enterprises to actively achieve alliance cooperation and obtain government subsidies instead of passively accepting government supervision and paying penalties, in order to promote the formation of logistics ecological environment and market mechanism.

scholarly journals Chain Innovation Mechanism of the Manufacturing Industry in the Yangtze River Delta of China Based on Evolutionary Game

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (17) ◽  
pp. 9729
Author(s):  
Na Yu ◽  
Chunfeng Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Yangtze River ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Yangtze River Delta ◽  
River Delta ◽  
Policy Support ◽  
The Yangtze River ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Collaborative Innovation ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Yangtze River Delta

It is of great theoretical and practical significance to achieve high-quality development that promotes the transformation of digestion, absorption, and re-innovation to an independent innovation model, actively participating in the restructuring of the industrial chain, and enhancing the status of the Yangtze River Delta in the global innovation chain. This study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of collaborative innovation led by the government, participated by upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises. Moreover, this article analyzes the strategic choices of the tripartite entities in the process of collaborative innovation, and the simulation analyzes the influencing factors of the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises’ collaborative innovation strategy selection. The results indicate that the government, upstream enterprises, and downstream enterprises have different degrees of influence on each other’s willingness to participate. In addition, the analysis proves that government policy support and financial support have different impacts on upstream enterprises and downstream enterprises.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Analysis of Coal Enterprise Resource Integration Under Government Regulation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ziyuan Sun ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Weixing Zhu ◽  
Lin Ma ◽  
Yuting Dong ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Government Regulation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Policy Implications ◽  
Resource Integration ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Government Regulations ◽  
Coal Enterprise ◽  
The Government ◽  
Coal Enterprises ◽  
The Impact

Abstract Based on the perspective of government regulation, this paper discusses how to guide and restrict coal enterprises to conduct resource integration behavior, and whether the government supervises this behavior. First, through empirical research, government regulations of coal enterprises are given practical policy implications. Second, using evolutionary game and simulation technology, from the perspective of government regulation, we explore the complex behavioral interaction mechanism between the dominant and inferior coal enterprises, the mechanism between the government and coal enterprises, and analyze the impact of key factors on the dynamic evolution process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of the selected parameters is discussed in details, which provides useful decision-making suggestions for the government and enterprises. Results demonstrate that:(1) when the power gap between enterprises is great, government regulations are not effective for inferior enterprises;(2) the combination of government regulation can help to improve the efficiency of coal enterprise strategy selection;(3) excessive government regulations make the strategic choices of the government and coal enterprise tend to swing, failing to achieve effectively resource integration and government supervision.

scholarly journals The Evolutionary Game of Stakeholders’ Coordination Mechanism of New Energy Power Construction PPP Project: A China Case

2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 1045 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lei Gao ◽  
Zhen-Yu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Public Participation ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Evolutionary Process ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
The Public ◽  
Power Construction ◽  
New Energy ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

The government, investors, and the public have formed a dynamic multi-game relationship on the Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) project, but few studies include them in a system to study their win–win solutions. Firstly, we constructed a tripartite game model of the government, investors, and the public based on evolutionary game theory. Secondly, the evolutionary process of tripartite strategy behaviors was studied with the system dynamics (SD) model. Finally, the impact of changes in key factors on behavior strategies was studied through sensitivity analysis. The results show the following: (1) In the outsourcing of new energy and power construction PPP projects, the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state of {government supervision, public participation, investors effort}, the three parties achieve a win–win situation and the project benefits are the highest at this time, and the public participation will play an important role in promoting the smooth outsourcing of PPP projects. (2) The strategic choices of the government, investors, and the public are sensitive to changes in the corresponding exogenous variables. (3) The security factor plays a crucial role in the choice of public strategy. The public’s choice is not only affected by its own income and cost, but also by the amount of compensation promised by the government and the estimated damage caused by the investor.

scholarly journals Study on the Compliance Management of the Electricity Market in China Based on the Evolutionary Game Theory

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Luosong Jin ◽  
Chang He ◽  
Xiangyang Wang ◽  
Wei Wang ◽  
Panting Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Evolutionary Game Theory ◽  
Electricity Market ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Power Market ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
System Reform ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Compliance Management ◽  
Effective Compliance

China’s new round of power system reform has further released market vitality, making the power market more open and diversified. Meanwhile, China’s power market faces various risks and challenges incurred by this new reform, which further highlights the importance of the compliance management. However, the study on effective compliance management of China’s power market is missing, and the way to achieving effective compliance management is still unanswered. This paper tries to fill the research gap using the evolutionary game theory. We constructed a tripartite game model to analyze the strategic choices and influencing factors of power generators, compliance departments of the trading centre, and government regulatory agencies. Furthermore, simulation analysis was conducted based on evolutionary stable strategies. The results show that effective compliance management can be achieved without government supervision if the market mechanism is properly designed. In addition, the costs and profits of market participants and regulators are important factors influencing the effectiveness of compliance management. Our findings may arouse inspiration for the policy makers to construct an effective compliance management system.

