Coevolution of synchronization and cooperation in real networks

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (07) ◽  
pp. 1940012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mingyang Zhou ◽  
Xiaoyu Li ◽  
Wenman Xiong ◽  
Hao Liao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Collective Behavior ◽  
Information Exchange ◽  
The State ◽  
Average Degree ◽  
Kuramoto Model ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Cost ◽  
State Difference

As game theory thrives in networked interactions, we usually neglect the cost of information exchange between involved individuals. Individuals may decide (or refuse) to follow the state of their neighbors, which depends on the cost of the interactions. The payoff of a node’s behavior is associated with the state difference between the node and its neighbors. Here, based on Kuramoto model, we investigate the collective behavior of different individuals in the game theory and the synchronization byproduct that is induced by the cooperation of connected nodes. Specially, we investigate the influence of network structure on the coevolutionary progress of cooperation and synchronization. We find that the networks with the higher average degree are more likely to reach synchronization in real networks. Strong synchronization is a sufficient, but not necessary condition to guarantee the cooperation. Besides, we show that synchronization is largely influenced by the average degree in both Erdös–Rényi (ER) and Barabási–Albert (BA) networks, which is also illustrated by theoretical analysis.

scholarly journals An Income Distribution Method for Stakeholders of Modern Apprenticeship Based on Game Theory

2021 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 305-310
Author(s):  
Suyan Zhang ◽  
Wei Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Income Distribution ◽  
Social Development ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Distribution Problem ◽  
Distribution Method ◽  
Participation Motivation ◽  
Game Situation ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
The Cost

The reasonable distribution of benefits for the stakeholders of modern apprenticeship can satisfy the interest demands of stakeholders, contribute to the construction of a modern apprenticeship system and ultimately meet the inherent requirements of vocational education for economic and social development. To solve the enterprise participation motivation and low enthusiasm, unreasonable income distribution between enterprises and colleges, this article regard enterprises and schools as the main stakeholders involved in the modern apprenticeship, using the game theory, under a non-cooperative game and cooperative game situation, analyze the cost, net earning, enterprise effort and school subsidy coefficient of modern apprenticeship, research the income distribution problem in education of modern apprenticeship between enterprises and colleges.

scholarly journals Using the mathematical apparatus of game theory in strategic marketing

1970 ◽  
pp. 116-123
Author(s):  
Є.А. Івченко ◽  
M.M. Бучнєв
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Marketing Strategy ◽  
Optimal Strategies ◽  
Marketing Strategies ◽  
Strategic Marketing ◽  
Mathematical Apparatus ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Marketing Activities ◽  
The Cost

The article discusses the use of the mathematical apparatus of game theory in strategic marketing. The use of the game theory toolkit in the formation of the marketing strategies of an enterprise has been investigated. According to the results of the study, it has been established that the introduction of game theory methods into marketing activities will make it possible to analyze complex socio-economic systems for solving strategic problems. Game theory models can be thought of as games of strategies or actions, such as setting prices, setting the size of output, determining the cost of advertising, or determining the cost of promoting products to the market. It is noted that game theory can predict the results of competitive situations and help choose optimal strategies. For practical work in strategic marketing, it is of particular importance that game theory allows you to choose optimal strategies that can improve the structure and outcome of the game. The use of the conceptual apparatus of the theory in economic theory is analyzed using the example of quantitative models of duopoly and the concept of equilibrium. The description of the mathematical model of strategic interaction is formalized, which reflects the inherent features of the conflict. The procedure for applying game theory in the formation of marketing strategies of enterprises is analyzed and the main stages of the procedure for choosing an optimal marketing strategy using game theory are highlighted. An algorithm for applying the mathematical apparatus of game theory in marketing activities is proposed. When developing a marketing strategy for an enterprise, general marketing goals are considered, depending on the level of strategic management and goals concerning individual elements of the marketing mix. A "tree of goals" of an enterprise for a marketing complex is proposed when forming a marketing strategy of an enterprise using the mathematical apparatus of game theory. A payment matrix has been formed, which makes it possible to determine possible optimal strategies and options for the game. The problems of using the mathematical apparatus in the formation of the marketing strategies of the enterprise are highlighted. The conceptual apparatus has been determined and basic tasks have been formulated, with the help of which the game theory toolkit allows making decisions in the marketing activities of an enterprise. Keywords: game theory, strategy, strategic marketing, marketing strategy, strategic decisions, mathematical model, decision making.

