Germany's Strategic Narrative of the Eurozone Crisis

2015 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-57 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabelle Hertner ◽  
Alister Miskimmon

This article outlines how Germany has sought to project a strategic narrative of the Eurozone crisis. Germany has been placed center stage in the Eurozone crisis, and as a consequence, the German government's crisis narrative matters for the future of the common currency. We highlight how the German government has sought to narrate a story of the cause of the Eurozone crisis and present policy solutions to influence policy decisions within the EU and maintain domestic political support. This focus on the public communication of the crisis is central to understanding the development of Germany's policy as it was negotiated with EU partners, the U.S. and international financial institutions. We draw on speeches and interviews by Chancellor Angela Merkel and two of her senior cabinet ministers delivered at key moments of the Eurozone crisis between May 2010 and June 2012. The article argues that while Merkel and her governments have been able to shore up domestic support for her Eurozone policies, she has struggled to find a coherent strategic narrative that is both consistent with German domestic preferences and historical memory, and with those of other Eurozone members.

Author(s):  
Desmond Dinan

This edition examines the origins and evolution of the European Union and the development of European integration from the immediate post-World War II period, when politicians and the public seemed willing to share national sovereignty for the sake of greater security, to the shock of the eurozone crisis nearly seventy years later, when the EU lacked public and political support. Far from existing in isolation, the volume shows that the European Community and, later, the EU was inextricably linked with broader regional and international developments throughout that time. It features contributions from leading scholars of the EU, who discuss a wide range of issues including the common agricultural policy (CAP), the single market programme, the economic and monetary union (EMU), and EU enlargement.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 ◽  
pp. 173-192
Author(s):  
Arkadiusz Stempin

The article analyses the Angela Merkel government’s attitude towards far-reaching plans to rebuild the EU of the French president in three key areas: EU architecture, refugee issue and security policy and towards two non-EU players on the continent: Russia and Turkey. The article is trying to prove that the head of the German government, preferring the unity of the EU rather than integration, will looking for compromise with Macron, taking into account different from the French one positions of other EU countries, and will try to stop the wave of the refugees from Africa through agreements with African countries. Regarding the Turkish autocrat, to avoid provocation, A.Merkel will attempt pragmatic relations. Also regarding Russia, even though it poses a threat to the security of the EU, she will consider (as the requirement of the moment) to establish a network of lively relations with the Putin state.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 37-50
Author(s):  
Christian Schweiger

In recent years the seemingly firm historical ties between Warsaw and Berlin have become increasingly strained. This results from a growing political asymmetry between the two countries. Germany moved into a semi-hegemonial position under the conditions of the triple crisis of banking, economy and sovereign debt in the eurozone. Consequently, German chancellor Angela Merkel was in a strong enough position to implement ordoliberal reforms of the eurozone’s governance architecture, which were promoted as an approach without alternatives. Merkel maintained her uncompromising stance during the migration crisis in the summer of 2015, when she demanded implementation of compulsory migrant distribution quotas across the EU. Poland and the Visegrád countries had initially strongly supported German leadership in resolving the eurozone crisis. The alienation from Germany’s European agenda however became significant under the conditions of the migration crisis. Here the firm opposition of Poland and the rest of the Visegrád Group towards Germany’s preferences shows a strategic mismatch between the EU’s liberal core, which is spearheaded by Germany, and the concept of the “illiberal” state, which Poland has embraced under the PiS government. The willingness to resolve these differences will be crucial in determining the future shape of Polish-German relations.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 491-506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hanno Degner ◽  
Dirk Leuffen

Do crises increase governmental responsiveness to citizens’ policy demands in the European Union? Building on the responsiveness literature, we challenge the claim that well-organized business interests determine governmental preferences in times of crisis. We argue instead, that vote-seeking governments rather account for citizens’ policy demands, given particularly high levels of saliency and public attention prevalent during crises. To test our theory, we analyse the formation of German governmental preferences on Economic and Monetary Union reforms during the Eurozone Crisis. We use novel data from the ‘EMUChoices’ project, public opinion polls as well as newspaper articles and trace the development of the German government’s positioning on reforms such as the new Eurozone bailout fund or the tightening of fiscal governance rules. Our analyses show that the German government, despite intensive lobbying efforts by banks and industry associations, responded rather closely to the demands of the public. On a normative ground, this finding highlights that input legitimacy in European Union decision-making is stronger than oftentimes assumed, at least at the level of governmental preference formation in times of crises.


2016 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-36
Author(s):  
Kateryna Zelenska

Abstract Agricultural exporters tend to enter into contracts containing quality or standard clauses. These provisions may refer to either international public standards or standards set by private bodies. The second are usually more dynamic and thereby may respond to the consumers’ demand more quickly. However, high participation costs may exclude a large share of producers from private standards schemes. The state may pick certain socially desirable private standards and evolve them to the public regulation, as it was the case of the rules on organic farming in the EU. The government may introduce aid to encourage all interested actors to participate in the scheme, although the policy space left for the government to do so is limited by the WTO disciplines for domestic support.