scholarly journals Evolutionary Game Mechanism on Complex Networks of Green Agricultural Production under Intensive Management Pattern

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-13 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jianguo Du ◽  
Zhuoyun Zhou ◽  
Lingyan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Complex Networks ◽  
Agricultural Production ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Stable State ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Intensive Management ◽  
Production Network ◽  
Management Pattern ◽  
The Government ◽  
Agricultural Operation

The diffusion of green agricultural production under intensive management pattern is an interactive process of strategy comparison and learning on complex networks among traditional farmers and new agricultural operation entities. Based on the theory of evolutionary game and complex networks, we construct evolutionary game models on the scale-free networks to simulate the evolution process of green agricultural production under the market mechanism and the government guidance mechanism, respectively. The comparison analysis results in different scenarios show that the stable state of the green agricultural production network is determined by interactions among the subjects. Detailed experimental results indicate that the double-score system under government guidance mechanism has a significant effect on the diffusion of the green agricultural production, of which the extra reward or penalty obtained from government is crucial. Besides, the diffusion of the green agricultural production under the market mechanism is mostly affected by the net profit of green agricultural production. These results are of great significance for increasing efficiency of government’s incentive and promoting the initiatives of traditional farmers and new agricultural operation entities in the green agricultural production.

scholarly journals Analysis of a Multiparticipant Game under a Subsidy and Punishment Mechanism: An Evolutionary Theory Perspective

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Jiangchao Li ◽  
Shilei Yang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Pure Strategy ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Vital Role ◽  
Strategic Choices ◽  
Strategy Space ◽  
Market Sentiment ◽  
Punishment Mechanism ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability

In a market with intense competition, cost pressures tempt enterprises to seek profits in ways that infringe on the interests of consumers. This is especially true when market sentiment is weak. In such situations, governments play a vital role in protecting consumers’ interests and helping struggling enterprises. We construct a tripartite game model that includes the government, enterprises, and consumers under a subsidy and punishment mechanism. We use this model to investigate the strategic choices made by the participants in an evolutionary game theory (EGT) framework. We present four stable equilibrium points as pure strategy solutions with the aid of a replicator dynamic system. Three main findings are presented in this paper. First, not all equilibrium points can be evolutionary stable strategies (ESSs) when considering the potential motivations of the participants to change strategies. Second, there is an equilibrium point that satisfies the stability condition but changes periodically in its strategy space; strategy changes between participants are not synchronized. Third, the government prefers to subsidize enterprises when enterprise speculation is serious or when enterprise investment in improving production technology is high.

scholarly journals Feasibility analysis of water resources market transaction of water diversion project based on evolutionary game

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mengkai Liu ◽  
Acai Yan
Keyword(s):  
Project Management ◽  
Water Resources ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Source Area ◽  
Water Source ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Water Diversion ◽  
Water Price ◽  
Water Diversion Project ◽  
The Government

Abstract Water diversion project realize the change of water right ownership by diverting water resources, but most of the water diversion projects are dominated by the government in the operation stage, which can't realize complete market-oriented transaction of resources. In this study, the water source area, project management department and users involved in water resources trading of water diversion project are regarded as stakeholders, and an evolutionary game model is established to analyze the feasibility and restrictive conditions of the free trading of water resources in the water diversion project. The research results show that the three parties can realize the balance and stability of interests (water source area supplies good water, project management department supplies sufficient water, users take water according to the supply), which means that the feasibility of water market transactions. Meanwhile, it also gives clear restrictions on the water price of three parties transaction, project management department buys water price is less than on the premise of lower than + , sells water price is not higher than The free trading of water resources in the water diversion project under the market mechanism is of great significance for clarifying the water rights and reducing the financial pressure of the government.

Four-party evolutionary game analysis of supervision for vaccine quality in major epidemics

2022 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Rongjian Xie ◽  
Yucai Jia ◽  
Yuanmei Wu ◽  
Peiyun Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Equilibrium Points ◽  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Regulatory System ◽  
External Information ◽  
The Public ◽  
Leading Role ◽  
Government Supervision ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Stability ◽  
The Cost

During major epidemics, monitoring vaccine quality can ensure the public health and social stability. Considering that social media has become an important way for the public to obtain external information during the epidemic. We developed a dual regulatory system of vaccine quality with the government in the leading role and the participation of We Media, and constructed a four-party evolutionary game model (government regulatory agency, We Media, vaccine industry groups, and the public) and analyzed the stability of each game player’s strategy choice. The system’s possible equilibrium points are identified using Lyapunov’s first law. Then the game trajectory between stakeholders is simulated by MATLAB, the effects of initial intention and parameters on the evolution process and results are analyzed. The results show that to ensure the quality and safety of vaccines and stabilize network public opinion during epidemics, the government should invest in an effective supervision mechanism. By strengthening responsibility, increasing penalties, and reducing supervision costs, the probability of vaccine industry groups providing high-quality vaccines is effectively enhanced. Restricting the behavior of We Media and supervising vaccine industry groups to reduce speculation reduces the cost of government supervision and improves its efficiency.

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