scholarly journals Man–a Human Person in the Context of the Theory of Efficient and Purposeful Causality. Pedagogical Implications

2021 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-57
Author(s):  
Sławomir Chrost
Keyword(s):  
Human Person ◽  
Original Source ◽  
Final Cause ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Absolute

This article aims to justify the thesis about the need to develop transcendent, transcendental and teleological pedagogy in connection with the anthropological basis, which is the theory of the person and causality. A man–a person – is an ontically substantial individual being, demanding an external cause, which is the Pure Act of Existence–Transcendens–Absolute. The personalistic pedagogics and the pedagogy of the person are therefore inherently related to transcendence. If the subject and object of education is a human person, then transcendental pedagogy must be a sine qua non condition for practising personalistic pedagogics and pedagogy of the person. Personalistic pedagogics and the pedagogy of the person are also intrinsically related to teleology. Efficient cause is coupled with purposeful cause. If there is an action of the Absolute which results in the existence of a man, a human person, then the Absolute, as the fullness of good, is the ultimate goal-motive and final cause of the man–human person. The teleological aspect in personalistic pedagogy and the pedagogy of the person means a particular aim and meaning orientation; full realisation of potentialities and tasks dormant in a unique being–a human person. The goal is not to achieve perfection, but to direct to your original source – the Transcendent–the Absolute–God.

Sobre o Caráter Absoluto ou Relativo da Noção de Bem em sua Conexão com as Noções de Forma e Matéria

2021 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-162
Author(s):  
Luís Filipe Bellintani Ribeiro
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
The Other ◽  
Final Cause ◽  
Substantive Content ◽  
Absolute Sense ◽  
Ulterior Motive ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
Good Will ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Living Being

In ethics, the good is the final cause of every action. All other causes are what they are relatively to the final cause, but the final cause is not relative to something else, except as means and efficient cause of an ulterior motive, whereby the supreme end, whose possession brings happiness, is the absolute in ethics. In physics, the same thing: the living being tends to the fullness of its eidos (form) and all matter is moved towards that end. But the notion of happiness is a kind of empty truism (everyone wants to be happy) and the correspondent good will also remain empty until determined by relation to some substantive content, and in that determination we will fatally see the polyphony and the antilogy break out. In the realm of nature, as long as the good is thought from a philosophy of form and as what is useful and advantageous, that strengthens, brings health and preserves life, we will then have a total relativization of its absolute sense, because one form needs to snatch the matter from the other to survive, and the good of one, therefore, will be the evil of another. How to determine the good from the point of view of a philosophy of matter?

Deus Sive Vernunft

2020 ◽  
pp. 93-114
Author(s):  
Yitzhak Y. Melamed
Keyword(s):  
Formal Structure ◽  
Final Part ◽  
The Third ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Absolute

In the first part of this chapter, I provide a very brief overview of Schelling’s lifelong engagement with Spinoza’s philosophy, which will prepare us for my study of the 1801 Presentation. In the second part, I consider the formal structure and rhetoric of the Presentation against the background of Spinoza’s Ethics, and show how Schelling regularly imitates Spinoza’s tiniest rhetorical gestures. In the third and final part, I turn to the opening of the Presentation, and argue that Schelling attempts there to distance himself from Fichte by developing a conception of reason as the absolute, or the identity of the subject and object, just as the thinking substance and the extended substance are identified in Spinoza’s God.

scholarly journals Comprehension and Eye Movements in the Processing of Subject- and Object-Relative Clauses: Evidence from Dyslexia and Individual Differences

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 915
Author(s):  
Marianna Stella ◽  
Paul E. Engelhardt
Keyword(s):  
Working Memory ◽  
Individual Differences ◽  
Eye Movements ◽  
Relative Clauses ◽  
Sentence Type ◽  
Main Effect ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Processing Difficulty ◽  
Object Relative