Author(s):  
John Doyle ◽  
Eileen Connolly

This chapter analyses the potential impact of Brexit on the Northern Ireland ‘peace process’, through a discussion of four interrelated issues—political divisions in Northern Ireland; the single market; the common travel area; and the Good Friday Agreement, all of which reflect the fundamental political divisions between Irish nationalists and those who believe that Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK. The chapter highlights two main threats to peace – the undermining of the Good Friday Agreement which is premised on membership of the EU and its institutional framework, and the crucial issue of where the inevitable hard border between the EU and the UK will be located. It argues that Brexit has the potential to destroy the peace process and suggests possible policy solutions to mitigate the impact of Brexit on Northern Ireland, while also assessing the political obstacles to the adoption of such flexible policy solutions.


2011 ◽  
Vol 15 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 200-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Keohane

In 1999, few people would have predicted that the EU would send ships to Somalia, police to Afghanistan, judges to Kosovo and soldiers to Chad. Yet, that is exactly what the EU has been doing. The European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) –since renamed the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – was launched shortly after NATO’s war in Kosovo in June 1999, to ensure that Europeans could respond to international crises, including launching operations, without depending on the US (via NATO). Since 2003 the EU has initiated some 24 peace-support operations in Europe, Africa and Asia, using both civil and military resources, and some of these missions have had impressive results. However, at times there have been some real difficulties with CSDP operations, ranging from resource shortages, intermittent political support from Member States, and a lack of coordination between EU actors. Lessons already identified in the crisis management debate point to two fundamental factors of success. First, a comprehensive approach that brings together the different actors deployed in the field. Second, the resilience of the political and material commitment of crisis management actors, possibly over many years. Both these factors pose important questions for the future of EU peace operations.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-154
Author(s):  
Hana Kováčiková ◽  
Kristína Považanová

Conclusion of the Trade agreements between the European Union and the third countries is one of the displays of the EU´'s sovereignty. At the same time, it is an effective tool for enhancement of the EU´'s position within a globalised world of trade. The aim of the trade agreements is to create an easier business environment for (European) entrepreneurs, in particular by removing the customs, opening the public procurement, establishing the common technical standards, setting the rules of solving the disputes. At the same time, the trade agreements guarantee the achieved level of rights and interests protected by law of the European subjects. This leads to exterritorial application of the European law. This article is focused on brief analysis of concluded EU´'s trade agreements and their application.


Politik ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sine Nørholm Just

The question of how to deal with the EU’s economic crisis is often reduced to two opposed positions: auster- ity measures vs. public investments, neatly represented by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande, respectively. Merkel and Hollande also represent two di erent visions of EU- legitimacy in the broader sense: political integration vs. economic integration. at both the speci c and the general di erences between the two can be reconciled, is exempli ed by the European Council’s decisions to supplement the scal compact with a growth compact and to begin a process of political and economic reform. However, the proposed entwinement of political and economic legitimacy ignores the dimension of social legitimacy or solidarity among strangers, as Jürgen Habermas would put it. is paper explores how issues of identity and solidarity gure in the public debate about the Euro crisis. e main argument is that the politico-economic constitution of the EU as ‘Merkolland’ has, so far, rendered it a rather soulless place. 


2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 21 ◽  
Author(s):  
Loredana Radu

<p>The refugees’ crisis has set the public agenda on European topics throughout 2015. Considered by many as (another) existential test for the European project, this new type of crisis has triggered frustrations and extreme disappointment, leading to a further aggravation of the already existing intra-EU cleavages, such as those between the West and the East, the “net debtors” (now labeled as the net supporters of the refugees) and the “net creditors” (now intensely recognized as adversaries of migration). Noteworthy, Angela Merkel declared that the refugees’ crisis is “testing Europe’s mettle” (2015), whereas Jean-Claude Juncker posed that a “blame-game” is shattering the EU, with Member States accusing “each other of not doing enough or of doing the wrong thing” (2015). This paper argues that the European leaders have tacitly fueled – through their emotional and solidarity-centered discourse – the intra-EU cleavages between the Member-States, as well as public attachment to far-right xenophobic ideologies. By means of a combined narratives’ and frames’ analysis, this paper focuses on the discursive means employed by the European leaders in order to tackle the sensitive topic of the migration crisis. Firstly, some background information about the causes and developments of the migration crisis is presented. Secondly, frames and narratives are approached as two different yet complementary instances of discourse analysis. Lastly, two key discourses given by Angela Merkel and Jean- Claude Juncker are investigated with the purpose of identifying how frames and narratives combine to tell the story of European integration under the pressure of the refugees’ flows.</p>


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