scholarly journals Russia and Turkey in Regional and Geopolitical Space

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 147-160
Author(s):  
B. V. Dolgov

The article is devoted to examine Russian-Turkish relations in the historical retrospective review. The regional and geopolitical goals which Russia had to realize in XVII – beginning XX centuries and which is stipulated the necessity to ensure Russia security and further economical development are revealed. The factors which led to push of Russia and Turkey interests and which became the cause of Russian-Turkish military conflicts which is occurred at interval of cooperation and partnership in this period are represented. The results of Russian military and political efforts which allowed realize the tasks to liberate Crimea, for Russia passage to Black Sea and to Mediterranean Sea basin, to support Balkan peoples to win their national independence, what strengthened Russian regional and geopolitical positions considerably are examined. The character of Russian-Turkish relations in Soviet period which passed the stages of the cooperation and confrontation which caused “Cold War” is revealed.The main attention is allotted to analyze in details the recent stage of Russia – Turkey relations. The character of the actual Turkish ruling elite, which is represented of the Justice and Development Party (JDP), which is confessing the ideology of the moderate Islamism and Neo Osmanism is exposed. The internal social and economical politics of JDP is examined. The goals and intentions, which Turkish leadership pushed forward, are analyzed and their influence on Russian-Turkish relations is inspected. The activity of the Turkish foreign politics on the different directions in the Arab World, Europe, countries of CIS, Moslem regions of Russian Federation is examined. In the conclusions the differences and common interests in the foreign politics of Russia and Turkey and the possibility of their cooperation are analyzed.

Born in 1945, the United Nations (UN) came to life in the Arab world. It was there that the UN dealt with early diplomatic challenges that helped shape its institutions such as peacekeeping and political mediation. It was also there that the UN found itself trapped in, and sometimes part of, confounding geopolitical tensions in key international conflicts in the Cold War and post-Cold War periods, such as hostilities between Palestine and Iraq and between Libya and Syria. Much has changed over the past seven decades, but what has not changed is the central role played by the UN. This book's claim is that the UN is a constant site of struggle in the Arab world and equally that the Arab world serves as a location for the UN to define itself against the shifting politics of its age. Looking at the UN from the standpoint of the Arab world, this volume includes chapters on the potential and the problems of a UN that is framed by both the promises of its Charter and the contradictions of its member states.


Author(s):  
Jesse Ferris

This book draws on declassified documents from six countries and original material in Arabic, German, Hebrew, and Russian to present a new understanding of Egypt's disastrous five-year intervention in Yemen, which Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser later referred to as “my Vietnam.” The book argues that Nasser's attempt to export the Egyptian revolution to Yemen played a decisive role in destabilizing Egypt's relations with the Cold War powers, tarnishing its image in the Arab world, ruining its economy, and driving its rulers to instigate the fatal series of missteps that led to war with Israel in 1967. Viewing the Six Day War as an unintended consequence of the Saudi–Egyptian struggle over Yemen, the book demonstrates that the most important Cold War conflict in the Middle East was not the clash between Israel and its neighbors. It was the inter-Arab struggle between monarchies and republics over power and legitimacy. Egypt's defeat in the “Arab Cold War” set the stage for the rise of Saudi Arabia and political Islam. Bold and provocative, this book brings to life a critical phase in the modern history of the Middle East. Its compelling analysis of Egypt's fall from power in the 1960s offers new insights into the decline of Arab nationalism, exposing the deep historical roots of the Arab Spring of 2011.


Author(s):  
Sir Richard Dearlove

This article discusses the changing perceptions on national security and civic anxiety. During the Cold War and its aftermath, security was rather a simple and straightforward issue. The countries knew their enemies, where they are and the threats they presented. On the event that, the enemies's secrets were unknown, probing techniques were employed to determine the weaknesses of the enemy. This formulaic situation which seeped through in to the twenty-first century left little room for innovation. In fact, in some countries, security maintained at the Cold War levels despite criticisms that new and emerging national security threats should be addressed at a new level. Of the powerful nations, America maintained the role of a world policeman and adapted its national security priorities according to its perception of a new series of strategic threats; however these new security strategies were without a sense of urgency. However, the perception of global threats and national security radically changed in the event of the 9/11 attack. The sleeping national security priorities of America came to a full force which affected the national security priorities of other nations as well. In the twenty-first globalized world, no conflict remains a regional clash. The reverberations of the Russian military action in Georgia, the Israeli intervention in Gaza, and the results of the attacks in Mumbai resonates loudly and rapidly through the wider international security system. While today, nations continue to seek new methods for addressing new security threats, the paradox of the national security policy is that nation-states have lost their exclusive grip of their own security at a time when the private citizens are assailed by increased fears for their own security and demand a more enhanced safety from the state. Nation-states have been much safer from large-scale violence, however there exists a strong sense of anxiety about the lack of security in the face of multiplicity of threats. Nations have been largely dependent on international coordinated action to achieve their important national security objectives. National policies and security theory lack precision. In addition, the internationalization of national security has eroded the distinction between domestic and foreign security. These blurring lines suggest that the understanding of national security is still at the height of transformations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Rob de Wijk