In this study, we examined eye movements and comprehension in sentences containing a relative clause. To date, few studies have focused on syntactic processing in dyslexia and so one goal of the study is to contribute to this gap in the experimental literature. A second goal is to contribute to theoretical psycholinguistic debate concerning the cause and the location of the processing difficulty associated with object-relative clauses. We compared dyslexic readers (n = 50) to a group of non-dyslexic controls (n = 50). We also assessed two key individual differences variables (working memory and verbal intelligence), which have been theorised to impact reading times and comprehension of subject- and object-relative clauses. The results showed that dyslexics and controls had similar comprehension accuracy. However, reading times showed participants with dyslexia spent significantly longer reading the sentences compared to controls (i.e., a main effect of dyslexia). In general, sentence type did not interact with dyslexia status. With respect to individual differences and the theoretical debate, we found that processing difficulty between the subject and object relatives was no longer significant when individual differences in working memory were controlled. Thus, our findings support theories, which assume that working memory demands are responsible for the processing difficulty incurred by (1) individuals with dyslexia and (2) object-relative clauses as compared to subject relative clauses.

Bimbingan Nilai-Nilai Spiritual Di Madrasah Aliyah Mafaza Bantul Yogyakarta

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Heri Fadli Wahyudi
Keyword(s):  
High School ◽  
Data Analysis ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Religious Values ◽  
Next Generation ◽  
Spiritual Values ◽  
Vertical Relationship ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Descriptive Approach

The cultivation of spiritual values to learners is a very vital step in shaping the characteristics and character of the human person, because the internalization of spiritual values is closely related to the cultivation of religious values, and is part of the formation of adolescent character as the next generation of religion and nation. This research is to find out the process of planting and internalizing spiritual value education conducted at The Senior high school of Mafaza Institute located in the Maguntapan Bantul area of Yogyakarta, while the type in this study is qualitative with a descriptive approach, while the subject in this study is teachers or teachers at this institution as well as some M.A. Mafaza students. While the data collected passes through the process of interviews, observations and documentation which then the author of the data analysis to draw conclusions. The results of this study show the following: 1). The process of planting and internalizing values and spiritual in this institution is carried out with an understanding of the material in the classes. 2). Then as a follow-up in the form of application in programs and activities such as requiring mandatory congregational prayers, sunnah worship and others, there are also activities such as the loving mosque and the the Adiwiata program. So from there it is seen that all aspects in value and spiritual, namely the aspect of Aqidah and Worship become the center of attention in planting to their students. So that it covers everything, either in the pattern of vertical relationship (Servant-Godnya) or horizontal (Servants and Environment).

scholarly journals An attempt at clarifying Maximus the Confesor’s remarks on (the fate of) sexual difference in Ambiguum 41

2021 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 194-203
Author(s):  
Sotiris Mitralexis
Keyword(s):  
Sexual Difference ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Church Fathers ◽  
Male And Female ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Maximus The Confessor ◽  
As If

Maximus the Confessor?s Ambiguum 41 contains some rather atypical observations concerning the distinction of sexes in the human person. There is a certain ambiguity as to whether the distinction of the sexes was intended by God and is ?by nature? (as found in Genesis and asserted by most Church Fathers) or a product of the Fall. Namely, Christ is described three times as ?shaking out of nature the distinctive characteristics of male and female?, ?driving out of nature the difference and division of male and female? and ?removing the difference between male and female?. Different readings of those passages engender important implications that can be drawn out from the Confessor?s thought, both eschatological implications and otherwise. The subject has been picked up by Cameron Partridge, Doru Costache and Karolina Kochanczyk-Boninska, among others, but is by no means settled, as they draw quite different conclusions. The noteworthy and far-reaching implications of Maximus? theological stance and problems are not the object of this paper. In a 2017 paper I attempted to demonstrate what Maximus exactly says in these peculiar and oft-commented passages through a close reading, in order to avoid a two-edged Maximian misunderstanding: to either draw overly radical implications from those passages, projecting decidedly non-Maximian visions on the historical Maximus, or none at all, as if those passages represented standard Patristic positions. Here, I am revisiting this argument, given that the interest in what the Confessor has to say on the subject seems to be increasing.