The Social Contract in Leviathan and the Prisoner's Dilemma Supergame

1981 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Social Contract ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
The State ◽  
Theory Approach ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
State Of Nature ◽  
The Social ◽  
The Game Theory

The familiar problem of whether Hobbesian men in the state of nature would ever abide by an agreement to obey a Sovereign is a version of the puzzle now known as ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’. The present paper has the following aims: (1) To establish that the game-theory approach is a legitimate way to study Hobbes. (2) To see whether a proposed ‘solution’ to the paradox of Prisoner's Dilemma applies to this example. The paradox is that individually rational self-interested calculations sum to an outcome that is suboptimal not only for society but also for every single member of it. The solution is the Supergame which consists of indefinitely repeated plays of the simple Prisoner's Dilemma game. (3) To compare the results of the above with the similar conclusions reached by a different route by recent arguments in sociobiology.

scholarly journals Personal income tax management in Ukraine on the game theory basis

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-48
Author(s):  
Olena Tymchenko ◽  
Yuliia Sybirianska ◽  
Yevheniia Polishchuk ◽  
Nataliia Rudyk ◽  
Volodymyr Korotun
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Local Governments ◽  
Income Tax ◽  
Central Government ◽  
Fiscal Decentralization ◽  
The State ◽  
Personal Income ◽  
Personal Income Tax ◽  
Different Types ◽  
The Game Theory

One of the main problems of the fiscal decentralization in Ukraine is the substantiation of the optimal proportion of the personal income tax distribution among the state and different types of local budgets in order to insure the sufficient financial resources for the territorial communities. Since period of the Budget Code adoption, the percentage of the personal income tax paid from salaries to the different levels of budgets has changed three times. However, the methodic of such distribution is not clear. The authors suggest approach of analyzing the logic of the personal income tax distribution on the game theory basis. They consider different ways of making decisions and prove that in all of the analyzed cases the winner was the central government of Ukraine. Such behavior of the central government in making decisions does not meet the goals of the fiscal decentralization reform. The main reason of such situation is that the decisions are made by the state government, but not by the local communities or their representatives. Besides, it is difficult to distribute the expenditures among different types of budgets according to the Governments’ competences. The authors suggest some recommendation of the personal income tax distribution in order to ensure benefits for all participants of the game: communities, local governments and central government. But they conclude that the active influence of people on the behavior of the local governments is the basic premise for the scientific research of the PIT optimal distribution.

PREREQUISITES FOR THE FORMATION OF A MECHANISM FOR STATE REGULATION OF SOCIAL GUARANTEES IN THE REGION

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vitaly Lobas ◽  
◽  
Elena Petryaeva ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Protection ◽  
Well Being ◽  
State Regulation ◽  
The State ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Periodic Review ◽  
Cost Of Living ◽  
Economic Relations ◽  
State Management ◽  
The Cost

The article deals with modern mechanisms for managing social protection of the population by the state and the private sector. From the point of view of forms of state regulation of the sphere of social protection, system indicators usually include the state and dynamics of growth in the standard of living of the population, material goods, services and social guarantees for the poorly provided segments of the population. The main indicator among the above is the state of the consumer market, as one of the main factors in the development of the state. Priority areas of public administration with the use of various forms of social security have been identified. It should be emphasized that, despite the legislative conflicts that exist today in Ukraine, mandatory indexation of the cost of living is established, which is associated with inflation. Various scientists note that although the definition of the cost of living index has a well-established methodology, there are quite a lot of regional features in the structure of consumption. All this is due to restrictions that are included in the consumer basket of goods and different levels of socio-economic development of regions. The analysis of the establishment and periodic review of the minimum consumer budgets of the subsistence minimum and wages of the working population and the need to form state insurance funds for unforeseen circumstances is carried out. Considering in this context the levers of state management of social guarantees of the population, we drew attention to the crisis periods that are associated with the market transformation of the regional economy. In these conditions, there is a need to develop and implement new mechanisms and clusters in the system of socio-economic relations. The components of the mechanisms ofstate regulation ofsocial guarantees of the population are proposed. The deepening of market relations in the process of reforming the system of social protection of the population should be aimed at social well-being.

Economic feasibility of restoration of degraded and neglected lands

2020 ◽  
pp. 79-90
Author(s):  
Anastasiya V. Mironova ◽  
Igor’ V. Liskin ◽  
Irina I. Afonina
Keyword(s):  
Soil Layer ◽  
Black Soil ◽  
Economic Feasibility ◽  
Research Purpose ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Labor Costs ◽  
Human Needs ◽  
Fallow Lands ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Regions Of Russia

