Stroud on Logical Necessity and General Facts of Nature
AbstractWhat makes the denial of a necessary truth impossible or unintelligible? Barry Stroud argues that there is an answer to this question which avoids Platonism, yet does not force us to adopt Conventionalism about logical necessity. In Part 1, I give a brief characterization of Platonism and Conventionalism and sketch some of the difficulties that arise when trying to explain logical necessity along either of those lines. In Part 2, I will summarize the main points of what Stroud has to say on the matter and raise what I believe to be serious difficulties for his account.
1974 ◽
Vol 32
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pp. 254-255
1983 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 270-271
1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 144-145
1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 132-133
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1983 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 194-195
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1983 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 160-161
1983 ◽
Vol 41
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pp. 72-73
Keyword(s):
1973 ◽
Vol 31
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pp. 420-421