Forget Time
Is there a notion of time compatible with the physical world? Because this is certainly not the case with Newtonian time, the answer requires a wider conception of time. I propose such a conception under the form of a synthesis of the “primary” notions of dating and chronology, duration, and causality. Although these notions (that I precisely define) are often confused with “time” itself, I insist on their conceptual and operational differences. These notions appear perfectly relevant and operational in the Newtonian world; moreover, they show intimate relations that justify a (Newtonian) universal time as their synthesis. I suggest enlarging this characterization of “time” beyond the Newtonian context. The incompatibility of such a synthesis with realistic observations or measurements (described in the context of relativistic Einsteinian physics) leads us to conclude the impossibility of reconciling a notion of time with the physical world.