scholarly journals Inferences about mental states

2009 ◽  
Vol 364 (1521) ◽  
pp. 1309-1316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason P. Mitchell

Human social cognition relies on an ability to predict what others will think, feel or do in novel situations. Research in social neuroscience has consistently observed several brain regions that contribute ubiquitously to these abilities, including medial prefrontal cortex and aspects of lateral and medial parietal cortex. Interestingly, parallel work has suggested that this same network of regions subserves several seemingly distinct phenomena—notably, the abilities to remember the past, imagine the future and visualize spatial layouts—suggesting the existence of a common set of cognitive processes devoted to projecting oneself into worlds that differ mentally, temporally or physically from one's current experience. This use of self-projection to understand others' minds requires perceivers to solve three distinct cognitive challenges: (i) generating a simulated facsimile of one's own hypothetical mental states in a given situation, (ii) suppressing one's own current mental states, and (iii) deciding on the appropriateness of simulated states for understanding a particular other person. The present paper reviews recent psychology and neuroscience research aimed at understanding the underlying mechanisms that allow humans to solve each of these cognitive challenges to use self-projection to predict and understand the mental states of others.

2010 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 322-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jessica R. Andrews-Hanna ◽  
Jay S. Reidler ◽  
Christine Huang ◽  
Randy L. Buckner

A set of brain regions known as the default network increases its activity when focus on the external world is relaxed. During such moments, participants change their focus of external attention and engage in spontaneous cognitive processes including remembering the past and imagining the future. However, the functional contributions of the default network to shifts in external attention versus internal mentation have been difficult to disentangle because the two processes are correlated under typical circumstances. To address this issue, the present study manipulated factors that promote spontaneous cognition separately from those that change the scope of external attention. Results revealed that the default network increased its activity when spontaneous cognition was maximized but not when participants increased their attention to unpredictable foveal or peripheral stimuli. To examine the nature of participants' spontaneous thoughts, a second experiment used self-report questionnaires to quantify spontaneous thoughts during extended fixation epochs. Thoughts about one's personal past and future comprised a major focus of spontaneous cognition with considerable variability. Activity correlations between the medial temporal lobe and distributed cortical regions within the default network predicted a small, but significant, portion of the observed variability. Collectively, these results suggest that during passive states, activity within the default network reflects spontaneous, internally directed cognitive processes.


2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (9) ◽  
pp. 1406-1417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Manuel Contreras ◽  
Jessica Schirmer ◽  
Mahzarin R. Banaji ◽  
Jason P. Mitchell

An individual has a mind; a group does not. Yet humans routinely endow groups with mental states irreducible to any of their members (e.g., “scientists hope to understand every aspect of nature”). But are these mental states categorically similar to those we attribute to individuals? In two fMRI experiments, we tested this question against a set of brain regions that are consistently associated with social cognition—medial pFC, anterior temporal lobe, TPJ, and medial parietal cortex. Participants alternately answered questions about the mental states and physical attributes of individual people and groups. Regions previously associated with mentalizing about individuals were also robustly responsive to judgments of groups, suggesting that perceivers deploy the same social-cognitive processes when thinking about the mind of an individual and the “mind” of a group. However, multivariate searchlight analysis revealed that several of these regions showed distinct multivoxel patterns of response to groups and individual people, suggesting that perceivers maintain distinct representations of groups and individuals during mental state inferences. These findings suggest that perceivers mentalize about groups in a manner qualitatively similar to mentalizing about individual people, but that the brain nevertheless maintains important distinctions between the representations of such entities.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shaohan Jiang ◽  
Sidong Wang ◽  
Xiaohong Wan

Metacognition and mentalizing are both associated with meta-level mental state representations. Specifically, metacognition refers to monitoring one’s own cognitive processes, while mentalizing refers to monitoring others’ cognitive processes. However, this self-other dichotomy is insufficient to delineate the two high-level mental processes. We here used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to systematically investigate the neural representations of different levels of decision uncertainty in monitoring different targets (the current self, the past self, and others) performing a perceptual decision-making task. Our results reveal diverse formats of intrinsic mental state representations of decision uncertainty in mentalizing, separate from the associations with external information. External information was commonly represented in the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) across the mentalizing tasks. However, the meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty attributed to others were uniquely represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), rather than the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that also equivalently represented the object-level mental states of decision inaccuracy attributed to others. Further, the object-level and meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty, when attributed to the past self, were represented in the precuneus and the lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), respectively. In contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) consistently represented both decision uncertainty in metacognition and estimate uncertainty during monitoring the different mentalizing processes, but not the inferred decision uncertainty in mentalizing. Hence, our findings identify neural signatures to clearly delineate metacognition and mentalizing and further imply distinct neural computations on the mental states of decision uncertainty during metacognition and mentalizing.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junaid Salim Merchant ◽  
Diana Alkire ◽  
Elizabeth Redcay