scholarly journals Justifying Unparticipated Causality in Proclus

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Greig
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
First Principle ◽  
Efficient Cause ◽  
University Of Edinburgh ◽  
Separate Source ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
First Cause ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
The University ◽  
Phd Thesis

Proclus introduces the concept of the unparticipated (ἀμέθεκτον) (P1) among two other terms— the participated (P2) and participant (P3)—as the first principle (ἀρχή) of any given series of entities or Forms in his metaphysical structure. For instance, the unparticipated monad (P1), Soul, generates all individual, participated souls (P2), which in turn generate the attribute of life in their respective, participating bodies (P3). Proclus looks at (P2) as an efficient cause of (P3), where (P2) must be the attribute in actuality in relation to the attribute it brings about in (P3). At the outset, this suggests that (P2) is necessary and sufficient for (P3), which then implies a problem for positing (P1): if (P2) is doing the causal legwork for (P3), what role does (P1) play? One of Proclus’ main explanations is that (P1) is responsible for ‘unifying’ the multiple participated entities (P2), so that the commonality of the participated entities (P2) must go back to a separate source (P1). However, one could easily respond that this just amounts to a reversion to a priori Platonist principles for transcendent, separate Forms without providing a real justification for the necessity of (P1) as a cause. In my talk, I wish to elaborate on how Proclus thinks about (P1)’s type of causation in relation to (P2) and (P3), particularly showing why (P2) for Proclus is ultimately insufficient as an efficient cause compared to (P1) as the absolute first cause for a given series.[Early work on a PhD thesis chapter — presentation for the University of Edinburgh, July 16, 2017. Any comments or feedback are welcome!]

scholarly journals Metaphysics and the Existential Problematic of Human Finitude

Lumen et Vita ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Taylor Nutter
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Practical Importance ◽  
Human Person ◽  
Finite Horizon ◽  
The World ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Intentional Structure ◽  
Working Out ◽  
Human Finitude

Rather than being of little practical importance, the metaphysical underpinnings of a given horizon determine the character of its existential problematic. With the breakdown of classical metaphysics concomitant with the modern turn to the subjective, the existential problematic of finitude as ultimate horizon arose. According to this subjective turn, the human person can no longer engage the world as though it were in itself constituted by transcendently grounded meaning and value. Standing within this genealogical lineage, Martin Heidegger undertook a phenomenological investigation into the existential constitution of the human person which defines authenticity in terms of finitude. For the early Heidegger, human life is essentially ‘guilty’. This guilt, however, is not the traditional cognizance of one’s sinfulness, but the foundational Nichtigkeit (‘nullity’) of life and its attendant possibilities in the light of the ultimate finality of death. Authenticity, then, consists of a resolute working out of one’s life in the face of such inevitable finality. For the later Heidegger, the finite horizon of a particular epochal disclosure gifts Being to thought and determines it thereby. Authenticity in this case consists of giving oneself over to be appropriated by an event of Being. In contrast, Lonergan understands authenticity as being true to that primordial love which beckons us to intellectual probity and responsibility in working out life’s possibilities. This essay will illustrate how Lonergan’s analysis of the intentional structure of human conscious operations stands as a corrective to Heidegger’s early existential analysis of human being-in-the-world and later thought about Being. While Lonergan defines authenticity as loving openness to transcendent Being, Heidegger, because of his forgetfulness of the subject in her conscious operations, does not allow for a transcendence which stands beyond any finite horizon. 

scholarly journals On the Subject of Objects: Four Views on Object Perception and Tool Use

1970 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 6-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tarja Susi ◽  
Tom Ziemke
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Science ◽  
Tool Use ◽  
Theoretical Biology ◽  
Object Perception ◽  
Entry Point ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Von Uexküll ◽  
Functional Tone