Neglect of soils leads to their degradation, worsens useful properties, and reduces fertility and productivity. (Research purpose) The research purpose is in conducting a comparative analysis of technologies for treating degraded soils, taking into account the economic feasibility of their restoration in non-black-soil regions of Russia. (Materials and methods) The article shows the main technological scheme of restoration of degraded soils. Authors have identified the main groups of land that are located in non-black-soil regions of Russia. (Results and discussion) The article presents the need for equipment, economic and labor costs for the restoration of each type of land in the non-black-soil regions of Russia. Authors took into account that the salary of machine operators depends on the time of direct execution of the task. It was found that the restoration of virgin and fallow lands was the most preferable from the economic, energy-saving and environmental points of view. The article shows that the restoration of pasture areas exceeds the cost of processing virgin lands, but the number of necessary machine and tractor units is comparable to work on virgin lands. Authors recommend to develop the soils with woody and shrubby vegetation in the first place, starting with land occupied by young plants. It is necessary to take into account the criteria for the fertility of the soil layer. It was found that soils with a small excess of moisture have small cost of its development, while on heavily swampy soils the cost of work on their development is many times higher than the cost of restoring other types of land. (Conclusion) The article shows that the restoration of neglected land is a necessary condition for improving the provision of human needs for food and a number of industrial goods. First of all, it is necessary to develop land that requires minimal investment of economic and labor costs.

The Self-Undermining State

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arjun Chowdhury
Keyword(s):  
State Formation ◽  
Final Section ◽  
The State ◽  
The Self ◽  
Central Authority ◽  
Interstate War ◽  
External Threats ◽  
Willingness To Sacrifice ◽  
The Cost

This chapter provides an informal rationalist model of state formation as an exchange between a central authority and a population. In the model, the central authority protects the population against external threats and the population disarms and pays taxes. The model specifies the conditions under which the exchange is self-enforcing, meaning that the parties prefer the exchange to alternative courses of action. These conditions—costly but winnable interstate war—are historically rare, and the cost of such wars can rise beyond the population’s willingness to sacrifice. At this point, the population prefers to avoid war rather than fight it and may prefer an alternative institution to the state if that institution can prevent war and reduce the level of extraction. Thus the modern centralized state is self-undermining rather than self-enforcing. A final section addresses alternative explanations for state formation.

Reputation and Gossip in Game Theory

2019 ◽  
pp. 213-229
Author(s):  
Charles Roddie
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Strategic Behavior ◽  
Third Party ◽  
The Past ◽  
Past Behavior ◽  
Future Behavior ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Shed Light

When interacting with others, it is often important for you to know what they have done in similar situations in the past: to know their reputation. One reason is that their past behavior may be a guide to their future behavior. A second reason is that their past behavior may have qualified them for reward and cooperation, or for punishment and revenge. The fact that you respond positively or negatively to the reputation of others then generates incentives for them to maintain good reputations. This article surveys the game theory literature which analyses the mechanisms and incentives involved in reputation. It also discusses how experiments have shed light on strategic behavior involved in maintaining reputations, and the adequacy of unreliable and third party information (gossip) for maintaining incentives for cooperation.

scholarly journals The Superiority of Quantum Strategy in 3-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma

Mathematics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (12) ◽  
pp. 1443
Author(s):  
Zhiyuan Dong ◽  
Ai-Guo Wu
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Quantum Game ◽  
Final State ◽  
The Game Theory ◽  
Initial States ◽  
Quantum Strategy ◽  
Selection Of

In this paper, we extend the quantum game theory of Prisoner’s Dilemma to the N-player case. The final state of quantum game theory of N-player Prisoner’s Dilemma is derived, which can be used to investigate the payoff of each player. As demonstration, two cases (2-player and 3-player) are studied to illustrate the superiority of quantum strategy in the game theory. Specifically, the non-unique entanglement parameter is found to maximize the total payoff, which oscillates periodically. Finally, the optimal strategic set is proved to depend on the selection of initial states.

Constructing Images of Deviance: A Look at State Intervention into the Problem of Wife-Battery

1983 ◽  
Vol 31 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 60-76
Author(s):  
Patricia A. Morgan
Keyword(s):  
Social Problem ◽  
State Intervention ◽  
The United States ◽  
The State ◽  
Structural Position ◽  
Wife Battering ◽  
The Social ◽  
Class Context ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Cost

Patricia Morgan's paper describes what happens when the state intervenes in the social problem of wife-battering. Her analysis refers to the United States, but there are clear implications for other countries, including Britain. The author argues that the state, through its social problem apparatus, manages the image of the problem by a process of bureaucratization, professionalization and individualization. This serves to narrow the definition of the problem, and to depoliticize it by removing it from its class context and viewing it in terms of individual pathology rather than structure. Thus refuges were initially run by small feminist collectives which had a dual objective of providing a service and promoting among the women an understanding of their structural position in society. The need for funds forced the groups to turn to the state for financial aid. This was given, but at the cost to the refuges of losing their political aims. Many refuges became larger, much more service-orientated and more diversified in providing therapy for the batterers and dealing with other problems such as alcoholism and drug abuse. This transformed not only the refuges but also the image of the problem of wife-battering.

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