Reciprocal social interactions are a quintessential part of human life, yet little neuroimaging research has examined the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms using social interactive experimental paradigms. Recent work using social interactive tasks has demonstrated brain activity in the mentalizing network, even in the absence of explicit mentalizing demands, suggesting that social interactive contexts automatically engage mentalizing. However, while overlapping brain activations are suggestive of similar underlying neural processes between explicit mentalizing and spontaneous mentalizing during interaction, they are not a direct test of whether or not these processes are represented similarly in the brain. Pattern-based approaches provide the sensitivity to examine the similarity between different neurocognitive processes. The current study used representational similarity analysis on a task wherein participants made mental and non-mental judgments about an abstract character and a live, social interactive partner during fMRI. The within-subject, 2 (Mental/Non-mental) x 2 (Peer/Character) design enabled us to examine the similarity in response patterns between conditions across numerous brain regions associated with social cognition, and estimate fit to three theoretical models of how the two processes relate: 1) social interaction and explicit mentalizing about an abstract character are represented similarly; 2) interactive peer and abstract character are represented differently regardless of the evaluation type; and 3) mental and non-mental states are represented dissimilarly regardless of target. Results demonstrate that the temporal poles and the right posterior superior temporal sulcus represent mentalizing and peer interactions similarly (Model 1), suggesting that response patterns in these regions provide a link between mentalizing and social interaction. Much of the rest of the social brain exhibits different representations for interactive peers and abstract characters (Model 2). Finally, model-free analyses showed that different regions show sensitivity to either the interaction partner or story character. Together, our findings highlight the importance of studying social cognitive processes using interactive approaches, and the utility of pattern-based approaches in understanding how social cognitive processes relate to each other.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 148-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Friedman ◽  
Ray Johnson

A cardinal feature of aging is a decline in episodic memory (EM). Nevertheless, there is evidence that some older adults may be able to “compensate” for failures in recollection-based processing by recruiting brain regions and cognitive processes not normally recruited by the young. We review the evidence suggesting that age-related declines in EM performance and recollection-related brain activity (left-parietal EM effect; LPEM) are due to altered processing at encoding. We describe results from our laboratory on differences in encoding- and retrieval-related activity between young and older adults. We then show that, relative to the young, in older adults brain activity at encoding is reduced over a brain region believed to be crucial for successful semantic elaboration in a 400–1,400-ms interval (left inferior prefrontal cortex, LIPFC; Johnson, Nessler, & Friedman, 2013 ; Nessler, Friedman, Johnson, & Bersick, 2007 ; Nessler, Johnson, Bersick, & Friedman, 2006 ). This reduced brain activity is associated with diminished subsequent recognition-memory performance and the LPEM at retrieval. We provide evidence for this premise by demonstrating that disrupting encoding-related processes during this 400–1,400-ms interval in young adults affords causal support for the hypothesis that the reduction over LIPFC during encoding produces the hallmarks of an age-related EM deficit: normal semantic retrieval at encoding, reduced subsequent episodic recognition accuracy, free recall, and the LPEM. Finally, we show that the reduced LPEM in young adults is associated with “additional” brain activity over similar brain areas as those activated when older adults show deficient retrieval. Hence, rather than supporting the compensation hypothesis, these data are more consistent with the scaffolding hypothesis, in which the recruitment of additional cognitive processes is an adaptive response across the life span in the face of momentary increases in task demand due to poorly-encoded episodic memories.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Miriam E. Weaverdyck ◽  
Mark Allen Thornton ◽  
Diana Tamir

Each individual experiences mental states in their own idiosyncratic way, yet perceivers are able to accurately understand a huge variety of states across unique individuals. How do they accomplish this feat? Do people think about their own anger in the same ways as another person’s? Is reading about someone’s anxiety the same as seeing it? Here, we test the hypothesis that a common conceptual core unites mental state representations across contexts. Across three studies, participants judged the mental states of multiple targets, including a generic other, the self, a socially close other, and a socially distant other. Participants viewed mental state stimuli in multiple modalities, including written scenarios and images. Using representational similarity analysis, we found that brain regions associated with social cognition expressed stable neural representations of mental states across both targets and modalities. This suggests that people use stable models of mental states across different people and contexts.