Abstract: The new Russian military doctrine from 2010, the growing international assertiveness of Russia, and eventually the annexation of the Crimea Peninsula in 2014 have forced the West to rethink deterrence strategies vis a vis Russia. Consequently, the old Cold War concept of deterrence was dusted off and the debate picked up from where it had ended in 1990. This article summarizes the end of the Cold War thinking on deterring aggression against NATO-Europe. It explains why the present Western theoretical foundation of deterrence, which still focuses on strong conventional forces backed up by nuclear weapons, no longer suffices, and argues that the new Russian concept of strategic deterrence requires a complete overhaul of the Western approach. It is not only the security of the Baltic member states of NATO or of transatlantic cables that matter, Europe has to cope with desinformation and destabilization campaigns and has to rethink its energy security strategy. Only together can NATO and EU master these challenges.


Author(s):  
Anna L. Bailey

Examines how alcohol has been constructed as a “social problem” in Russia in the post-Soviet period. For many years the dominant construction of the problem was that of illegal alcohol, with alcohol’s negative effects on the demographic situation only gaining prominence in the latter half of the 2000s. The chapter explains why and why the large consumption peaks in 1994–5 and 2002–3 failed to provoke alarm among the ruling elite at the time, in spite of efforts by public health activists to problematise the issue, finding that the crises provoked by the transition from communism detracted attention from demographic issues.


Author(s):  
Gerard Toal

It was supposed to be China’s coming-out party, a moment in the global spotlight affirming its arrival as an economic superpower. But hours before the opening ceremonies of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, news of a war in the Caucasus flashed across the world’s TV screens. On the southern slopes of the Caucasus Mountains, the state of Georgia launched a military offensive against South Ossetia, a small breakaway territory beyond its control since the Soviet collapse. Georgia’s offensive quickly brought Russia to the defense of its local Ossetian allies. As Soviet-era tanks rolled through the Roki tunnel, the only land connection between South Ossetia and Russia, Russian aircraft bombed Georgian targets in the region and beyond. For the first time since the Cold War ended, Russia was invading a neighboring state. Instead of glowing stories about China, speculation about a new Cold War filled the front pages of the Western press. Yet within a week the war was over and a ceasefire agreed. Thereafter a rapidly moving global financial crisis displaced what seemed a harbinger of geopolitical rupture to an afterthought. As quickly as it had flared, the Russo-Georgian war disappeared, and with it talk of a return to geopolitics past. Six years later Russia was in the global spotlight as host of the XXII Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, located on the shores of the Black Sea at the western end of the Caucasus Mountains. Despite well-grounded fears of terrorism, the Olympics were a triumph for Russia and its leadership. Yet a few days later, the world recoiled in shock as Russia once again invaded a neighboring state. Responding to a perceived “fascist coup” in Kyiv, unmarked Russian military personnel seized control of the Ukrainian province of Crimea, once part of Soviet Russia and home to Russia’s Black Sea Fleet. A hastily organized referendum followed, creating the appearance of legitimacy for Russia to formally annex the province, and the city of Sevastopol, in late March 2014.


Worldview ◽  
1974 ◽  
Vol 17 (6) ◽  
pp. 21-22
Author(s):  
John W. Holmes

The problem in judging M. Servan-Schreiber's message is that he reaches some sound conclusions on the basis of dubious premises, from which he derives recommendations which could be disastrous.There may be some satisfaction in seeing a Frenchman concerned with le défi, russe instead of le défi américain, but his interpretation of one is as crude as was his interpretation of the other. The shock of revelation that there are common interests of the Atlantic countries in economic as well as strategic matters is understandably more startling to a Frenchman than to others. It was all set out in 1949 in Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and was restated eloquently in 1973 by Mr. Kissinger. But last spring European leaders were included to see the latter as a self-interested plea from a weak United States to a prosperous Europe. The North American countries were reminded that their role in Europe was simply to defend it on request.


Author(s):  
Fei Wu

Vladimir Putin's annual address as president in 2006 neatly summaries the reason why Russia had to press forward with long-overdue reforms of its armed forces. Two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was still left with an oversized military organization built for large-scale mobilization and the demands of the Cold War, but highly ineffective for the type of conventional military conflicts that Russia was most likely to become involved in. The rationale behind Russia's reforms of the armed forces were thus clear long before the war in Georgia, which has often been pointed to as the reason why the reforms were launched in October 2008. President Vladimir Putin's current period runs out in 2024, when he is due to step down, according to the constitution. Given the fact that the current political system has been carefully crafted for almost 20 years, it is evident that there is uncertainty about its future. First, it no longer produces wealth for the population. For five years in a row, the real disposable income has been decreasing.


2019 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 75-87
Author(s):  
Md Muddassir Quamar ◽  
P. R. Kumaraswamy

The Iraqi invasion, occupation, and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990 exposed the soft underbelly of India’s policy toward the Middle East in general and the Persian Gulf region in particular. While safe evacuation of the Indian workers was a prime concern, some of the steps in that direction proved counterproductive. However, in the long run, the Kuwait crisis resulted in India making two critical steps that shaped its post-Cold War policy toward the region: diminishing influence of the Palestinian cause in its engagements with the Arab world and economic substance replacing political rhetoric.


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