European Jihadi Cells and the motivations behind them

Chapter 7 describes the different types of jihadi cells, highlighting their differences as well as some similarities between them. Each cell has a life of its own, and the essence of each is determined by group dynamics, the origins of its leaders, the interactions between its members, and their cultural and economic homogeneity or heterogeneity. Each of these factors plays a significant role in the radicalization and in the effectiveness of the group to implement its goals. In general, cells are loosely structured, and it is very rare to find “egalitarian cells” or “leaderless” groups of friends or buddies, contrary to the claims of some researchers. Sometimes, they have more than one leader, a division of tasks occurring between them (for instance, the ideological and the military). Jihadi actors choose to belong to a group for many reasons: friendship, spatial proximity (they live in the same neighborhood), attendance at the same university, high school, sports association, or mosque, and so on These facets have been frequently studied, some researchers focusing on the horizontal relationships (a group of friends without formal hierarchy) or vertical ones (the presence of a leader and his lieutenants), their actual link with a larger network (al-Qaeda, IS) or imaginary (laying claim or making allegiance without any effective ties), the degree of their dependence on the web, or the greater or lesser scope of the group (from a solo jihadi to large groups of more than ten or fifteen people).

The Jihadogenic Urban Structure

A jihadogenic urban structure is an urban setting that has been the stage for the departure of high numbers of jihadi agents to Syria in comparison with other districts. The dominant structure is a deprived poor district and in a minority of cases a specific poor or middle-class neighborhood. Chapter 6 explores the locations from which large numbers of jihadists have made the trip to Syria and the conditions that characterize these areas. In Europe, the geographic location of jihadism has been overwhelmingly urban, with two major exceptions. The first is the Islamist community of Artigat in France. The second is the Balkans and rural Bosnia. Regarding those urban dwellings where jihadism prospered, we can study local history, youth networks, and charismatic leaders who played a key role in the radicalization of the settlers. The intrinsic peculiarity of the urban setting seems not to exist in middle-class districts, in contrast to the poor ethnic districts where structural factors led to the radicalization of disaffected youth.

Jihadi Actors

IS jihadism attracted several new categories of male and female actors, sometimes newcomers (European teenagers, for instance). During the crucial years of 2013–2017, when IS was born, established, thrived, and then declined, most of these actors identified with the new State that epitomized in their minds the rebirth of the caliphate and the dawn of a new world. The main link between them was the aspiration to a future other than the one they had come to expect in their society as well as a sense of a meaningful and sacred mission, which consisted in fulfilling the utopia of a universal Islamic State. An unbridled imagination, often with contempt for reality, but in search of a new world, inspired them. Chapter 3 describes the wide variety of jihadi actors, the main group being disaffected youth, but also a minority of middle-class youth, young women who represent a specific group (the majority being jihadi brides rather than jihadi agents), converts, and recruiters and preachers.

General Conclusion

The sociology of jihadism in Europe is manifold: • It is a sociology of humiliation, stigmatization, hatred, and resentment, particularly within impoverished, ethnic neighborhoods where poverty, relative frustration, and internalized indignity are rampant, amplified by a victimized imaginary. • It is also a sociology of revolt against an unjust world, first of all by lower classes, mostly of migrant origin, left behind in late capitalist societies, but also by fragile middle classes threatened by social decline and uncertainty about their future. Their imagination attributed to IS a capacity to promote their social status and restore justice that was more a matter of fantasy than reality....

The Birth of the Islamic State and its Impact on European Youth

Since 2013, a major event occurred in the Middle East. A jihadi group founded a new state in June 2014 with a territory that was, at its heights, as vast as the United Kingdom under the name of the Islamic State in Syria and Sham (ISIS), and later on, simply the Islamic State (IS). Chapter 1 reveals how this event was a sea change in jihadism, not only in the Middle East but also in Europe and, more generally, worldwide. IS brought about a great transformation in the minds of European jihadis. European societies had not undergone major ruptures between the years 2000 and 2014, but the number of young people who became jihadi warriors, either internally (the so-called homegrown terrorists) or externally (the so-called Foreign Fighters) grew disproportionately between 2013 and 2016 in comparison to the pre-IS period. A key element was holding a territory as a state. It fundamentally changed the capacity of this jihadi organization. One essential characteristic of IS was its apocalyptic nature. The creation of the new caliphate in 2014 after a ninety-year interruption aroused new hopes in many parts of the Sunni world, traumatized by the failure of nationalism and pan-Arabism and eager to rekindle its lost glory. The attraction of radical Islamic utopias promising revenge against inhospitable European societies pushed a tiny minority of them toward violent action in the name of Allah, in particular after the creation of IS that galvanized them in that sense.