2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (9) ◽  
pp. 800-811 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ferath Kherif ◽  
Sandrine Muller

In the past decades, neuroscientists and clinicians have collected a considerable amount of data and drastically increased our knowledge about the mapping of language in the brain. The emerging picture from the accumulated knowledge is that there are complex and combinatorial relationships between language functions and anatomical brain regions. Understanding the underlying principles of this complex mapping is of paramount importance for the identification of the brain signature of language and Neuro-Clinical signatures that explain language impairments and predict language recovery after stroke. We review recent attempts to addresses this question of language-brain mapping. We introduce the different concepts of mapping (from diffeomorphic one-to-one mapping to many-to-many mapping). We build those different forms of mapping to derive a theoretical framework where the current principles of brain architectures including redundancy, degeneracy, pluri-potentiality and bow-tie network are described.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 156-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jiaqiang Wang ◽  
Chien-shan Cheng ◽  
Yan Lu ◽  
Xiaowei Ding ◽  
Minmin Zhu ◽  
...  

Background: Propofol, a widely used intravenous anesthetic agent, is traditionally applied for sedation and general anesthesia. Explanation: Recent attention has been drawn to explore the effect and mechanisms of propofol against cancer progression in vitro and in vivo. Specifically, the proliferation-inhibiting and apoptosis-inducing properties of propofol in cancer have been studied. However, the underlying mechanisms remain unclear. Conclusion: This review focused on the findings within the past ten years and aimed to provide a general overview of propofol's malignance-modulating properties and the potential molecular mechanisms.


Author(s):  
Ross Buck ◽  
Zhan Xu

Individual differences in the ability to recognize emotion displays relate strongly to emotional intelligence, and emotional and social competence. However, there is a difference between the ability to judge the emotions of another person (i.e., emotional empathy) and the ability to take the perspective of another person, including making accurate appraisals, attributions, and inferences about the mental states of others (i.e., cognitive empathy). In this chapter, we review the concept of emotional empathy and the current state of the field, including emerging and converging evidence from neuroscience research that emotional and cognitive empathy involve doubly dissociable brain systems. We also discuss emerging literature on the physiological mechanisms underlying empathy in the peripheral and central nervous systems. We then distinguish spontaneous and symbolic communication processes to show how cognitive empathy emerges from emotional empathy during development. Development starts with the prelinguistic mutual contingent responsiveness of infant and caregiver yielding “raw” primary intersubjectivity, then secondary and tertiary intersubjectivity advances with increasing social experience, and finally cognitive empathic abilities expand in perspective taking and Theory of Mind (ToM) skills. We then present an Affect-Reason-Involvement (ARI) model to guide the conceptualization and measurement of emotional and cognitive empathy. We consider emotion correlation scores as a flexible and valid approach to empathy measurement, with implications for understanding the role of discrete emotions in decision making. Finally, we apply this reasoning to recent studies of the role of emotion and empathy in bullying.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 81
Author(s):  
Kristina C. Backer ◽  
Heather Bortfeld

A debate over the past decade has focused on the so-called bilingual advantage—the idea that bilingual and multilingual individuals have enhanced domain-general executive functions, relative to monolinguals, due to competition-induced monitoring of both processing and representation from the task-irrelevant language(s). In this commentary, we consider a recent study by Pot, Keijzer, and de Bot (2018), which focused on the relationship between individual differences in language usage and performance on an executive function task among multilingual older adults. We discuss their approach and findings in light of a more general movement towards embracing complexity in this domain of research, including individuals’ sociocultural context and position in the lifespan. The field increasingly considers interactions between bilingualism/multilingualism and cognition, employing measures of language use well beyond the early dichotomous perspectives on language background. Moreover, new measures of bilingualism and analytical approaches are helping researchers interrogate the complexities of specific processing issues. Indeed, our review of the bilingualism/multilingualism literature confirms the increased appreciation researchers have for the range of factors—beyond whether someone speaks one, two, or more languages—that impact specific cognitive processes. Here, we highlight some of the most salient of these, and incorporate suggestions for a way forward that likewise encompasses neural perspectives on the topic.


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