This paper addresses the relation between an agent and its environment, and more specifically, how subjects perceive object/artefacts/tools and their (possible) use. Four different conceptions of the relation between subject and object are compared here: functional tone (von Uexküll), equipment (Heidegger), affordance (Gibson), and entry point (Kirsh). even as these concepts have developed within different disciplines (theoretical biology, philosophy, psychology, and cognitive science) and in very different historical contexts, they are used more or less interchangeably in much of the literature, and typically conflated under the label of ‘affordance’. However, at closer inspection, they turn out to have not only similarities, but also substantial differences, which are identified and discussed here. Given that the relation between subjects and their objects is crucial to understanding human cognition and interaction with tools and technology, as well as robots’ interaction with their environment, we argue that these differences deserve some more attention than they have received so far.

scholarly journals Hegelian Phenomenology of Spirit and Boxing Fight

2018 ◽  
Vol 77 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-54
Author(s):  
Jerzy Kosiewicz
Keyword(s):  
The Body ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Collective Consciousness ◽  
Phenomenology Of Spirit ◽  
Human Individual ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Low Culture ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Absolute Synthesis

Abstract In the presented text the author points out to anthropological as well as axiological foundations of the boxing fight from the viewpoint of Hegel’s philosophy. In the genial idealist’s views it is possible to perceive the appreciation of the body, which constitutes a necessary basis for the man’s physical activity, for his work oriented towards the self-transformation and the transformation of the external world, as well as for rivalry and the hand-to-hand fight. While focusing our attention on the issue of rivalry and on the situation of the fight - and regarding it from the viewpoint of the master - slave theory (included in the phenomenology of spirit), it is possible to proclaim that even a conventionalised boxing fight - that is, restricted by cultural and sports rules of the game - has features of the fight to the death between two Hegelian forms of selfknowledge striving for self-affirmation and self-realisation. In the boxing fight, similarly as in the above mentioned Hegelian theory, a problem of work and of the development of the human individual (that is, of the subject, self-knowledge, the participant of the fight) appears. There appears also a prospect of death as a possible end of merciless rivalry. The fight revalues the human way in an important way, whereas the prospect for death, the awareness of its proximity, the feeling that its close and possible, saturates the life with additional values. It places the boxer, just like every subject fighting in a similar or a different way, on the path towards absolute abstraction - that is, it brings him closer to his self-fulfilment in the Absolute, to the absolute synthesis. The Hegelian viewpoint enables also to appreciate the boxing fight as a manifestation of low culture (being in contrast with high culture), to turn attention to the relations which - according to Hegel - take place between the Absolute and the man, as well as to show which place is occupied by the subject both in the process of the Absolute’s self-realisation and in the German thinker’s philosophical system. Independently of the dialectical, simultaneously pessimistic and optimistic overtone of considerations connected with the very boxing fight (regarding destruction and spiritualisation on a higher level), it is possible to perceive farreaching appreciation of the human individual in Hegel’s philosophy since the Absolute cannot make its own self-affirmation without the individual, without the human body, without the fight aimed at the destruction of the enemy and without the subjective consciousness and the collective consciousness which appear thanks to this fight. Thus, it is justified to suppose that the foundation of the whole Hegel’s philosophy is constituted by anthropology and that in the framework of this anthropology a special role is played by the fight and by work, which changes the subject and his(her) environment. Admittedly Hegel does not emphasise it explicitly, nevertheless his views (with their centre, which, according to Hegel himself and his interpreters, is constituted by the Absolute) have, as a matter of fact, an anthropocentric character and the main source of the subject’s development is the struggle which, irrespectively of its result, always primarily leads to the destruction or even to the death of one of the sides, just like in the boxing fight. However, it is also a germ of the positive re-orientation of the subject, the beginning and a continuation of that what the phenomenology of the spirit describes as a movement towards absolute abstraction.

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