The European Societies and Jihadism

The introductory chapter gives insight into the major topics of the book. It stresses the fact that the major actors of jihadism were of Muslim immigration origin but also include a minority of middle-class converts from secular Europe. The notion of “total social fact,” coined by Marcel Mauss, a major French anthropologist, is used to give a comprehensive picture of jihadism as a social phenomenon involving urban sociology (many came from the so-called poor districts, but also some came from some middle-class districts), ethnic relations (Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Moroccan, Algerian), national political culture (in France Laïcité, in Great Britain multiculturalism), family (the crisis in family among many jihadis), gender (a significant minority), and generation. From my viewpoint, all these aspects are to be taken into account in order to make sense of jihadism in Europe.

The European Nations and Their Jihadis

The comparative analysis of jihadis in different European countries is of major significance. Chapter 5 focuses on the ethnic and national origin of migrants and their sons in Europe, the political culture of the host European country, and the social and economic process of the integration of migrants’ progenies within each European country. In France, for instance, laïcité is a distinguishing feature compared to the rest of Europe. Likewise, English multiculturalism is a characteristic that affects immigrants in the UK differently from those in other countries. These differences in political culture among various countries may provide important information regarding the factors that led to jihadism. Still, the common denominator among disaffected youth in Europe was a strong sense of non-belonging among the European jihadis. IS was quick to exploit the enduring malaise of young Muslims, middle-class or disaffected, into a massive fascination through its promises of reconquered dignity, economic promotion, and the status of hero in the war against the Infidels.

The Jihadis and the Family

Chapter 4 examines the ways in which the circumstances and dynamics of a family can affect the decisions and behavior of its members, including decisions leading to jihadism. Regarding Europeans jihadis, in many cases the analysis of their family background sheds light on their radicalization. Some configurations, such as the single-parent family or stepfamily, play a role in young people’s radicalization, particularly broken families, especially among Muslims living in ghettoized neighborhoods. Some people used family as the setting for their violent action: brothers, sisters, cousins, and, more exceptionally, fathers or mothers. For others, coming from broken families, jihadi violence was a continuation of family violence. In some cases, members of crisis-stricken families (brothers, cousins) were reconciled through their joint participation in jihadi action. Three types of families in crisis can be mentioned: the headless patriarchal family, the neo-traditional family, and the stepfamily. All of them are marked by the crisis of authority in the home, which can lead to feelings of guilt (self-blame) or injustice. These feelings, in some cases, can contribute to a person’s involvement in jihadism. One can also distinguish jihadi “fratriarchy” (brotherhood), and “jihadophile” families.

Subcultures of Humiliation and Counter-Humiliation

Chapter 2 discusses the fact that jihadism cannot be solely attributed to the disaffected young Muslims. A sizeable minority of jihadis consists of converts (from 8 percent to more than 20 percent, according to the European countries), as well as middle-class Muslims. Nevertheless, male disaffected Muslim youth, mostly from the first and the second generations, living chiefly in ghettoized neighborhoods, represent the major part of the jihadis in Europe. They come from at least three types of “slum subculture” which are marked by poverty, humiliation, and discontent. These are: the European slum subculture proper, the subculture of religious introversion (Salafism and Tabligh), and the subculture of violent religious confrontation (jihadism). These themes of poverty, humiliation, and discontent are discussed at length in this chapter and are reflected in interviews presented throughout, which were conducted by the author with some of the young men affected by these conditions. Also discussed are the ways in which secular society and its social freedoms contribute to the frustration and discontent expressed by these individuals.